Negotiating with Terrorists: The Costs of Compliance

It is often argued that negotiating with terrorists will encourage terrorist attacks. To date, corroborating empirical evidence is scarce. Using ITERATE data, we investigate the impact of conceding to terrorist demands on terror activity. We restrict attention to hostage events with clear‐cut demands from terrorists. Our sample period runs from 1978 to 2005 and comprises 1435 events in 125 countries. Estimating a flexible and dynamic Structured Additive Regression model, we find that the percentage of successfully negotiated events has a nonlinear effect on future terror intensity consistent with our simple theoretical model. More specifically, although moderate rates of negotiation increase the number of future terror events, higher negotiation rates tend to have the opposite effect. The estimated threshold is around 20%.     

You May Not Reap What You Sow: How Employees’ Moral Awareness Minimizes Ethical Leadership’s Positive Impact on Workplace Deviance

Although a growing body of research has shown the positive impact of ethical leadership on workplace deviance, questions remain as to whether its benefits are consistent across all situations. In this investigation, we explore an important boundary condition of ethical leadership by exploring how employees’ moral awareness may lessen the need for ethical leadership. Drawing on substitutes for leadership theory, we suggest that when individuals already possess a heightened level of moral awareness, ethical leadership’s role in reducing deviant actions may be reduced. However, when individuals lack this strong moral disposition, ethical leadership may be instrumental in inspiring them to reduce their deviant actions. To enhance the external validity and generalizability of our findings, the current research used two large field samples of working professionals in both Turkey and the USA. Results suggest that ethical leadership’s positive influence on workplace deviance is dependent upon the individual’s moral awareness—helpful for those employees whose moral awareness is low, but not high. Thus, our investigation helps to build theory around the contingencies of ethical leadership and the specific audience for whom it may be more (or less) influential.     

The elasticity of demand for wagering in an unregulated market

The literature estimating the take-out rate (price) elasticity of horse race wagering has consistently found values far above one. The persistence of these apparently inefficiently high prices can be attributed to institutional factors of the US market where federal taxes are imposed on the total amount wagered, and not on the bookmakers’ revenue. By investigating all horse races in New Zealand from August 1993 to April 2009, our article is the first one to consider price setting for wagering in an unregulated market where taxes for a monopolistic betting agency are based on revenues. In such a setting, one would expect elasticities close to one, but in all econometric specifications, we find values well below one. We identify two reasons why higher prices could nevertheless reduce profits: cross price elasticities are negative and, due to the specific features of parimutuel betting, international competitors may only be attracted when take-out rates are above a critical threshold.     

Bank capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation

We analyze the interplay of capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation in reducing banks’ risk taking incentives. Two heterogenous banks fund uncorrelated projects with fully diversifiable risk or correlated projects with systematic risk. One of both banks can identify project types and is superior at managing risks. If projects are in abundant supply, full mandatory deferral of compensation is optimal as it allows a larger banking sector without increasing the default risk. With limited supply of projects, deferred compensation may misallocate risky projects to the bank that is inferior at managing risks, so that early compensation may be optimal.     

Economic problems of increasing urbanisation

The economic problems of increasing urbanisation are presently the subject of active discussion — in other industrialised and in developing countries no less than in the Federal Republic of Germany. The following article deals with the special features of the development in the Federal Republic.     

Revisiting the role of the environment in the capabilities–financial performance relationship: A meta‐analysis

Within the capabilities‐based view of the firm, there is debate about the relative importance of ordinary and dynamic capabilities for firm performance and about the extent to which their performance effects are contingent on environmental conditions. We meta‐analyze 115 studies to investigate the relationship between both ordinary and dynamic capabilities and the financial performance of firms in relatively stable versus changing environments. The results suggest that the performance effects of both types of capabilities are positive and similar in magnitude. Environmental dynamism reinforces the effects of both ordinary and dynamic capabilities. Furthermore, the two types of capabilities are closely associated. Our findings provide support for a moderate capabilities‐based view of the firm, rather than one that considers dynamic capabilities as superior to ordinary ones. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values

We consider a model of optimal law enforcement where sanctions can be reduced for self-reporting individuals. We distinguish between a first self-reporting stage before the case is investigated and a second one where the criminal is detected, but not yet convicted. Since we assume that violators have private information in both stages, fine reductions for self-reporting individuals lead ceteris paribus to a higher violation frequency. Nevertheless, we show that fine reductions should be granted in both stages. We characterize the connection between the two fine reductions in the optimal policy and relate our results to self-reporting schemes observed in reality.