Economic nationalism and economic integration: the Austro‐Hungarian Empire in the late nineteenth century 1

This article seeks to square two seemingly contradictory strands in the literature on economic development in the late nineteenth‐century Habsburg Empire. On the one hand, there is an extensive historiography stressing the rise of nationalism and its close correlate of growing efforts to organize economic life along ethno‐linguistic lines. On the other, there is a substantial body of research that emphasizes significant improvements in market integration across the empire as an outcome of the diffusion of industrialization and an expanding railway network, among other factors. In this article, it is argued that the process of market integration was systematically asymmetric, shaped by intensifying intra‐empire nationality conflicts. While grain markets in Austria‐Hungary became overall more integrated over time, they also became systematically biased: regions with a similar ethno‐linguistic composition of their population came to display significantly smaller price gaps between each other than regions with different compositions. The emergence and persistence of this differential integration cannot be explained by changes in infrastructure and transport costs, simple geographical features, asymmetric integration with neighbouring regions abroad, or communication problems. Instead, differential market integration along ethno‐linguistic lines was driven by the formation of ethno‐linguistic networks due to intensifying conflict between groups—economic nationalism mattered.     

The imposed gift of Versailles: the fiscal effects of restricting the size of Germany's armed forces, 1924–9

Weimar's politicians used to attribute the continuous budget crises after the currency stabilization of 1923–4 to the burden put on the German economy by the Treaty of Versailles, in particular the reparation payments. This argument, which is still popular, neglects the fact that the restriction of the German military to 115,000 men relieved the German central budget considerably. In a counterfactual analysis we assess the savings in additional military costs and compare them to the reparation payments. Depending on the character of the foreign policy pursued by an unrestricted Germany, we find that the net effect of the Treaty's stipulations on the German central budgets was either much lower than hitherto thought or even positive. This finding gives support to the argument that Germany suffered from home‐made political failure even in the relatively stable period from 1924 to 1929.     

Distinguished Fellow of the Economic Society of Australia, 2007: Yew-Kwang Ng

This article surveys the work of Yew-Kwang Ng who, in 2007, was elected Distinguished Fellow of the Economic Society of Australia. Emphasis is given to the distinctive, wide ranging and original aspects of his work.     

The Significance of the Profit and Loss Account in Nineteenth-Century Britain: A Reassessment

This article presents a reassessment of the development of regulated financial disclosure in nineteenth-century British companies legislation. Most accounting historians have emphasized the importance of the balance sheet under the disclosure requirements of various Acts. The relative importance of the profit and loss account has been largely neglected by historians. This paper contends that the profit and loss account was a considerably more important document in the financial regulation of companies than previously contemplated. In fact, the profit and loss account was required in the disclosure regulations of numerous Acts, including the Joint Stock Banks Act (1844), the Regulation of Railways Act (1868), the Life Assurance Companies Act (1870) and the Building and Friendly Societies Act (1874).     

International Business Cycle and Financial Intermediation

The paper extends a standard two‐country international real business cycle model to include financial intermediation by banks of loans and government bonds. The paper contributes an explanation for both the United States relative to the Euro‐area, and the United States relative to China, of cross‐country correlations of loan rates, deposit rates, and the loan premia. It shows a type of financial retrenchment for the United States relative to both Europe and China following a negative bank productivity shock, such as during the 2008 crisis. After 2008, results suggest that the Euro‐area has been more financially integrated with the United States, and China less financially integrated.     

Money Velocity in an Endogenous Growth Business Cycle with Credit Shocks

The paper sets the neoclassical monetary business cycle model within endogenous growth, adds exchange credit shocks, and finds that money and credit shocks explain much of the velocity variations. The role of the shocks varies across subperiods in an intuitive fashion. Endogenous growth is key to the construction of the money and credit shocks because these have similar effects on velocity, but opposite effects upon growth. The model matches the data's average velocity and simulates well velocity volatility. Its Cagan-like money demand means that money and credit shocks cause greater velocity variation, the higher is the nominal interest rate.