Hayek on the essential dispersion of market knowledge

The Review of Austrian Economics - A key insight in Hayek’s thought is the importance of so-called “local knowledge” in economic activity. In The Fatal Conceit, he states that...     

Allegations of Sexual Misconduct: A View from the Observation Deck of Power Distance Belief

Journal of Business Ethics - We seek to understand how third-party observers respond to allegations of sexual transgressions, whether their responses vary and if so why, how they determine...     

Why and when organizational culture fosters affective commitment among knowledge workers: the mediating role of perceived psychological contract fulfilment and moderating role of organizational tenure

Drawing on Denison and Mishra (1995)’s framework of organizational culture, this study examines why and when organizational culture is related to knowledge workers’ affective commitment. Data were collected from 640 employees working in three high-technology companies in China. The findings indicate that the relationship between organizational culture and affective commitment is mediated by perceived psychological contract fulfilment. In addition, organizational tenure moderates the relationship between two external dimensions (i.e. adaptability and mission) of organizational culture and perceived psychological contract fulfilment. This study extends the current theoretical framework of organizational culture by demonstrating the underlying mechanism and the boundary condition of the relationship between organizational culture and affective commitment. The findings also provide practical implications for international managers to design appropriate human resource management policies and practices in China.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Experimental investigation into the role of trust in collusion

Trust has traditionally been regarded as conducive to ethical decision making. However, empirical studies on the relationship between trust and ethical decision making are rare, especially those concerning the negative effects of trust. Therefore, our study aimed to provide empirical evidence in this area. An experiment was designed to investigate whether trusted parties are more likely than non‐trusted parties to enter into a collusion that will have unfair consequences for a third party. The results showed that trusted parties are significantly more likely to collude than are non‐trusted parties. Furthermore, an ancillary analysis revealed the mechanism of trust. First, participants with a stronger need to collude were the most likely to collude in the trust group. Second, experimental and hypothetical settings generated different results, and we suspect that real harm plays a vital role. Overall, we conclude that the absence of trust serves as an impediment to collusion.     

The importance of career goal in relation to academic performance: a case study of hospitality management students

ABSTRACT

Hospitality management programs have commonly offered exclusive learning opportunities to talented students in order to keep “brains” in the industry. While academic performance indices are often used to identify “brains” in the education sector, scant research has empirically examined whether “brains” are intended to stay in the industry. This study surveyed 304 hospitality management students and examined the relationships between their career-goal related factors and academic performance. Findings indicate that career goal and positive job valence toward the hospitality industry are significantly related to academic performance. The results of this study contribute to the limited literature on the relationship between career goal and academic performance.     

“Retail is detail! Give consumers a gift rather than a bundle”: Promotion framing and consumer product returns

Retailers often use the promotion strategy of offering supplementary products (e.g., free gift, bundle) to attract consumers and increase sales. Despite the growing literature on the promotions that are differently framed but offer economically identical values, little research has examined the link between promotion framing and consumer product returns. The current article sheds light on this relationship, hypothesizing that a free gift promotion would be superior to a bundle promotion in reducing consumer product returns. The findings suggest that a gift‐framed promotion leads to a lower product return intention than an economically equivalent bundle promotion, because consumers tend to perceive more loss from giving up the gift‐framed (vs. bundle‐framed) deal. Further, this study examines a moderating role of brand familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) and shows that the merits of free gift framing on product return intention via perceived loss are amplified (attenuated) when the promoted brand is familiar (unfamiliar). Overall, the investigations of this study imply that it is better to frame a promotion as a “free gift” than a “bundle” to increase perceived loss in returning the purchase and thus to decrease consumer product returns. This strategic intervention works especially when the gift is offered by familiar brands.     

Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists.