Economic reforms,efficiency and productivity in Chinese banking

This paper analyzes the impact of banking reforms on efficiency and total factor productivity (TFP) change in Chinese banking industry. Using an input distance function, we find that joint-equity banks are more efficient than wholly state-owned banks (WSOBs). Furthermore, both WSOBs and joint-equity banks are found to be operating slightly below their optimal size, suggesting potential advantages in expansion of their businesses. Overall, TFP growth was 4.4% per annum for the sample period 1993–2002. Joint-equity banks experienced much higher growth in TFP (5.5% per annum) compared to the WSOBs (1.4% per annum).      

Deregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-quality Tradeoffs

This paper examines the effects of introducing competition into monopolized network industries on prices and infrastructure quality. Analyzing a model with reduced-form demand, we first show that deregulating an integrated monopoly cannot simultaneously decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. Second, we derive conditions under which reducing both retail price and infrastructure quality relative to the integrated monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, we argue that restructuring and setting very low access charges may yield welfare losses, as infrastructure investment is undermined. We provide an extensive analysis of the linear demand model and discuss policy implications.     

Effective regulation versus tacit collusion in the long-distance market: an empirical analysis

Regulatory decisions often must be made in an atmosphere of uncertainty, and arguments presented by the affected parties frequently add to, rather than resolve, that uncertainty. Here, we examine several of the deregulatory decisions affecting the long-distance market that were rendered by the FCC over the two-decade period following the divestiture of AT&T. Our purpose is to provide empirical evidence relevant to some of the arguments regarding market conditions that were presented during that period. Findings suggest that some of the more prominent allegations are not supported by the data.      

Industry aspects of takeovers and divestitures: Evidence from the UK

This paper examines takeover and divestiture activity at the industry level for the population of UK firms over the period 1986–2000. Consistent with US research, takeovers in the UK cluster both across industries and over time. The evidence for divestitures indicates clustering across industries only. The paper further investigates whether broad and specific industry shocks (e.g., growth, free cash flow, concentration, deregulation, foreign competition, technology, stock market performance) explain takeover and divestiture clustering at the industry level. The results suggest that broad shocks increase (decrease) the likelihood of takeovers (divestitures), although not significantly for takeovers. Specific industry shocks that increase the likelihood of takeover activity include low growth, the threat of foreign competition and high stock market performance. For divestitures, high industry concentration and deregulation increase activity. Little evidence is found for deregulation as a significant factor in explaining takeover activity.     

Vertical separation of transmission control and market efficiency in the wholesale electricity market

This study examines how vertical separation of transmission control affects the wholesale market efficiency in the electric power industry. We analyze a unique regional electricity wholesale market in the U.S. where initially restructuring only occurred in the transmission sector. Following a commonly-used best dispatch model (Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein et al., 2002), we simulate competitive benchmark prices and compare with the best estimates available for actual prices to measure price-cost markups of the wholesale market. Empirical results demonstrate that the vertical separation of transmission control led to a significant increase in market markups in peak-load hours, documenting evidence of enhanced market power. Although we also find a reduction in the price-cost margin in low-demand hours, we reserve caution for this finding.     

Clustered airline flight scheduling: Evidence from airline deregulation in Korea

This paper explores the impacts of competition level on airline scheduling in the Korean domestic short-haul routes where a hub-and-spoke system is not the optimal air transport network strategy. The empirical findings using the Korean airline panel data for the period 2006–2010 suggest that competition leads to less differentiated departure flight times as expected from spatial competition theory. Unlike the previous study on the U.S airline industry, the degree of this tendency for less differentiation differs across the type of routes: the Jeju island routes (leisure type) and the inland routes (business type), in the deregulated period. Following the May 2008 Deregulation Act we find an increasingly clustered pattern of airline scheduling in the Jeju island routes where there have been competitive pressures associated with new low cost entrants. This recent evidence would imply that airline carriers strategically schedule departure flight times and allocate flights between routes as competition increases in the deregulated period.     

Productivity efficiency analysis of the airlines in China after deregulation

Using data envelopment analysis and the Malmquist productivity index, this paper studies productivity efficiency of various airlines in China after the Chinese government deregulated the aviation industry in 2005. The results show that the productivity efficiency of non-state-owned airlines improves rapidly and eventually exceeds state-owned airlines after the deregulation policy. Among the state-owned airlines, the productivity of the local airlines and their technical changes are better than those of the central airlines.     

After work shopping? Employment effects of a deregulation of shop opening hours in the German retail sector

This study investigates the impact of a deregulation of shop opening laws on employment in the German retail sector. Exploiting the gradual change in the opening times of shops across states and using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, difference-in-differences estimates indicate an average increase in the employment probability, driven by a rise in the likelihood of working marginal part-time hours. Workers in small firms are likely to experience a reduction of their propensity to work. For individuals facing high family-related, supply-side constraints, the change in shop opening hours has opposing effects on employment — positive on lower and negative on upper parts of the hours distribution. Overall, the deregulation is estimated to have raised the likelihood of working fewer hours than desired by the workers.     

Firm entry deregulation,competition and returns to education and skill

This paper studies the effect of firm entry deregulation on the returns to skill and education. We exploit a comprehensive episode of entry deregulation, unique in the industrialized world, as a quasi-natural experiment. Using matched employer–employee data for the universe of workers and firms in Portugal, we show that increased product market competition, which resulted from deregulation, increased the returns to a university degree and the returns to skill. We verify that our results are not driven by changes in employment composition, and are unlikely to be driven by skill-biased technical change, or by workers who change skill levels after the deregulation.     

Interconnection in Network Industries

Recent deregulation of telecommunications in the U.S. and elsewhere has highlighted the importance of interconnection in network industries. In this paper, we analyse interconnection in a deregulated network where the participants compete in the final retail market. We consider both the case of a mature industry as well as one where a new entrant challenges the incumbent. In the later case, network externalities allow the incumbent to use the terms of interconnection to maintain its dominant position. Moreover, in either case, competition in the retail market can be undermined by collusion over access prices. We discuss the implications for some of the provisions of the new U.S. Telecommunications Act, specifically mandatory interconnection and reciprocity of tariffs, comparing these to the simple bill and keep rule.