Shareholder Engagement on Environmental,Social, and Governance Performance

We study behind-the-scenes investor activism promoting environmental, social, and governance (ESG) improvements by means of a proprietary dataset of a large international, socially responsible activist fund. We examine the activist’s target selection, forms of engagement, impact on ESG performance, drivers of success, and effects on the targets’ operations and value creation. Target firms are typically large and visible, perform well, and have high liquidity (stock turnover) and low ESG performance. Engagement induces ESG rating adjustments: firms with poor ex ante ESG ratings experience a ratings increase after complying with the activist’s demands, whereas firms with high ex ante ESG ratings experience a ratings decrease following the revelation of their ESG problems. Activism that is focused on environmental and social issues is more likely to succeed if targets are ESG-sensitive (i.e., they have a strong ex ante ESG profile). Successful engagements boost targets’ sales. Risk-adjusted excess stock returns (with four-factor adjustment and relative to a matched sample of non-engaged firms) of successful engagements outperform those of unsuccessful engagements by 2.7%. Results are especially strong for firms with low ex ante ESG scores. Specifically, targeted firms in the lowest ex ante ESG quartile outperform matched peers by 7.5% in the year after the end of the engagement. Our results thus suggest that the activism regarding corporate social responsibility generally improves ESG practices and corporate sales and is profitable to the activist. Taken together, we provide direct evidence that ethical investing and strong financial performance, both from the activist’s and the targeted firm’s perspective, can go hand-in-hand together.

     

Capital Mobility in Open OLG Models of Neoclassical Growth

This paper explores whether the international mobility of physical and/or financial capital is essential for productive efficiency in each of three open OLG models of neoclassical growth that vary in terms of dimensional attributes. A tradeoff between capital mobility requirements and dimension has previously been established by example where, ceteris paribus , neither form of capital mobility is required with three productive sectors, only physical capital mobility is required with two sectors, and both forms of mobility are required with a single sector. This paper reconsiders that tradeoff using a generalization of the production and utility functions which introduces the potential for specialization along the transition path—an event which would imply inconsistent capital mobility requirements along the growth path for models with fixed dimension. Conditions are established under which the tradeoff between capital mobility requirements and dimension remains valid.     

What Corporate Governance Can Learn from Catholic Social Teaching

This reflection focuses on what insights Catholic Social Teaching (CST) can provide for corporate governance. I argue that the ‘standard’ agency theory is overly reductionist and insufficiently incorporates important economic limitations (such as asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, and the need for coordination) as well as human frailty. As a result, such agency theory insufficiently distinguishes firms from markets, which can easily relativize how we treat others and facilitate rationalization of unethical behavior. I then explore how three pillars of CST—human dignity, solidarity, and subsidiarity—can help overcome these limitations. CST proposes a vision of the business corporation as a community of persons, working together in cooperative business relationships toward the shared purpose of contributing to human flourishing.     

Turning over Turnover

This article applies the methodology of Bai and Ng (2002, 2004)for decomposing panel data into systematic and idiosyncraticcomponents to both stock returns and turnover panels. This approachworks well for both returns and turnover, despite the presenceof severe heteroscedasticity and nonstationarity of individualstocks' turnover. We test the mutual fund separation model ofLo and Wang (2000). Trading due to systematic risk in returnscan account for 66% of systematic turnover. Thus, portfoliorebalancing due to systematic risk is a very important motivefor stock trading. Finally, several common turnover measuresmay understate the impact of stock trading.     

Stock Return Predictability: A Bayesian Model Selection Perspective

Attempts to characterize stock return predictability have resultedin little consensus on the important conditioning variables,giving rise to model uncertainty and data snooping fears. Weintroduce a new methodology that explicitly incorporates modeluncertainty by comparing all possible models simultaneouslyand in which the priors are calibrated to reflect economicallymeaningful information. Our approach minimizes data snoopinggiven the information set and the priors. We compare the priorviews of a skeptic and a confident investor. The data implyposterior probabilities that are in general more supportiveof stock return predictability than the priors for both typesof investors.     

General equilibrium with trade balance and real interest rate parity

This paper demonstrates, in the context of a two-sector OLG neoclassical growth model, conditions under which international trade in consumption goods alone may be sufficient for the equalization of real returns to physical capital across countries; that is, under which commodity arbitrage is sufficient for real interest rate parity (RIRP). This role for repeated commodity arbitrage is established via a dynamic extension of the factor price equalization (FPE) theorem which is valid at all dates comprising the equilibrium path as well as its steady state. The results are at odds with the conventional view regarding RIRP which arises from open one-sector growth models, in which case steady state trade balance and RIRP are irreconcilable, and are also a contradiction to frequent assertions of lon-run specialization in two-sector frameworks. An equilibrium path for an integrated world economy yields an endogenous, time-variant cone of diversification which implies sufficient conditions for the dynamic paths of a cross-section of economies to exhibit FPE, and hence RIRP with trade balance, at all points in time. These conditions require that the savings rates and initial capital-labor ratios of individual countries do not deviate too significantly from world averages, and that both sectors absorb capital easily. The first of these requirements is sufficient to establish steady state FPE and RIRP in the general specification. The first two requirements are sufficient for the entire equilibrium path to be characterized by FPE and RIRP in a log-linear example. Received: September 22, 1998; revised version: February 10, 2000     

