Economics of household food waste

Food waste has drawn increasing public attention, and the high levels of estimated waste are largely considered to be a failure of our current food system. Recently, economists have begun to weigh in, showing food waste can emerge as the result of a complex equilibrium affected by consumers’ preferences for convenience; expectations about future food prices and availability; food safety concerns; producers’ costs of holding inventory, transportation, and storage; government regulation; and technology. If food waste is a form of inefficiency, there are either strong economic motivations to reduce waste, or unmeasured costs or preferences affecting waste decisions. If consumers have behavioral biases, suffer from information asymmetries, or do not pay the full cost of their waste, there may be a role for government intervention to reduce waste, but most empirical models in the literature have not articulated or quantified the extent of the deadweight loss from the market failures in relation to food waste. In some cases, waste reduction efforts could harm producers if overall demand for food is reduced or harm consumers if overconsumption is encouraged, quality or safety degrades, or supply disruptions occur. Technological innovations, which lower the cost of storage or extend shelf life have the potential to improve both consumer and producer welfare.     

Social Marketing of a Fortified Staple Food at Scale: Generating Demand for Fortified Rice in Brazil

ABSTRACT

This paper describes the social marketing strategy implemented by PATH and GAIN to create a sustainable market for rice fortification in Brazil and develop a replicable model relevant to other geographies. It draws on market research on consumer attitudes and practices, as well as key demand and consumer metrics before and after execution of the social marketing campaign in Brazil. This marketing endeavor succeeded in establishing the viability of introducing fortified rice in a country through a purely market-based approach. Whereas social marketing is vital to the introduction and scale-up of fortified staple foods through commercial markets, it is not sufficient to achieve meaningful scale and sustainability. Engagement from the public and social sectors, clear governance, and other factors are critical to substantial and long-term impact. Lessons from this first attempt to introduce a fortified staple food through a market-based approach are relevant to similar initiatives elsewhere.     

Charleston's newfound “entertainment zone”: should we be concerned?

This CIT Research Letter addresses issues related to the night-time economy and the rapid proliferation of bars along a section of a tourism oriented city's main street. Merely 10 years ago, locals did not frequent the area, it was of no interest to tourists, and it was regarded as a neighbourhood where one would not want to walk, especially at night. However, with the area's transformation to the nightlife centre of the city, issues have arisen that are of concern to city government officials. This paper considers these concerns.     

The impact of transportation deregulation in the united states on Canadian—U.S. distribution channels

During the 1978-80 period the United States deregulated its transportation industry. Common carriers, through increased reward and expert power, can now perform a more dominant role in the distribution channel. Because of major differences created in the regulatory environment of the U.S. and Canada, deregulation has also had an impact on the distribution channels between the two countries. It is evident horizontal competition between U.S. and Canadian carriers, and between shippers for both domestic and export markets in the respective countries has increased. Another major result of deregulation has been that Canadian shippers and carriers engaged in international traffic to the U.S., even though they have been in complicance with Canadian law, have found themselves subject to the extra-territorial reach of the U.S. anti-trust legislation.     

The learning cost of interest rate reversals

Many central banks in many time periods have sought to avoid interest rate reversals, but at present there is no good explanation of this phenomenon. Our analysis identifies a new learning cost associated with reversing the interest rate. In a standard monetary model with forward-looking expectations, data uncertainty and parameter uncertainty, a policy that frequently reverses the interest rate makes learning the key parameters of the model more difficult. Optimal monetary policy internalises this learning cost and therefore has a lower number of interest rate reversals.     

A search cost model of obfuscation

This article develops models in which obfuscation is individually rational for oligopolistic firms. Firms sell a homogeneous good to rational consumers who incur search costs to learn prices. Search costs are endogenized by allowing obfuscation—firms have an unobservable action that increases the time needed to learn their price. One model involves search costs convex in shopping time. We show that slight convexity can dramatically alter the equilibrium price distribution. A second model examines an informational linkage between current and future search costs: consumers are uncertain about a component of search costs. Here, a signal‐jamming mechanism can lead to equilibrium obfuscation.     

The Great Inflation and the Greenbook

Can the story of evolving Federal Reserve beliefs in The Conquest of American Inflation simultaneously explain the Great Inflation and the forecasts published in the Greenbook during that time? If Sargent is correct then evolving beliefs should be reflected not only in policy outcomes but also in Greenbook forecasts. In this paper they are. By conditioning on the Greenbook, it is show that both inflation outcomes and Greenbook forecasts can be rationalised by evolving beliefs. The results improve on recent empirical evidence that has been criticised for relying on unrealistic beliefs that produce forecasts inconsistent with the Greenbook.