NONPRICE COMPETITION IN THE TURKISH CREDIT CARD MARKET

Attempts to explain high and sticky credit card rates have given rise to a vast literature on credit card markets. This article endeavors to explain the rates in the Turkish market using measures of nonprice competition. In this market, issuers compete monopolistically by differentiating their credit card products. The fact that consumers perceive credit cards and all other banking services as a bundle allows banks to also employ bank level characteristics to differentiate their credit cards. Thus, the features and service quality of banks are expected to affect credit card rates. Panel data estimations also control for various costs associated with credit card lending. The results show that nonprice competition variables have significant and robust effects on credit card rates. (JEL G21, G28, O16)     

MARKET DISCIPLINING OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS

In this article, we contribute to the current literature on market disciplining of the sovereign governments of the developing countries by distinguishing both sides of the market discipline hypothesis by adopting three‐stage least square estimation to incorporate the contemporaneous feedback effects between primary structural budget balances and the country's default‐risk premiums. We provide empirical evidence of a unidirectional causal relationship between a country's default‐risk premium and primary structural budget balances with the direction flowing from primary structural budget balances to country's risk premium in 40 developing countries over the period 1975–2008. We also employ the Arellano‐Bond dynamic panel generalized methods of moments estimation to control for this joint determination of primary structural budget balances and the country's default‐risk premium, and find supportive evidence of undisciplined sovereign governments and of nonlinearly behaving well‐functioning financial markets in the sample countries. (JEL C5, G1, G3)     

A Prudential Paradox: The Signal in (Not) Restricting Bank Dividends

By restricting dividends in the weakest banks, prudential regulators counterintuitively induce more capital payouts in marginal banks. The potential for bank runs exacerbates the incentive to signal strength through dividend payments. Regulatory restrictions on those payments can be used to achieve the first-best outcome, but only if the prevailing capital requirements are sufficiently high. In a crisis, the optimal dividend policy is more restrictive, since it allows the weak but solvent banks to pool with the strong. Finally, we show that the optimal release of regulatory bank information depends critically on the regulator's information and dividend restriction policies.     

PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN STACKELBERG COMPETITION*

We examine the effects of price discrimination in the Stackelberg competition model for the linear demand case. We show that the leader does not use any price discrimination at all. Rather, the follower does all price discrimination. The leader directs all of its first mover preemptive advantage to attract the highest value consumers who pay a uniformly high price. We observe that profits and total welfare are larger and consumer surplus is smaller than those of the standard Stackelberg competition model.