Missionaries,Mercenaries Or Car Salesmen? MBA Teaching In Malaysia*

Increasing academic attention is being given to the role of management gurus, consultants, managers and academic researchers in the international diffusion of Western management ideas. This is part of wider debates on knowledge, power and globalization. Relatively little attention has been paid to the mechanisms through which diffusion takes place and, in particular, the role of academics as lecturers and business schools as disseminators of management knowledge at home and abroad. This paper draws on the authors' personal experiences and perceptions of teaching on an Executive MBA programme in Malaysia and those of their students.
Management education is growing rapidly in many regions of the world and has become highly commodified and commercialized, with Western universities competing in emerging markets for potentially lucrative local opportunities and foreign students or 'consumers'. Accordingly, the process of diffusion of Western management ideas is examined through a consumption perspective which treats the foreign MBA as a standardized commodity (much like the foreign car) with particular use, symbolic and exchange values. However, the limits of the consumption perspective in terms of both consumer sovereignty and subordination are also established in revealing deeper and more dynamic relations of power. Moreover, it is argued that while there are parallels with domestic consumption of MBAs, the teaching of MBAs in Malaysia generates added ambivalence among learners founded on global–local and development–imperialism dynamics and tensions.     

An examination into the causal logic of rent generation: contrasting Porter's competitive strategy framework and the resource‐based perspective

In this study we revisit some fundamental questions that are increasingly at the heart of current strategic management discourse regarding the relative impact of industry and firm‐specific factors on sustainable competitive advantage. We explore this issue by referring to respective assertions of two major perspectives that dominate the literature over the last two decades: the Porter framework of competitive strategy and the more recent resource‐based view of the firm. A composite model is proposed which elaborates upon both perspectives' divergent causal logic with respect to the conditions relevant for firm success. Empirical findings suggest that industry and firm specific effects are both important but explain different dimensions of performance. Where industry forces influence market performance and profitability, firm assets act upon accomplishments in the market arena (i.e., market performance), and via the latter, to profitability. The paper concludes with directions for future research that will seek to integrate both content and process aspects of firm behavior. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van     

On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

We show, by means of an example, that in models where default is subject to both collateral repossession and utility punishments, opportunities for doing Ponzi schemes are not always ruled out and (refined) equilibria may fail to exist. This is true even if default penalties are moderate as defined in Páscoa and Seghir (Game Econ Behav 65:270–286, 2009). In our example, asset promises and default penalties are chosen such that, if an equilibrium does exist, agents never default on their promises. At the same time collateral bundles and utility functions are such that the full repayment of debts implies that the asset price should be strictly larger than the cost of collateral requirements. This is sufficient to induce agents to run Ponzi schemes and destroy equilibrium existence.     

Strategic Decision Making: from Crisis to Opportunity

Managers can perceive and categorise problems as crisis, threat, familiar everyday nuisance or even opportunity. This article focuses on the extent to which this categorisation determines the process the organisation goes through in tackling the problem. Using the case history of a big externally-triggered decision in a chemical company to illustrate these distinctions, the authors show that the characteristics of the processes can vary a lot according to how the problem is perceived: and across many dimensions – procedural rationality, generation of alternatives, politicisation, timing and lateral and horizontal communication. They argue that top managers should not only pay particular attention to the manner in which strategic issues are perceived and labelled within the company and its systems, but even in some circumstances should 'manipulate' the information provided from external or internal systems. The case described here also illustrates the crucial role of middle managers in providing expertise and information during the making of strategic decisions. Finally, it points to ways in which management teams can avoid destructive conflict and engage in constructive conflict.     

Dreaming of Flying When Grounded: Occupational Identity and Occupational Fantasies of Furloughed Airline Pilots

This article analyses the effects of job loss on the occupational identities of a group of United States pilots, laid off (or ‘furloughed’) twice by their employer in the decade following 9/11. Using a narrative methodology, the paper examines how the childhood dream of flying, referred to as the Phaëthon dream, serves as an identity anchor that sustained their occupational identities. When the circumstances of the aviation industry (restructuring, outsourcing, and downsizing) led to extensive lay‐offs, this identity anchor functioned in two contrasting ways. Some pilots moved on to retrain and start new careers, without abandoning their occupational identities or relinquishing the dream of flying. Another group of pilots, however, were stuck in occupational limbo waiting to be recalled by their employer, unwilling to forsake this dream and refusing to contemplate a move that would decisively take them out of their pilot seats. The paper's contribution lies in theorizing how a dream originating in childhood, linked to a long‐standing archetype of flying and subsequently hardened into a shared occupational fantasy, acts as an identity anchor and how this shapes responses to the trauma of job loss. The paper concludes by linking the Phaëthon dream to its mythological counterpart in order to highlight its enduring, shared, and unconscious character.     

Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information

We introduce differential information in the asset market model studied by Cheng J Math Econ 20(1):137–152,1991, Dana and Le Van J Math Econ 25(3):263–280,1996 and Le Van and Truong Xuan J Math Econ 36(3): 241–254, 2001. We prove an equilibrium existence result assuming that the economy’s information structure satisfies the conditional independence property. If private information is not publicly verifiable, agents have incentives to misreport their types and therefore contracts may not be executed in the second period. We also show that under the conditional independence property equilibrium contracts are always executable.     

The cheapest hedge

Investors often wish to insure themselves against the payoff of their portfolios falling below a certain value. One way of doing this is by purchasing an appropriate collection of traded securities. However, when the derivatives market is not complete, an investor who seeks portfolio insurance will also be interested in the cheapest hedge that is marketed. Such insurance will not exactly replicate the desired insured-payoff, but it is the cheapest that can be achieved using the market.Analytically, the problem of finding a cheapest insuring portfolio is a linear programming problem. The present paper provides an alternative portfolio dominance approach to solving the minimum-premium insurance portfolio problem. This affords remarkably rich and intuitive insights to determining and describing the minimum-premium insurance portfolios.     

Is the value of an environmental public good sensitive to the providing institution?

In this paper we examine whether stated preferences and Willingness To Pay estimates, obtained in a choice experiment, are sensitive to the institutional context in which the good under evaluation is provided. Specifically, we examine the effects on valuation from employing two different institutions, an authority under the supervision of the National government and an authority under the supervision of an international body, the European Commission, as responsible for the design and implementation of a forest restoration project following a split sample approach. We find that coefficients of the utility model and Willingness To Pay estimates for all attributes are not statistically different between the two treatments. This is so despite the significant differences in the trust levels reported for the two institutions. We speculate that our results reflect the significance of the environmental good to the citizens given its local nature and the sheer size of the fire disaster.