Marx‐biased technical change and income distribution: A panel data analysis

This paper provides a further empirical evaluation of the Neoclassical theory of distribution as opposed to Marx‐biased technical change (MBTC) using a series of panel estimators. We argue that a panel data analysis is instrumental in increasing the efficiency and validity of the test. Our results generalize previous findings in providing support for MBTC and against the Neoclassical theory of income distribution.     

UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.     

Common Stock Returns in Corporate Takeover Bids: The Case of Brokerage House Acquisitions

This paper examines the common stock returns of three groups of bidders that purchased brokerage houses. Only in the cases of horizontal mergers, one brokerage house purchasing another, are there abnormal returns associated with the purchase. Neither bank holding company bidders nor non-financial bidders gain significantly when purchasing a brokerage house. Bank holding company bidders face considerable regulatory delays, and these economic disturbances may eliminate their gains. Bank holding company expansion into these non-bank activities does not appear, at the time of announcement, to either hurt or benefit them; hence, this expansion does not appear to further the loss exposure of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.     

A model of fractional cointegration, and tests for cointegration using the bootstrap

The paper proposes a framework for modelling cointegration in fractionally integrated processes, and considers methods for testing the existence of cointegrating relationships using the parametric bootstrap. In these procedures, ARFIMA models are fitted to the data, and the estimates used to simulate the null hypothesis of non-cointegration in a vector autoregressive modelling framework. The simulations are used to estimate p-values for alternative regression-based test statistics, including the F goodness-of-fit statistic, the Durbin–Watson statistic and estimates of the residual d. The bootstrap distributions are economical to compute, being conditioned on the actual sample values of all but the dependent variable in the regression. The procedures are easily adapted to test stronger null hypotheses, such as statistical independence. The tests are not in general asymptotically pivotal, but implemented by the bootstrap, are shown to be consistent against alternatives with both stationary and nonstationary cointegrating residuals. As an example, the tests are applied to the series for UK consumption and disposable income. The power properties of the tests are studied by simulations of artificial cointegrating relationships based on the sample data. The F test performs better in these experiments than the residual-based tests, although the Durbin–Watson in turn dominates the test based on the residual d.     

Voting Rights and Market Reaction to Dual Class Common Stock Issues

This paper examines the return of the original class of common stock around the announcement of the creation of a second class of stock. As in previous studies, this one finds a generally ambiguous market reaction on the first public announcement. However, this paper offers new evidence that both the voting rights and the compensation for loss of voting rights are important determinants of the market's reaction. Specifically, it demonstrates that a second class stock issue that contains no compensation for the lost voting rights results in negative returns. When the original stockholders are compensated for lost voting rights, they experience positive abnormal returns.     

Electronic data interchange: a strategic approach

The potential of EDI is virtually unlimited, but the success of any EDI initiative hinges on its ability to directly support strategies that achieve your institution's business objectives. At its most fundamental level, EDI technology automates current business practices, speeding up the exchange of business information. This application of EDI most often is found in a hospital's material management department. But EDI integrated internally within a hospital and externally with suppliers and vendors has the potential to go beyond simple automation and to transform processes. This is where the full value of EDI can be realized. No matter which level of EDI participation hospital management decides is appropriate to fulfill its business objectives and strategies, EDI will affect the entire institution's exchange of information with its internal and external audiences. The question management must answer is: Will the hospital's EDI strategy be offensive and managed, or defensive and reactive? Today's environment leaves no room for a "no-strategy" EDI option. The options are either to proactively shape EDI, or reactively play catch-up. EDI can work for you. Adequately developing an EDI game plan in support of your business objectives and calling on your suppliers and other trading partners to work with you will ensure EDI is an asset to your facility.     

Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls,culture and tail risk

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives’ behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs.