Does oligopsony power matter in price support policy design? Empirical evidence from the Thai Jasmine rice market

In the oligopsony market, farmers may receive low prices and policy analysis assuming perfect competition can yield serious bias results. In this paper, we estimate oligopsony power between processors and farmers and evaluate the welfare impact of the paddy pledging program (PPP), a generous price support program in the Thai Jasmine rice market, with an imperfect competition model. We develop a model that consists of rice supply equation and derived demand equation. We then simultaneously estimate these equations using system estimation methods to recover oligopsony power parameters. Finally, we use these parameters to assess the welfare impact of the price support program. Using annual panel data running from crop marketing year 2001/2002–2015/2016 and exploiting the institutional feature of the PPP, we find strong evidence of some oligopsony power, a moderate level of oligopsony price distortion, and a negative relationship between price support and oligopsony power. We also find that the PPP is inefficient but effective in income redistribution. Moreover, the program benefits both farmers and consumers. With better policymaking decisions, the PPP can be efficient by setting a suitable support price. Therefore, our results show that in the case of the Thai Jasmine rice market, the generally accepted “wisdom” about agricultural price support policy does not necessarily hold, and price support can be designed to improve the efficiency of the market.     

Does agricultural trade liberalization increase risks of supply-side uncertainty?: Effects of productivity shocks and export restrictions on welfare and food supply in Japan

Agriculture is the focus of much contention in free trade negotiations. The Japanese government is against liberalizing the rice trade on the grounds that it would threaten “national food security” in the events of such shocks as crop failure and embargoes. Trade liberalization is expected to make the Japanese economy more dependent upon food imports and, thus, more susceptible to these risks. Using a computable general equilibrium model with a Monte Carlo simulation, we quantify the welfare impacts of productivity shocks and export quotas by major rice exporters to Japan and found little evidence of Japan suffering from such shocks.     

More on money as a medium of exchange

Summary We extend the analysis of Kiyotaki and Wright, who study economies where the commodities that serve as media of exchange (or, commodity money) are determined endogenously. Kiyotaki and Wright consider only steady-state, pure-strategy equilibria; here we allow dynamic and mixed-strategy equilibria. We demonstrate that symmetric, steady-state equilibria in mixed-strategies always exist, while sometimes no such equilibria exist in pure-strategies. We prove that the number of symmetric steady-state equilibria is generically finite. We also show, however, that for some parameter values there exists a continuum of dynamic equilibria. Further, some equilibria display cycles.We thank the National Science Foundation and the University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation for financial support, as well as seminar participants at Stanford University, the London School of Economics, the Econometric Society World Congress in Barcelona, and the Conference on Monetary Theory and Financial Institutions at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for their comments or suggestions. Alberto Trejos provided research assistance. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Dynamic Investment Strategies to Reaction–Diffusion Systems Based upon Stochastic Differential Utilities

We study the dynamic investment strategies in continuous-time settings based upon stochastic differential utilities of Duffie and Epstein (Econometrica 60:353–394, 1992). We assume that the asset prices follow interacting Itô-Poisson processes, which are known to be the so-called reaction–diffusion systems. Stochastic maximum principle for stochastic control problems described by some backward-stochastic differential equations that are driven by Poisson jump processes allows us to derive the optimal investment strategies as well as optimal consumption. We shall furthermore propose a numerical procedure for solving the associated nested quasi-linear partial differential equations.     

Optimal risk transfer and investment policies based upon stochastic differential utilities

This paper addresses the stochastic differential utility (SDU) version of the issue raised by Barrieu and El Karoui (Quantitative Finance, 2:181–188, 2002a) in which optimal risk transfer from a bank to an investor, realized by transacting well-designed derivatives written on relevant illiquid assets, was␣mainly studied in two cases with and without an available financial market. From a stochastic maximum principle as described in Yong and Zhou (Stochastic controls: Hamiltonian systems and HJB equations. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1999) we shall derive necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality in several SDU-based maximization problems. It is also shown that the optimal risk transfer, consumptions, investment policies of both agents are characterized by a forward–backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) system.     

Global implications of national unconventional policies: A comment

This comment discusses “Global Implications of National Unconventional Policies” by L. Dedola. P. Karadi and G. Lombardo, which was presented in Carnegie-Rocherster conference in April 2012.     

Crop failure,price regulation,and emergency imports of Japan's rice sector in 1993

In 1993, an extraordinarily cool summer in Japan brought about low rice yields, which caused considerable disturbances to the rice markets. Japan imported a large amount of rice as an emergency measure. Two controversies about Japan's rice policies were raised, particularly in that period. The first centred on the effectiveness of the price regulation policies in stabilizing rice prices and farmers’?incomes. The second involved the newspapers’?arguments that the emergency imports harmed other countries, especially developing countries. These controversies were examined with a world trade computable general equilibrium model.     

INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE AND NATIONAL ENTRY POLICY

Abstract.  This paper analyses entry policy in an open economy using an intra-industry trade model. Entry policy is the policy by which a government regulates the number of firms in the country. Implementation of this policy is accompanied by subsidies. In this paper, only one country implements this policy and the other country does not enforce any regulations. We show that the national entry policy makes both countries better off than they would be at the market equilibrium if a certain condition is met. This means that national entry policy is not necessarily a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.     

Retail power market competition with endogenous entry decision—An auction data analysis

Deregulation in the electric power industry has been aimed at promoting competition and thereby enhancing the industry’s efficiency. We use the auction data of public power procurements to study the impact of the reform on the retail power market in Japan. We quantify this impact by measuring a decline in power charges, controlling for the endogeneity bias caused by the entrants’ bid-submission decisions. Our results suggest that power charges would decline by about 0.48 yen/kW h on average when two or more providers bid at an auction.