Experiment-inspired comments on John Roemer’s theory of cooperation

Abstract

We report on a nonsocial experiment where we find that all participants choose the dominant strategy in the experimental payoff, and compare it with the payoff-isomorphic, but social, Prisoner’s Dilemma treatment presented in a recent paper by Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre where 28% choose cooperation instead of the dominant strategy. The contrast reinforces Roemer’s emphasis on human cooperation. Next, we argue that Roemer’s Simple Kantian Equilibrium works well as a theory of cooperation under the assumption of monotonicity (positive or negative externalities), but not when efficient cooperation requires the division of labor by coordinating dissimilar tasks.     

The CE-mark and the new European approach to product law: a system of fundamental legal safety requirements and technical specification standards

European product law consists of three parts: product liability law, a general product safety regulation and an increasing number of provisions with requirements on product group level. In recent years this third part has been revised in order to speed up the completion of the European single market. This article describes the development from the negative integration of member states’ markets to the positive integration by supranational law. The CE-mark is the symbol of the new approach to the harmonization of European product safety requirements. The modular system of conformity assessment is an important characteristic of harmonization-based product law. Advantages and disadvantages of the new European product law are discussed from the perspective of ensuring the future of the consumers’ basic right to safety in an increasingly global and therefore international market.     

Non-market valuation of forest goods and services: Good practice guidelines

The European COST Action E45 on European Forest Externalities (EUROFOREX) participants developed a set of good practice guidelines for the non-market valuation of forests, elaborating on stated and revealed preference methodologies, as well as benefit transfer and meta-analytical procedures. This article presents a summary of the guidelines.     

Ownership Dynamics with Multiple Insiders: The Case of REITs

We study ownership dynamics of multiple strategic risk-averse insiders facing a moral hazard problem. We show that, when insiders cannot commit,  ex ante , to an ownership policy, the aggregate insider stake gradually declines toward the competitive market allocation. Both the speed of adjustment and the long-term equilibrium aggregate insider ownership level are greater for companies with a larger number of insiders,  ceteris paribus . Using data from U.S. real estate investment trusts, we then test the model and find that the predictions of the model are verified empirically.     

Social cooperatives,social welfare associations and social networks

We use an original data-set to study how participation in two types of non-profit organizations – i.e. social welfare associations and social cooperatives – affects individual social capital, understood as a network of cooperative relationships. Participation in both the types of organization allows members to start new social relations. However, social welfare associations seem to play a significantly greater role in the development of volunteers’ social capital, favouring the creation of weak ties that are used to exchange information and advice, and offering the opportunity to establish stronger ties entailing concrete mutual support. Within social cooperatives, workers appear to develop their individual social capital to a greater extent than volunteers. Our results suggest that the composition of the workforce, the depth of members’ involvement in the organization’s activities and the human resources strategies adopted by the management influence the creation of cooperative relations through on-the-job interactions.     

Cognitive bubbles

Smith et al. (Econometrica 56(5):1119, 1988) reported large bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets, a result that has been replicated many times. Here we test whether the occurrence of bubbles depends on the experimental subjects’ cognitive sophistication. In a two-part experiment, we first run a battery of tests to assess the subjects’ cognitive sophistication and classify them into low or high levels. We then invite them separately to two asset market experiments populated only by subjects with either low or high cognitive sophistication. We observe classic bubble and crash patterns in markets populated by subjects with low levels of cognitive sophistication. Yet, no bubbles or crashes are observed with our sophisticated subjects, indicating that cognitive sophistication of the experimental market participants has a strong impact on price efficiency.     

Cycles of Aggregate Behavior in Theory and Experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game (which we interpret as a borrower–lender relation), we study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching setup, and we test its predictions. The theoretical model provides conditions for changes in qualitative aggregate behavior in response to variations in structural parameters. While it turns out that Nash equilibrium is not a reliable predictor of average aggregate behavior, the experiment seems to confirm the qualitative predictions of the evolutionary model under structural changes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C9, E3.