What Does CEOs’ Pay-for-Performance Reveal About Shareholders’ Attitude Toward Earnings Overstatements?

If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of incentive pay prior to 2002. To corroborate our interpretation, we show that (i) CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities are higher among firms whose shareholders stand to benefit from overstatements; (ii) this cross-sectional relationship weakens significantly after SOX; and (iii) the within-firm decrease in pay-for-performance sensitivity is most pronounced among firms with high pre-SOX shareholder benefits from overstatements.     

Performance budgeting: effects on government debt and economic growth

This article examines the effects of performance budgeting on government debt and economic growth rates. The results show that countries with a higher share of ministries using performance targets in budget negotiation tend to have lower government debt and higher GDP growth rates. A simple fixed-effect model shows similar results. The evidence suggests that these results hold only in those countries with relatively lower corruption.     

Incentives,wages, and promotions: theory and evidence

I study an incentive problem that has been largely ignored in the agency literature: incentives for repeated (human capital) investment. The optimal contract is very simple but still provides rich implications for incentive and wage structures in large organizations. The empirical evidence is presented using personnel records of health insurance claim processors in a large U.S. insurance company. These processors are white‐collar, nonmanagerial, female, service industry workers—a rapidly growing but rarely studied labor group. The empirical findings are consistent with the main features of the optimal contract.     

Optimal Contracts for Long-Term Decisions and the Threat of Dismissal

This paper studies a simple agency model where an agent's decision can affect his or her own future payoffs as well as the principal's. The threat of dismissal becomes an important part of an incentive scheme even if the principal can use the performance-based wage contract. However, if the agent's future payoffs depend on the past realized performance, but not on the past decision directly, or if the agent is risk-neutral, it is not optimal to use the threat of dismissal. As the agent's discretion over his future payoffs increases, the principal relies more on the threat of dismissal but less on the wage contract.     

Job dissatisfaction of the self-employed in Indonesia

In developed countries, the self-employed have been found to be more satisfied with their jobs than paid employees. We found the exact opposite for a developing country after analyzing 8732 respondents in the Indonesian Family Life Survey. The job dissatisfaction of the self-employed was not fully explained by earnings, personal traits, job characteristics, anticipation, or adaptation, but mostly by segregation into a small number of industries with few job benefits. This finding is consistent with the dual labor market theory. We also found that among the self-employed, those with the highest probability of being paid employees were the least satisfied. Paid employment was highly sought after in developing countries, and these were presumably self-employed workers with high abilities. This finding cannot be explained by the dual labor market theory alone. To explain this inconsistency, we enriched this theory with relative deprivation. Our results suggest that the existence of the dual labor market and relative deprivation are important determinants of the job satisfaction of the self-employed in developing countries.     

Gender quota in the civil service and female participation: Evidence from Nepal

Female quotas for high-ranking positions in corporations and governments should (i) increase the hiring of women and (ii) inspire more women to apply for these positions. The goal will be that eventually, (iii) even without the quota, more women will apply to and succeed in high-ranked positions. This paper exploits the variations of female quotas in Nepalese civil service exams across years, services, ranks and exams within the same service to investigate these three effects. Empirical results show that female quotas in a given exam increase applications and the hiring of women. Even in exams without a quota, the female quotas of other exams within the same service increase the number of female applicants.     

Patent Races with Secrecy

Firms do not always patent their innovations. Instead, they often rely on secrecy to appropriate the returns of innovations. This paper endogenizes firms’ patent propensity, and shows that when the equilibrium patent propensity is small, strengthening patent protection can decrease firms’ incentive to innovate. Paradoxically, this result holds precisely when a stronger patent policy induces more patent applications. Also, these results can arise even in the simplest patent race model with independent innovations as well as with complementary innovations.