USING RANDOMIZED CONTROL DESIGNS IN EVALUATING SOCIAL SECTOR PROGRAMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Seven case studies—from Bolivia, Colombia, Indonesia,Mexico, Nicaragua, Taiwan (China), and Turkey—demonstratethe feasibility of conducting rigorous impact evaluations indeveloping countries using randomized control designs. Thisexperience, covering a wide variety of settings and social programs,offers lessons for task managers and policymakers interestedin evaluating social sector investments. The main conclusions are: first, policymakers interested inassessing the effectiveness of a project ought to consider arandomized control design because such evaluations not onlyare feasible but also yield the most robust results. Second,the acute resource constraints common in developing countriesthat often make program rationing unavoidable also present opportunitiesfor adopting randomized control designs. Policymakers and programmanagers need to be alert to the opportunities for buildingrandomized control designs into development programs right fromthe start of the project cycle because they, more than academicresearchers or evaluation experts, are in the best positionto ensure that opportunities for rigorous evaluations are exploited.      

The Willingness to Pay for Education for Daughters in Contrast to Sons: Evidence from Rural Peru

In most of the developing world the education of women lagsbehind that of men. This could come about from a lack of parentaldesire for educated daughters or from a perception by the parentsthat there is a lower net return to education for girls. Therelation between gender and education in rural Peru is exploredusing data from the 1985–86 Peru Living Standards Survey.A model of educational choice is developed. The estimated demandfunctions are used to assess the impact of user fees on demandand revenues. The empirical evidence indicates that parentsare more willing to pay for reduced travel time to secondaryschool for boys than for girls. However, parents are willingto pay increased fees for girls' schooling sufficient to generateteachers' salaries.     

How firm capabilities affect who benefits from foreign technology

We explore how firm capabilities affect the diffusion of technology brought with foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a panel dataset on Indonesian manufacturers from 1988 to 1996, we measure how the productivity of differing domestic firms responds to the entry of multinational competitors. We find that firms with investments in research and development and firms with highly educated employees adopt more technology from foreign entrants than others. In contrast, firms that have a small “technology gap,” meaning that they are close to the international best-practice frontier, benefit less than firms with weak prior technical competency. This finding suggests that the marginal return to new knowledge is greater for firms that have more room to “catch up” than it is for already competitive firms.     

Regulation and the provision of quality to heterogenous consumers: The case of prospective pricing of medical services

This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixed-price regulation of services in a model in which consumers are heterogenous and a firm can endogenously quality discriminate. We consider two different scenarios: The first scenario is when the consumer is also the payer. The second scenario is when the payer (usually the government) is not the consumer. Our major result is that fixed-price regulation causes a distributional welfare loss. We show that it is not possible for fixed-price regulation to induce providers to supply all consumer types with the first-best quality even under perfect information, under either pricing scenario. We show that high and low demand types may receive more than their respective first-best qualities, less than their first-best qualities, or one type may receive more and the other type less depending on the level of the regulated price. It is always true that when consumers are payers, quality is higher for both types than when consumers are not the payers. In this paper, we motivate and discuss the results in terms of price regulation of hospitals where consumers are patients and patient types vary by severity of illness.     

Central Bank Communication and Financial Market Comovements in the Euro Area

Open Economies Review - We examine whether unscheduled communication of members of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Governing Council affects financial market comovements. To assess...     

The information in the high-yield bond spread for the business cycle: evidence and some implications

The market for high-yield (below-investment-grade) corporatebonds developed in the middle 1980s. We show that, since thistime, the high-yield spread has had significant explanatorypower for the business cycle. We interpret this finding as possiblysymptomatic of financial factors at work in the business cycle,along the lines suggested by the financial accelerator. We alsoshow that over this period the high-yield spread outperformsother leading financial indicators, including the term spread,the paper-bill spread, and the Federal Funds rate. We conjecturethat changes in the conduct of monetary policy over time mayaccount for the reduced informativeness of these alternativeindicators, all of which are tied closely to monetary policy.     

Monetary randomness and investment

This paper develops a neoclassical model in which the behavior of the money supply affects investment by affecting the real distribution of asset returns. Investment depends on wealthholders' demand for capital. A stochastic money growth rule influences portfolio choice by affecting the distribution of the inflation rate. The variance of inflation matters to wealthholders because of the existence of assets with returns that are not indexed to changes in the price level: money and bonds which are contracted in nominal terms. In a rational expectations environment, asset demands will thus be sensitive to the distribution of the money growth rate. Our principle conclusion is that an increase in the variance of the money growth rate lowers investment, which complements Tobin's (1965) result that an increase in the mean stimulates capital accumulation. The paper also represents a step toward incorporating an asset market into a macroeconomic model in a manner which takes account of Lucas' (1976) criticism of econometric policy evaluation. All variables in the model, including asset return distributions, are functions of technology, preferences and the money supply rule. Further, expectations are rational.     

Welfare gains from Foreign Direct Investment through technology transfer to local suppliers

We hypothesize that multinational firms operating in emerging markets transfer technology to local suppliers to increase their productivity and to lower input prices. To avoid hold-up by any single supplier, the foreign firm must make the technology widely available. This technology diffusion induces entry and more competition which lowers prices in the supply market. As a result, not just the foreign-owned firm, but all firms downstream of that supply market obtain lower prices. We test this hypothesis using a panel dataset of Indonesian manufacturing establishments. We find strong evidence of productivity gains, greater competition, and lower prices among local firms in markets that supply foreign entrants. The technology transfer is Pareto improving — output and profits increase for firms in both the supplier and buyer sectors. Further, the technology transfer generates an externality that benefits buyers in other sectors downstream from the supply sector as well. This externality may provide a justification for policy intervention to encourage foreign investment.     

Regulation,Local Monopolies and Spatial Competition

Many regulated industries involve an oligopoly market structure. We examine optimal incentive regulation for a duopoly model of spatial competition when firms have private cost information. Market structure is endogenous as regulation determines market segments for firms and output distribution across consumers in each firm's market. By varying the assignment of consumers to firms, a relatively more efficient firm can be rewarded with a larger market, thus reducing quantity incentive distortions. We derive the optimal policy, assess the impact of asymmetric information relative to full information, and examine extensions to allow for ex ante asymmetries in firm structure.