Identifying Price Reviews by Firms: An Econometric Approach

Price reviews are a potentially costly activity. A significant fraction of unchanged prices may stem from firms not reviewing prices, rather than from obstacles to changing prices per se, such as menu costs. In this paper, we disentangle these two causes of price stickiness by estimating an inflated ordered probit model on a panel of French manufacturing firms. The results point to a low frequency of price reviews, suggestive of the relevance of information costs as a determinant of the observed price stickiness. In view of the “inattentive producers” literature, pointing that the source of price rigidity matters, this is suggestive of a large real effect of monetary policy.     

MODELING THE INCIDENCE OF SELF‐EMPLOYMENT: INDIVIDUAL AND EMPLOYMENT TYPE HETEROGENEITY

Modeling the incidence of self‐employment has traditionally proved problematic. Although the supply‐side characteristics of the self‐employed are well documented, we argue that the literature has neglected demand‐side aspects. We explore the determinants of self‐employment using the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances. We present results from an econometric framework that allows us to model, separately and simultaneously, the influences of individual heterogeneity (i.e., supply‐side factors) and employment type heterogeneity (i.e., demand‐side factors) on the probability of self‐employment. Our findings suggest that while individual characteristics are important determinants of self‐employment, there are factors specific to the type of employment that influence self‐employment. (JEL J23, J33, C25, C10)     

Financial disclosure effects on labor contracts: A Nash analysis

Abstract. This study investigated the role of financial information disclosure on union-management preferences for labor contract outcomes. The effect of accounting information on negotiated outcome proximity to Nash equilibrium outcomes was also examined. Both the extent and credibility of financial information disclosure as well as dyadic and team negotiations were examined. Conjoint analysis was used to measure union and management preferences for contract attributes. Results indicated insignificant conjoint part worth differences on union and management contractual preferences under both accounting information and team negotiation treatments. Actual contractual outcomes were significantly correlated with Nash predictions, and information disclosure had a marginally significant effect on the proximity of actual to predicted outcomes. Résumé. Les auteurs étudient le rôle de la présentation d'informations financières dans les préférences du syndicat et de la direction en ce qui a trait au contrat de travail final. Ils s'intéressent également à l'incidence de l'information comptable lorsque les conventions négociées se rapprochent de l'équilibre de Nash. L'étendue et la crédibilité de l'information financière présentée ainsi que les négociations dyadiques et collectives sont aussi objet d'étude. Les auteurs ont recours à l'analyse conjointe pour mesurer les préférences du syndicat et de la direction à l'égard des attributs du contrat de travail. Les résultats indiquent des écarts non significatifs dans la valeur conjointe partielle associée par le syndicat et la direction aux attributs du contrat, par suite du traitement de l'information comptable ainsi que de la négociation collective. Le contrat final qui résulte présente une corrélation significative avec les prévisions de Nash, et la communication d'informations a une incidence marginale sur l'analogie entre les résultats réels et les résultats prévus.