Socio-demographics,political attitudes and informal sector employment: A cross-country analysis

In this paper, we empirically investigate the relationship between informal sector employment and micro-level socio-demographic characteristics, political acts and attitudes, and individual norms. Using self-reported individual micro-level data from the World Values Survey for seven developing countries (China, Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, Peru, South Africa and Yemen), our cross-country regressions and principal component analysis reveal that socio-demographic characteristics of individuals are strong predictors of their informal sector employment. Our estimations further document that individual preferences for an economically strong, interventionist and egalitarian state and confidence in state and political institutions are positively and significantly correlated with informal sector employment, whereas variables associated with confidence in free market institutions and support for competition are negatively and significantly correlated with informal sector employment. We also show that individuals who participate either actively or inactively in peaceful and lawful political processes are significantly less likely to work in the informal sector. Finally, we document that individual norms, such as religiosity and tax morale, are negatively correlated with informal sector employment. Throughout our analysis, instead of having to rely on ad-hoc informality categorizations of third parties, we base our measurement of informal sector employment directly on the self-evaluation of individuals, who have the best information on the degree of their informality.     

Domestic political connections and international expansion: It's not only ‘who you know’ that matters

Former politicians on the board of directors bring to the firm domestic political connections and political knowledge. Previous research has mainly highlighted the role of contacts, without fully recognizing the role of political knowledge accumulated at home. By focusing on the effect of domestic political connections on foreign direct investment, we show that domestic political knowledge also shapes foreign expansion. We argue that contacts provided by former politicians may not be useful for foreign expansion whilst their political knowledge can be of help in countries with discretionary governments and with similar institutional environments to the one of the home country.     

以企业文化为切入点加强和改进企业思想政治工作

企业为了搞好经营，都十分重视提高员工的工作积极性，而提高员工的工作积极性往往采取增加薪酬、改善福利的方式，当然，这种方式的运用无可厚非，也比较见效，但随着企业各项制度的不断完善和员工构成的高学历化，单纯的经济刺激已不足以应对员工的多元化需求；因此重新审视我党的思想政治工作，将它与企业文化建设有机结合，在提高员工经济收入的同时，努力提高员工的“精神收入”，成为企业提升管理品质、吸引人才、锻造内力的有效途径。     

汇率制度:变迁轨迹与经济绩效

通过对汇率制度变迁下实际汇率水平、内外部均衡目标的实证研究发现:钉住一揽子货币制度能较好的实现内部均衡目标,经济绩效显著;相对浮动汇率制度在内部均衡目标实现方面的经济绩效不显著,却能有效的促进外部均衡目标的实现;固定汇率制度能促进内部均衡目标的实现,国内经济绩效显著,却不能有效促进外部均衡目标的实现。我国汇率制度的变迁揭示,汇率变化要与国内经济结构和市场能力相适应。当前人民币升值虽然是趋势,但要循序渐进缓步推进,给予国内经济结构和出口行业留有转型时间和空间。我国均衡汇率的逐步形成,需要实现国内经济绩效和国际经济绩效的协调同步,才能实现经济可持续发展。     

思想政治课教学改革应着力于"新、活、多"

思想政治课教学，是强化青年学生德育素质的重要环节和基本渠道，当前改革的重点应着力于内容上求“新”，方法上求“活”，手段上求“多”。     

Central Bank's interventions and the Fisher hypothesis: a threshold cointegration investigation

The long-run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation is examined, allowing for structural breaks and asymmetric mean reversion. From a Threshold AutoRegressive (TAR) test applied to the residuals of the cointegration relationship (while allowing for both a break in the mean of the long-run equation and a smooth regime-transition), there is strong evidence for non-linear mean reversion properties for the real interest rates of the US Treasury Bill market. This suggests asymmetric changes to inflation shocks in the Central Bank's reaction function. The existence of different regimes is consistent with some interpretations of the monetary policies run by the Fed, such as credibility and opportunism.     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin     

On wage- and profit-led demand regimes: learning from the evidence

Abstract

This paper contributes to the empirical research around the “wage-led” or “profit-led” demand regimes. It first reviews how Kalecki, and then Steindl, approached the relationship between economic growth and income distribution. Then, empirical analysis carried out under the probabilistic approach to econometric modeling shows statistical evidence, estimated through cointegration analysis, that in the long run, in three very open economies—Mexico, France, and Korea—the wage share is positively associated with demand and output. It finally discusses the macroeconomic dilemma that almost all countries have to face, i.e., a positive effect of a high-wage policy on demand and employment may diverge from a negative effect on output compatible with external equilibrium.     

公共产品歧视性分配政策与城市人口控制

本文在一个二元经济框架内,通过一个改进的“亨利.乔治”模型,研究了转轨过程中的经济发展导向政府的城市人口控制问题。证明非歧视分配政策和任由城乡人口自由流动的政策组合并非一个有效率的户籍制度安排。不同主体之间在关于城市人口规模的控制上存在着利益差别,歧视性分配政策有助于缩小不同主体之间的利益差别。实行非歧视的公共产品分配政策同时对城市人口规模按照生产效率加以控制是现有体制下一个有效率的户籍制度安排。     

Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice

Summary. The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems. Received: August 15, 2001; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Parts of this article were previously circulated in somewhat different form in a working paper with the same title by the second author. We are grateful to Michel Le Breton and an anonymous referee for their comments. Correspondence to:J.A. Weymark