The Making of Pro‐Poor Growth

A system of three endogenous equations is used to estimate the determinants of poverty dynamics. The system incorporates: (i) the direct effect of growth and income inequality on poverty, (ii) the feedback effect of poverty on inequality and growth, and (iii) different channels through which economic policies can contribute to poverty reduction. Results suggest that countries tend to move towards one of two possible equilibria. The positive (virtuous) equilibrium is characterized by fast growth, decreasing inequality, and rapid poverty reduction. The negative (vicious) equilibrium involves slow (or even negative) growth, sharpening inequalities, and resilient poverty. The policy mix is critical in determining to which of the two equilibria a country converges.     

Quantitative aspects of economic and financial reform in the GDR

Quantitative aspects of economic and financial reform in the GDR     

The Curse of Being Landlocked: Institutions Rather than Trade

This article revisits the long‐term economic effects of being landlocked. The conventional wisdom, which also prevails in policy circles, is that landlockedness hurts development by reducing trade. Gravity models of bilateral trade seem to confirm this view. However, there is no evidence in cross‐country data of a systematic relationship between landlockedness and country's trade to GDP ratio. Drawing on this stylised fact, the paper explores the possibility that landlockedness might affect GDP independently from its effect on trade. Theoretical considerations suggest that institutional quality could be a relevant transmission mechanism. The estimation of a system of three equations confirms that landlockedness has a negative effect on GDP and that this negative effect is transmitted through institutions rather than trade. Moreover, after controlling for the transmission via institutions and trade, landlockedness has a further negative effect on GDP. These findings call for a review of the policy approach to the development of landlocked countries.     

Provincial business cycles and fiscal policy in China

We characterize the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in China along two related dimensions. First, we estimate the sign and size of the fiscal policy multiplier. Second, we assess whether fiscal policy is conducted pro‐ or counter‐cyclically. To account for the challenges posed by China's vast geography, we use data at the provincial level. We find that (i) fiscal policy generally has ‘Keynesian’ effects, and (ii) fiscal policy is mostly conducted pro‐cyclically. This means that fiscal policy is more an element of destabilization than a tool for stabilization.     

Revisiting the Effects of Remittances on Bank Credit: A Macro Perspective

We investigate the effect of remittances on bank credit in developing countries. Understanding this link is important in view of the growing relevance of remittances as a source of external finance and of the beneficial impact that financial intermediation is likely to have on economic growth. Our contribution is twofold. First, we present a theoretical model of bank credit in a hypothetical remittances‐receiving country where: (1) the banking sector is imperfectly competitive; and (2) bank rates change infrequently because of the presence of adjustment costs. We show that in equilibrium, the relationship between remittances and bank‐credit is likely to be non‐linear. Second, we look at the evidence using a panel data set for a large group of developing and emerging economies over the period 1970–2009. We find that at initially low levels of remittances, an increase in remittances reduces the volume of credit extended by banks. However, at sufficiently high levels of remittances, the effect becomes positive. The turning point of the relationship occurs at a level of remittances of about 2.5% of GDP, which would imply that approximately 50% of our sample lies to each side of this threshold.     

The distributive effects of institutional quality when government stability is endogenous

Redistribution is the strategic response of the incumbent to a decrease in its survival probability resulting from weak institutions and growing income inequalities. The purpose of the paper is to test empirically the validity of this conjecture. System and single equation estimations provide a consistent picture: (i) bad institutions increase income inequality, while more redistribution reduces income inequality; (ii) greater inequality increases the probability of government termination; and (iii) a higher probability of termination increases the extent of redistribution. Overall, there is strong evidence in support of the proposed conjecture.     

New Evidence on the Politics and Economics of Multiparty Cabinets Duration

A Proportional Hazards Specification for cabinet duration data is estimated by mean of a flexible parametric approach. The hazard rate is found to be significantly affected by the majority status, the degree of fragmentation and ideological homogeneity of the coalition, the stability and the polarisation of the legislature and the time horizon at the moment of cabinet formation. Interesting innovative results concern the higher stability of cabinets supported by coalitions ideologically closer to the median party and/or left–oriented. The overall state of the economy also has a role. Graphical evidence suggests that the underlying distribution of duration data might be a Gompertz distribution.     

Exploring different views of exchange rate regime choice

The empirical distinction between de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes raises a number of interesting questions. Which factors may induce a de facto peg? Why do countries enforce a peg but do not announce it? Why do countries “break their promises”? We show that a stable socio-political environment and an efficient political decision-making process are a necessary prerequisite for choosing a peg and sticking to it, challenging the view that sees the exchange rate as a commitment device. Policymakers seem rather concerned with regime sustainability in the face of adverse economic and socio-political fundamentals.     

Political Instability, Uncertainty and Economics

This paper focuses on the relationship between political instability, policy–making and macroeconomic outcomes. The theoretical section explores various models that explain the effect of instability (and political uncertainty) on growth, budget formation, inflation and monetary policy. The empirical section discusses the evidence on the predictions generated by theoretical models. Preliminary to this discussion, however, is the analysis of a few general issues concerning the specification and estimation of econometric models with political variables. Some new results are then produced on the empirical relevance of theories of strategic use of fiscal deficit.