Trade credit and supplier competition

This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model’s predictions and are statistically and economically significant.     

Interest group politics in a federation

The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996–2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.     

Strategic Cost of Diversification

This article proposes a new explanation for the large cross-sectionalvariation in the excess values of diversified firms. The modelapplies the idea of shareholders' limited liability affectingfirms' output market strategies to the analysis of financialand operating choices of conglomerates. The inability of conglomeratesto commit to unconstrained optimal operating strategies, followingfrom the lack of flexibility in choosing their divisions' capitalstructures, reduces their value. Thus, the model highlightsa new type of inefficiency of the conglomerate organizationalstructure, which is suboptimal financing. The predictions ofthe model are generally supported by the data.     

Gibbsian and non-Gibbsian states at Eurandom

We review some of the work on non-Gibbsian states of the last 10 years, emphasizing the developments in which Eurandom played a role.     

Autocracies and regional integration: the Eurasian case

The establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010, succeeded by the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, constituted an important discontinuity in the development of post-Soviet regionalism: while the preceding organisations remained cases of ‘ink-on-paper’ regional integration, in the case of the Customs Union the members actually implemented their commitments. This creates an important theoretical challenge: the literature (which the previous experience of Eurasian regionalism was very much in line with) conjectures that authoritarian states are unable to successfully implement an economic regional integration agreement (RIA). The aim of the article is to explore the conditions under which implementation of economic RIAs by autocracies happens. We argue that the implementation is influenced by the extent of economic, social and political ties between member states, and suggest that, unlike democratic states, which are more likely to implement a RIA where there are strong economic ties, non-democracies are more likely to do so in the case of intermediate economic dependence.     

Can smallholder farmers adapt to climate variability,and how effective are policy interventions? Agent‐based simulation results for Ethiopia

Climate variability with unexpected droughts and floods causes serious production losses and worsens food security, especially in Sub‐Saharan Africa. This study applies stochastic bioeconomic modeling to analyze smallholder adaptation to climate and price variability in Ethiopia. It uses the agent‐based simulation package Mathematical Programming‐based Multi‐Agent Systems (MPMAS) to capture nonseparable production and consumption decisions at household level, considering livestock and eucalyptus sales for consumption smoothing, as well as farmer responses to policy interventions. We find the promotion of new maize and wheat varieties to be an effective adaptation option, on average, especially when accompanied by policy interventions such as credit and fertilizer subsidy. We also find that the effectiveness of available adaptation options is quite different across the heterogeneous smallholder population in Ethiopia. This implies that policy assessments based on average farm households may mislead policy makers to adhere to interventions that are beneficial on average albeit ineffective in addressing the particular needs of poor and food insecure farmers.     

Multidimensional screening under nonlinear costs: Limits of standard approach

We generalize the usual screening approach and conditions for efficiency-at-the-top and acyclic property from linear to fixed-plus-separable or concave costs and multidimensional commodities. But under non-concave costs, like capacity constraints, an example shows a cycle in the solution graph. The cycle makes the standard screening solution non-implementable and approach inadequate.     

Unravelling the Puzzle of Social Standards’ Design in EU and US Trade Agreements

The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are signing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) increasingly used as vehicles for exporting social regulation, such as labour and environmental standards. Despite the similarity in terms of the inclusion of such provisions, their design varies greatly between US and EU agreements. The US exports its domestic standards, relying on coercive enforcement, while the EU emphasises international rules and soft measures. Why do US PTAs have stricter social standards than those signed by the EU? Using the principal–agent approach to explain the domestic politics of social provisions in EU and US PTAs, I argue that greater insulation of trade executives from interest groups and legislators results in their ability to set the agreement agenda independently, in accordance with their normative preferences. The argument is supported by case studies and original interview data.     

Forms of Opportunism Between Principals and Agents

The purpose of the paper is to discuss the development of the theoretical approach to a rating of the opportunism between the principals and agents within the framework of the neo-institutional theory. The matrix of the opportunistic forms between the principals and agents designed. On the basis of the carried out experimental research of firms of the Ural region of Russia, such opportunistic forms of the agents such as flubbing, negligence, and malversation were investigated. The experimental dependences of an opportunistic level of the agents from a level of wages, level of non-financial stimulus, effectiveness of punishment, share of creative element of labor, and degree of labor specificity are defined. Financial support for the grant from the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fond, No. 05-02-83214a is acknowledged.