Employment and hours of work

This paper develops a dynamic model of the labor market in which the degree of substitution between employment and hours of work is determined as part of a search equilibrium. Each firm chooses its demand for working hours and number of vacancies, and the earnings profile is determined by Nash bargaining. The earnings profile is generally nonlinear in hours of work, and defines the trade-off between employment and hours of work. Concave production technology induces firms to overemploy and, as a result, hours of work are below their optimal level. The Hosios condition is not sufficient for efficiency. When there are two industries, workers employed by firms with higher recruitment costs work longer and earn more. That is, “good jobs” require longer hours of work. Interestingly, technology differentials cannot account for working hours differentials.     

PRECAUTIONARY DEMAND FOR LABOUR AND FIRM SIZE

This paper studies firms' job creation decisions in a labour market with search frictions. A simple labour market search model is developed in which a firm can search for a second employee while producing with a first worker, and this creates the equilibrium size distribution of firms. A firm expands employment even if the instantaneous payoff to a large firm is less than that of staying small – a firm has a precautionary motive to expand its size. In addition, this motive is enhanced by a greater market tightness. Because of this effect, firms’ decisions become interdependent – a firm creates a vacancy if it expects other firms to do the same, creating strategic complementarity among firms and thereby self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria. An increase in productivity can cause a qualitative change in labour market tightness and the rate of unemployment.     

Public capital, public pension, and growth

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations, whose engine of economic growth is productive public capital. We investigate a public policy under which the government allocates tax revenue between investment in public capital accumulation and public pension provision. We show that increasing the share of spending on public pensions always reduces economic growth. However, we show numerically that public pension provision improves social welfare and there exists an optimal share of spending on public pension provision unless the value of the time discount factor of the government is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show that in an economy facing an aging population, an increase in social security provision for the old rather than an increase in public investment can be preferable from the viewpoint of social welfare.     

UNEMPLOYMENT POLICIES IN AN ECONOMY WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

This paper studies the effects of unemployment policies in a simple static general equilibrium model with adverse selection in the labour market. Firms offer a contract that induces the self‐selection of workers. In equilibrium, all unskilled workers are screened out and some skilled workers are rationed out. It is shown that the provision of unemployment insurance raises involuntary unemployment by encouraging adverse selection, while unemployment assistance – or subsidy to unemployment – reduces involuntary unemployment. A simple efficiency wage model is also presented to show that either of the two policies reduces employment by taxing effort and subsidizing shirking. The key is whether the social role of unemployment is a sorting device or a worker discipline device.     

Is an unfunded social security system good or bad for growth? A theoretical analysis of social security systems financed by VAT

This study investigates how unfunded public pensions financed by value added tax (VAT), as discussed in Japan, affect economic growth and whether payroll tax (PT) or VAT is the more growth‐friendly tax structure for financing public pensions. We examine these issues using overlapping generations models with parental altruism and find that a public pension system financed by VAT may increase economic growth when bequests are operative. By contrast, when bequests are inoperative, public pensions hinder growth unless agents are sufficiently patient. Finally, public pensions financed by VAT are more growth‐friendly than those financed by PT.     

Tight money policies and inflation revisited

In this paper we reconsider the link between tight money policies and inflation in the spirit of Sargent and Wallace's (1981) influential paper, 'Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.' A standard neoclassical model with capital, bonds, and return-dominated currency is used. The potential for tight-money policies to be inflationary (unpleasant arithmetic) exists, even when the real interest rate is below the growth rate of the economy. Additionally, the likely observability of unpleasant arithmetic in real world economies is shown to depend crucially on the type of monetary policy rule that is used. JEL Classification: E52, E63
Un autre coup d'œil sur la relation entre politiques monétaires restrictives et inflation. Ce mémoire ré-examine la relation entre politiques monétaires restrictives et inflation dans l'esprit du travail de Sargent et Wallace (1981) 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic'. Les auteurs utilisent un modèle néo-classique standard avec capital, débentures et une monnaie dont les rendements sont dominés par ceux d'autres réservoirs de valeur. La possibilité que les politiques monétaires restrictives soient inflationnistes existe même quand le taux d'intérêt réel est plus petit que le taux de croissance de l'économie De plus on montre que l'obtention de ces résultats déplaisants dans les économies concrètes dépend fondamentalement du type de règle monétaire qu'on utilise.