Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze priceformation and liquidity in a non-anonymous environment withsimilarities to the floor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis isthat the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probabilitythat a trader trades on the basis of private information. Heuses this knowledge to price discriminate. This can be achievedby quoting a large spread and granting price improvement totraders deemed uninformed. Consistent with our hypothesis wefind that price improvement reflects lower adverse selectioncosts but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit.Further, the quote adjustment following transactions at thequoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustmentafter transactions at prices inside the spread. Our resultsindicate that anonymity comes at the cost of higher adverseselection risk. JEL Classification: G10.     

Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze price formationand liquidity in a non-anonymous environment with similarities to thefloor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis is that the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probability that atrader trades on the basis of private information. He uses this knowledgeto price discriminate. This can be achieved by quoting a large spread and granting price improvement to traders deemed uninformed.Consistent with our hypothesis we find that price improvement reflects loweradverse selection costs but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit. Further, the quote adjustmentfollowing transactions at the quoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustment aftertransactions at prices inside the spread. Our results indicate that anonymity comes at the cost ofhigher adverse selection risk.     

Market Response to Investor Sentiment

This paper reconsiders the effect of investor sentiment on stock prices. Our main contribution is that, in addition to the intermediate term return predictability, we also analyze the immediate price reaction to the publication of survey‐based investor sentiment indicators. We find that the sign of the immediate market response is the same as that of the predictability at intermediate time horizons. This is consistent with underreaction to cash flow news or with investor sentiment being related to mispricing. It is inconsistent with the alternative explanations of a rational response to cash flow news or sentiment indicators providing information about future expected returns.     

Competition between Exchanges: Euronext versus Xetra

Exchanges in Europe are in a process of consolidation. After the failure of the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and Euronext, these two groups are likely to become the nuclei for further mergers and co‐operation with currently independent exchanges. A decision for one of the groups entails a decision for the respective trading platform. Against that background we evaluate the attractiveness of the two dominant continental European trading systems. Though both are anonymous electronic limit order books, there are important differences in the trading protocols. We use a matched‐sample approach to compare execution costs in Euronext Paris and Xetra. We find that both quoted and effective spreads are lower in Xetra. The differences are more pronounced for less liquid stocks. When decomposing the spread we find no systematic differences in the adverse selection component. Realised spreads, on the other hand, are significantly higher in Euronext. Neither differences in the number of liquidity provision agreements nor differences in the minimum tick size or in the degree of domestic competition for order flow explain the different spread levels. We thus conclude that Xetra is the more efficient trading system.     

Setting a fox to keep the geese — Does the comply-or-explain principle work?

The German Corporate Governance Code works according to the comply-or-explain principle. One of its recommendations was to publish the remuneration of the members of the executive board on an individual basis. We examine the characteristics of the firms that complied with the code requirement. Our results indicate that firms that paid higher average remunerations to their management board members were less likely to comply, whereas firms with higher Tobin's Q were more likely to comply. We also document a non-monotonic relation between ownership concentration and the probability of compliance that is consistent with standard corporate governance arguments.Due to the fact that the number of firms complying with the disclosure requirement was low, a new law was passed that mandates disclosure unless the shareholders' meeting (with a 75% majority) decides otherwise. We find that this “loophole” in the new legislation is exploited by smaller firms, firms with comparatively high levels of executive remuneration, and firms with concentrated ownership. We discuss the implications of our results for the effectiveness of the comply-or-explain regulation.     

Illiquidity transmission from spot to futures markets

We develop a model of illiquidity transmission from spot to futures markets that formalizes the derivative hedge theory of Cho and Engle (1999). The model shows that spot market illiquidity does not translate one to one to the futures market but, rather, interacts with price risk, liquidity risk, and the risk aversion of the market maker. The model's predictions are tested empirically with data from the stock market and markets for single-stock futures and index futures. The results support our model and show that the derivative hedge theory provides an explanation for the liquidity link between spot and futures markets.     

Knowing me, knowing you: : Trader anonymity and informed trading in parallel markets

In this paper we empirically analyze whether the degree of trader anonymity is related to the probability of information-based trading. We use data from the German stock market where non-anonymous traditional floor based exchanges co-exist with an anonymous computerized trading system. We use an extended version of the Easley et al. (J. Finance 51 (1996) 1405) model that allows for simultaneous estimation for two parallel markets. We find that the probability of informed trading is significantly lower in the floor based trading system. We further document that the size of the spread and the adverse selection component are positively related to the estimated probabilities of information-based trading.     

Price discovery in spot and futures markets: a reconsideration

We reconsider the issue of price discovery in spot and futures markets. We use a threshold error correction model to allow for arbitrage opportunities to have an impact on the return dynamics. We estimate the model using quote midpoints, and we modify the model to account for time-varying transaction costs. We find that (a) the futures market leads in the process of price discovery and (b) the presence of arbitrage opportunities has a strong impact on the dynamics of the price discovery process.     

Who knows what when? The information content of pre-IPO market prices

To resolve the IPO underpricing puzzle it is essential to analyze who knows what when during the issuing process. In Germany, broker-dealers make a market in IPOs that starts as soon as the offer range is published. We examine these pre-IPO prices and find that they are highly informative. They are closer to the first price subsequently established on the exchange than both the midpoint of the offer range and the offer price. The pre-IPO prices explain a large part of the underpricing left unexplained by other variables. The results imply that information asymmetries are much lower than the observed variance of underpricing suggests. They cast doubt on the informational role of bookbuilding and the relevance of the winner's curse problem.