How do successful scholars get their best research ideas? An exploration

We interview 24 marketing professors to ask how they got the ideas for 64 of their papers. More than three-quarters of the papers were inspired by holes in the literature, by a “stylized fact” that the current literature cannot explain, or by an interaction with a manager. The rest fall into several smaller categories that to a large extent can be seen as special cases of the three big ones. We describe how papers from each of the three big categories help move the literature forward. We also illustrate the range of situations contained in each category by way of several examples. Among the authors we interview, most do not use a single source. As these authors become more senior, managerial contacts play an increasing role, while the balance between literature and stylized facts appears to be unchanged.

     

Delegation, Committees, and Managers

Attempts to economize on decision-making time imply that groups of peers may delegate authority to a small committee of managers even though this means that the information and preferences of the uninvolved players are neglected. Decisions are more likely to be delegated to players with better information and more representative preferences. The possibility of ex post protests may force managers to take the preferences of others into account but may also give them incentives to ignore their private information. The argument may explain employees' willingness to let bosses decide, and thus throw some light on the theory of the firm.     

Multiple point competition

Situations where firms compete against each other simultaneously in several markets abound in real life. However, there is very little conceptual or theoretical literature on multiple point competition. This paper offers a first attempt at developing a conceptual framework for analysing and understanding situations involving multiple point competition. Several examples are discussed to provide insights into the options available to the competitors and the equilibrium outcomes of such competition.     

Why Should the Boss Own the Assets?

In the context of an employment relationship, I present an argument suggesting that it is more efficient for the boss to own the productive assets. The idea is that a conflict between productivity and depreciation is internalized if the player deciding what an asset is used for also has residual claims. An empirical test finds evidence consistent with this. By asking whether the boss should own the assets, the paper reverses the reasoning from the literature in which it is argued that the owner has power and thus is the boss.     

Technical change,competition and vertical integration

This paper starts with a survey of the received theories of vertical integration. We then extend these theories by arguing that while uncertainty in general will make integration more effective, a particular type of uncertainty, the possibility of technological obsolescence, works the other way. After making this point at a conceptual level, we build a model to study how the frequency of technological change interacts with the intensity of competition to influence the optimal level of integration. The predictions of the model are then tested and very strongly supported by data from 93 industries.     

On the Grouping of Tasks into Firms: Make‐or‐Buy with Interdependent Parts*

We study the division of labor within production systems and look for the optimal grouping of tasks into firms. Using a unique dataset on the global automobile industry, we present evidence consistent with the prediction that pairs of tasks requiring more frequent mutual adaptation are more likely to be performed by the same firm. By taking account of interdependencies between tasks, our econometric approach generalizes standard make‐or‐buy analysis and yields improvements in predictive accuracy.     

Bounded Rationality Modeling

This paper deals with bounded rationality as a way to describe behavior and focuses on the question of how to build such boundedly rational models. The first part is a discussion of the reasons why such models are needed and on the situations in which they can be regarded as more particularly useful. The second part examines three strategies of research towards bounded rationality modeling which have emerged in the last ten years and weights them. The concluding remarks offer a first link between the respective typologies of strategies and of situations and calls for additional experimental work by marketing scientists and economists together.     

A resource-based view of the firm

The paper explores the usefulness of analysing firms from the resource side rather than from the product side. In analogy to entry barriers and growth-share matrices, the concepts of resource position barrier and resource-product matrices are suggested. These tools are then used to highlight the new strategic options which naturally emerge from the resource perspective.     

Stagflation,new products,and speculation

The paper looks at the macroeconomic implications of some recent developments in the theory of industrial organization. In a Kaleckian model, firms are assumed to invest heavily early in the product life cycle, thus creating effective demand. Conversely, it is assumed that late in the product life cycle firms hoard, waiting for new products in which to invest. Under reasonable conditions, the rates of growth, unemployment, and inflation can be related to the fraction of new products in the economy.     

Competitive strategy under uncertainty

Competitive strategy under uncertainty involves a trade-off between acting early and acting later after the uncertainty is resolved, and another trade-off between focusing resources on one scenario and spreading resources on several scenarios, thus maintaining flexibility. This paper analyzes both these trade-offs taking into consideration the nature of uncertainty, industry economics, intensity of competition, and the position of a firm relative to its competitors.