Cooperative conversion and communalization: Closely observed interactions between the material and the mental

Various authors, including Elinor Ostrom, have shown that the legal form of a cooperative has many of the characteristics of a Common. Here we focus on cooperative conversion, through which conventional enterprises become labor‐managed firms (LMFs), viewing it dynamically as a communalization process. These processes are addressed in the light of a field survey carried out in France, looking at six firms involved in cooperative conversion. The changes entailed are two‐dimensional, both material and mental. This is visible, for example, when finding the capital to mount an LMF: members of the workforce must draw on their own funds; they must also believe in the project. Through our empirical observations we highlight the obstacles in the way of forming an LMF. In particular participants must undertake a work of negotiation hinging on stakes marked by the two, largely inseparable dimensions. Ultimately we query the ethic brought into play in the collective action of constituting a Common. Specifically, individuals must contribute to a collective action underpinned by principles of self‐governance, or commoning, the rock on which the Common rests. A key finding of our study is to demonstrate that a Common can only be successfully created if the constituent processes are consistent with the overall goal. In other words the manner in which we travel is inseparable from our final destination; otherwise we shall surely lose our way.     

Une comparaison entre divers établissements de services de première ligne en santé au Québec (Canada)

This paper presents an empirical and comparative investigation of four types of organizations providing primary health care services: private clinics, community centres, health coops and community associations. Case studies were done following a common design for data collecting and analysis, taking into account the organizations' context of creation, their institutional dimension (structure of power and political system), their organizational dimension (co-ordination and production of health care), and their main paths of development. Results show that organizations present many differences when it comes to delivering universal, accessible, and complete health care services. Non-profit organizations offer more promising perspectives for patients and health care workers by encouraging them to participate in their management. Health coops' openness depends on their nature: while consumer coops encourage patient participation, producer coops allow employees to make decisions. In this sense, patients and employees in collective health care organizations seem to have more political advantages than in private organizations.     

Assessing Applied Protection across the World*

This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution.     

The multiple unit auction with variable supply

Summary. The theory of multiple unit auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity is fixed. I argue that this assumption is not appropriate for many applications because the seller may be able and willing to adjust the supply as a function of the bidding. In this paper I address this shortcoming by analyzing a multi-unit auction game between a monopolistic seller who can produce arbitrary quantities at constant unit cost, and oligopolistic bidders. I establish the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium for price discriminating and for uniform price auctions. I also show that bidders have an incentive to misreport their true demand in both auction formats, but they do that in different ways and for different reasons. Furthermore, both auction formats are inefficient, but there is no unambiguous ordering among them. Finally, the more competitive the bidders are, the more likely the seller is to prefer uniform pricing over price discrimination, yet increased competition among bidders may or may not enhance efficiency. Received: June 18, 1998; revised version: January 13, 1999     

The impact of forecasting on operational performance: Mediation effects through flexibility enablers

Literature has devoted increasing attention to the problem of supply and demand management in uncertain contexts. Only limited contributions, however, can be found regarding the interaction between forecasting and flexibility enablers to manage demand as well as regarding the flexibility enablers’ effect on company performance. We will discuss the impacts of flexibility and forecasting on dynamic interactions. The aim of this work is to study the mediation effect of forecasting through flexibility enablers on company performance, i.e., customer satisfaction and cost efficiency. Our results provide evidence that the relationship between forecasting and customer satisfaction is mainly due to process flow management, while the relationship with cost efficiency is mainly due to layout.     

Optimal Discretion

We investigate the desirability of adopting a rule in favor of discretionary monetary policy in a model exhibiting Kydland and Prescott's dynamic inconsistency problem but no fundamental incompatibility between the policymaker's price stability and full employment objectives. We show that if discretion provides a policy flexibility benefit, then a rule is optimal only when inflation exceeds an endogenously determined threshold. This gives rise to a discretionary policy zone for inflation with the central bank taking more drastic action towards stabilizing inflation when inflation veers outside the zone. Imperfect credibility narrows the scope for discretion and enhances the benefits of adopting a rule.
JEL classification : E 58; D 82; C 72     

Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example

Summary. We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less discriminating the optimal menu of contracts is.Received: 24 September 2004, Revised: 5 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, D8, G3.L. Renou: Correspondence toWe thank Anne Villamil for insightful comments.