Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

Exact Ruin Probabilities and the Evaluation of Program Trading On Financial Markets

For a compound Poisson process with negative drift and jump distribution consisting of a mixture of exponentials on [0) and on (-, 0), an exact expression is derived for the probability of hitting the level c, c > 0. the problem is motivated by modeling the returns from trading on financial markets.     

An extension of mixed estimation,with an application to forecasting new product growth

This paper extends the mixed estimation technique to handle a case in which the coefficients of a set of linear constraints are known nonlinear functions of an unknown parameter vector for which an extraneous unbiased estimate is available. This novel form of the mixed estimation technique is illustrated by applying it to the Bass innovation/diffusion model of new product growth. It is suggested that this is superior to the traditional method whereby managerial intuition is incorporated into this type of model, and is an attractive alternative to recently-suggested Bayesian methods.I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and references.     

Economic progress and skill obsolescence with network effects

Summary. We construct an OLG model with network effects to examine skill obsolescence when individuals can choose technological vintages. In the absence of transfer payments, some regions of the parameter space have unique stationary equilibria, others have unique cyclical equilibria, and others have multiple stationary equilibria. All equilibria are Pareto efficient. However, rat race equilibria can exist in which all agents currently alive prefer a slower rate of progress than occurs in equilibrium. When contemporaneous transfers are allowed, equilibria are unique everywhere, but a cycle still exists, and a rat race can still arise in equilibrium. Allowing intertemporal transfers (debt) ensures that all equilibria are stationary. In the relevant parameter range, the introduction of debt can eliminate cycles and increase the long-run growth rate. No rat race equilibria exist when debt is allowed.Received: 3 January 2002, Revised: 3 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: 041, J24, O33. Correspondence to: Ian P. KingEarly versions of this paper were presented at the West Coast Macro Workshop, the Mid-West Macro Meetings, the Canadian Macroeconomics Study Group Meetings, and the Society for Economic Dynamics Meetings. We would like to thank V. V. Chari, Merwan Engineer, Don Ferguson, John Hillas, John Knowles, Dan Peled, Dan Usher, Linda Welling and Julian Wright for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee for some very useful and substantive comments.     

Finding a lasting cure for U.S. health care

In "Making Competition in Health Care Work" (July-August 1994), Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Michael E. Porter, and Gregory B. Brown ask a question that has been absent from the national debate on health care reform: How can the United States achieve sustained cost reductions while at the same time maintaining quality of care? The authors argue that innovation driven by rigorous competition is the key to successful reform. A lasting cure for health care in the United States should include four basic elements: corrected incentives to spur productive competition, universal insurance to secure economic efficiency, relevant information to ensure meaningful choice, and innovation to guarantee dynamic improvement. In this issue's Perspectives section, eleven experts examine the current state of the health care system and offer their views on the shape that reform should take. Some excerpts: "On the road to innovation, let us not forget to develop the tools that allow physicians, payers, and patients to make better decisions." I. Steven Udvarhelyi; "Health care is not a product or service that can be standardized, packaged, marketed, or adequately judged by consumers according to quality and price." Arnold S. Relman; "Just as antitrust laws are the wise restraints that make competition free in other sectors of the economy, so the right kind of managed competition can work well in health care." Edward M. Kennedy "Biomedical research should be considered primarily an investment in the national economic well-being with additional humanitarian benefits." Elizabeth Marincola.     

Attilla the Hun: leadership as a change agent

This presentation will examine both ideas and successful examples of how some companies are inspiring and empowering their employees through the development of leadership skills within their management ranks. These skills can be learned and used to aid any organization in its goal of continuous improvement. Today's leadership establishes corporate directions while balancing individual and group achievement, both of which can improve the overall company. Power is shared, not used to control. After all, leadership is not about power. It is about setting directions for others, the clearing of obstacles, and then allowing others to believe the direction was their idea. Great leadership is based on the success of others.     

Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest rates

We find that in a sample of emerging economies business cycles are more volatile than in developed ones, real interest rates are countercyclical and lead the cycle, consumption is more volatile than output and net exports are strongly countercyclical. We present a model of a small open economy, where the real interest rate is decomposed in an international rate and a country risk component. Country risk is affected by fundamental shocks but, through the presence of working capital, also amplifies the effects of those shocks. The model generates business cycles consistent with Argentine data. Eliminating country risk lowers Argentine output volatility by 27% while stabilizing international rates lowers it by less than 3%.     

ADAM SMITH AND THE ROLE OF THE METAPHOR OF AN INVISIBLE HAND

Daniel Klein and Brandon Lucas's ‘In a Word or Two, Placed in the Middle: The Invisible Hand in Smith's Tomes’, following a vague hint by Peter Minowitz (2004) , offers original physical evidence that Smith ‘deliberately placed the phrase “led by an invisible hand”– at the physical centre of both his masterworks’. Further, it suggests that the invisible‐hand paragraphs are a response to Rousseau (1755 ); and that in ‘numerous and rich ways’, centrality holds ‘special and positive significance in Smith's thought’. This paper acknowledges the physical centrality of the invisible‐hand metaphor, but questions whether centrality alone gives weight to wider claims that the ‘invisible hand’ was Smith's ‘central idea’. It draws upon Smith's Rhetoric Lectures (1763), and argues that the invisible‐hand paragraphs in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations identify the actual objects of the invisible‐hand metaphor. This paper insists that Adam Smith is the most reliable source for revealing what he meant. In contrast, most modern attributions of special meaning to Adam Smith's use of the metaphor ignore Smith's teaching on the use of metaphors and, instead, make numerous, and often mutually exclusive, claims that Smith had a ‘doctrine’ of ‘an invisible‐hand’.     

Training professionals' usage and understanding of Kirkpatrick's Level 3 and Level 4 evaluations

Training professionals have long acknowledged the necessity of conducting behavior‐based (Level 3) and results‐based (Level 4) evaluations, yet organizations do not frequently conduct such evaluations. This research examined training professionals' perceptions of the utility of Level 3 and Level 4 evaluations and the factors that facilitate or obstruct their attempts to perform them. The research was conducted using Brinkerhoff's Success Case Method and Gilbert's Behavior Engineering Model as its frameworks. The three key factors identified by study participants as having an impact upon their ability to conduct Level 3 and Level 4 evaluations were the availability of resources such as time and personnel, managerial support (organizational) and expertise in evaluative methodology (individual). The research findings indicated a need to further explore how training professionals interpret Level 3 and Level 4 and how they can better develop their evaluative expertise, which in turn may increase effectiveness in gaining organizational support for evaluation efforts.