A longitudinal study of concern and judged risk: the case of Ebola in the United States, 2014–2015

The goal of the present study was to investigate whether playing a serious game concerning natural and man-made risks leads to increased risk awareness and additional information search. As an experimental task, we developed a serious board game. Fifty-six students participated in the experiment; half of them played the serious game whereas the other half only filled in a questionnaire at pretest and posttest (after two weeks). Participants who had played the game were more aware of risks in their own environment. Furthermore, playing the serious game counterbalanced the decline in self-efficacy as seen in the control condition. In both conditions, participants gathered more information on natural risks. This positive effect in the control condition is probably a side effect of the method used: a reasonably elaborate questionnaire in combination with a delay of two weeks. In all, the results provide a positive basis for further development of the game and to use it on a larger scale to empower citizens to take more responsibility for their own safety.     

Posting of workers in the single market: attempts to prevent social dumping and regime competition in the EU

The so‐called ‘Posting of Workers Directive’ was an integral part of the European Commission (EC) Action programme linked to the Community Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers and was meant to establish a legal frame for labour conditions of workers posted for a temporary period to another Member State. Its content is about equal treatment, a guarantee of minimum protection, fair competition and respect for the regulatory frame in the host country. In the cases included in this article, increased divergence can be observed with respect to the role of the state versus the social partners with regards to regulation and control. The over‐riding challenge nowadays is to develop effective mechanisms of enforcement compatible with the constraints of European Union principles and regulations. In the EC documents, any reference to the Community Charter of Basic Rights of Workers has disappeared and the weight of power has shifted in favour of the free market hardliners, who seem to regard the Directive as an oddity in breach with the logic of the four freedoms.     

Individual stock-option prices and credit spreads

This paper introduces measures of volatility and jump risk that are based on individual stock options to explain credit spreads on corporate bonds. Implied volatilities of individual options are shown to contain useful information for credit spreads and improve on historical volatilities when explaining the cross-sectional and time-series variation in a panel of corporate bond spreads. Both the level of individual implied volatilities and (to a lesser extent) the implied-volatility skew matter for credit spreads. Detailed principal component analysis shows that a large part of the time-series variation in credit spreads can be explained in this way.     

Columbia Law School Roundtable on A Governance Research Agenda for the Academy

Since Jensen and Meckling's formulation of the theory of “agency costs” in 1976, corporate finance and governance scholars have produced a large body of research that attempts to identify the most important features and practices of effective corporate governance systems. But for all the research that has been done in the past 40 years, many practitioners continue to see a disconnect between theory and practice, between the questions researched and the questions that need to be answered. In this roundtable, Martijn Cremers begins by challenging the conventional view that limiting “agency costs” is the main challenge confronted by boards of directors in representing shareholder interests and, hence, the proper focus of most governance scholarship. Especially in today's economy, with the high values assigned to growth companies, the most important function of corporate governance may instead be to overcome the problem of American “short termism” that he attributes to “inadequate shareholder commitment to long‐term cooperation.” And he buttresses his argument with the findings of his own recent research suggesting that obstacles to the workings of the corporate control market like staggered boards and supermajority voting requirements may actually improve long‐run corporate performance by lengthening the decision‐making horizon of boards and the managements they supervise. Vik Khanna discusses Indian Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) spending and its effects in light of a recent law requiring Indian companies of a certain size to devote at least 2% of their after‐tax profit to CSR initiatives. One unintended effect of this mandate, which took effect in 2010, was that all Indian companies that were spending more than the prescribed 2% of profits cut their expenditure back to that minimum, suggesting that CSR and advertising are substitutes to some extent, and that such legal mandates can discourage CSR spending by early adapters or “leaders.” Nevertheless, Khanna also found evidence of social norms developing in support of CSR, including a spreading perception that such spending can help some companies achieve strategic goals. Jeff Gordon closes by arguing that, to the extent investors are short‐sighted, their short‐sightedness is likely to be justified by their recognition that public company directors have neither the information nor the incentives to do an effective job of monitoring corporate managements. The best solution to the problems with U.S. corporate governance is to replace today's “thinly informed” directors with “activist” directors who more closely resemble the directors of private‐equity owned firms. Such directors would spend far more time with, and be much more knowledgeable about, corporate management and operations—and they would have much more of their personal wealth at stake in the form of company stock.