Hedging performance of multiscale hedge ratios

In this study, the wavelet multiscale model is applied to selected assets to hedge time-dependent exposure of an agent with a preference for a certain hedging horizon. Based on the in-sample and out-of-sample portfolio variances, the wavelet-based generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model produces the lowest variances. From a utility standpoint, wavelet networks combined with GARCH have the highest utility. Finally, the wavelet-GARCH model has the lowest minimum capital risk requirements. Overall, the wavelet GARCH and wavelet networks offer improvements over traditional hedging models.     

Valuation Effects of Short Sale Constraints: the Case of Corporate Takeovers

We examine the relation between the degree of short sale constraints for acquiring firms' equity and post takeover stock performance. We find that negative long‐run abnormal returns appear to decline (in economic and statistical terms) as the extent and persistence of institutional block‐holder ownership increase, after accounting for the size, book‐to‐market and method of payment effects. In the spirit of Miller (1977) , such evidence implies that the degree of short sale constraints serves as an important determinant of acquiring firms' short‐run overpricing. It appears that the presence of concentrated institutional presence mitigates and in most cases eliminates, through effective arbitrage, any short‐run overpricing that may be responsible for the long‐run underperformance of acquirers, preserving in this way efficiency in the takeover markets.     

Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions Around the World: New Evidence

Using a global M&A data set, this paper provides evidence that the empirical observations relating public acquisitions to, at best, zero abnormal returns, and their stock-financed subset to negative abnormal returns for acquiring firms around the deal announcement are not unanimous across countries. Acquirers beyond the most competitive takeover markets (the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada) pay lower premia and realize gains, while share-for-share offers are at least non-value-destroying for their shareholders. In contrast, target shareholders within these markets gain significantly less, implying that the benefits generated are more evenly split between the involved parties.     

Does Firing a CEO Pay Off?

We examine whether involuntary chief executive officer (CEO) replacements pay off by improving firm prospects. We find CEO successors’ acquisition investments to be associated with significantly higher shareholder gains relative to their predecessors and the average CEO. This improvement in postturnover acquisition performance appears to be a function of board independence, hedge fund ownership, and the new CEO's relative experience. CEO successors also create sizable shareholder value by reversing prior investments through asset disposals and discontinuing operations and by employing more efficient investment strategies. Our evidence suggests that firing a CEO pays off.     

Divergence of Opinion and Post-Acquisition Performance

Abstract:  We examine the relation between divergence of opinion about the value of the acquiring firm in the pre-acquisition announcement period and post-acquisition stock returns. We find that acquirers subject to high opinion dispersion earn lower future returns than acquirers subject to low dispersion. It appears that, on average, only acquirers in the high divergence of opinion subset experience significant negative post-event abnormal returns. In the spirit of Miller (1977) , such evidence implies that high pre-event investor disagreement leads to systematic overpricing of acquirers that manifests itself through long-run underperformance of their stock. The documented misvaluation persists irrespective of the opinion divergence proxy and performance evaluation method used and after controlling for several common deal and acquirer characteristics.