Non-linear Gaussian sovereign CDS pricing models

Prior literature indicates that quadratic models and the Black–Karasinski model are very promising for CDS pricing. This paper extends these models and the Black [J. Finance 1995, 50, 1371–1376] model for pricing sovereign CDS’s. For all 10 sovereigns in the sample quadratic models best fit CDS spreads in-sample, and a four factor quadratic model can account for the joint effects on CDS spreads of default risk, default loss risk and liquidity risk with no restriction to factors correlation. Liquidity risk appears to affect sovereign CDS spreads. However, quadratic models tend to over-fit some CDS maturities at the expense of other maturities, while the BK model is particularly immune from this tendency. The Black model seems preferable because its out-of-sample performance in the time series dimension is the best.     

Hedonic pricing and the role of stud fees in the market for thoroughbred yearlings in Australia

Using data from one of Australia's largest thoroughbred auction houses, we investigate the price determinants of thoroughbred yearlings sold at auction. We include novel key variables to construct hedonic pricing models and examine the relative role of stud fees compared to the wide range of attributes in the pricing of yearlings. We find that the price effect of stud fees is influenced by the value buyers place on both the characteristics of sires and the characteristics of sire side siblings. The findings imply that the quality of dams a sire has been matched within the breeding market has consequential effects on yearling prices through the sire's stud fee and progeny.     

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

离散选择模型的基本原理及其发展演进评介

离散选择模型的研究真正兴起于19世纪50年代末，属于微观计量经济学的范畴。该模型能够对个体和家庭行为进行经验性的统计分析，因而在经济学和其他社会科学中得到广泛的应用。本文从离散选择模型的基本性质及效用最大化的理论背景出发，指出logit模型虽然使用的是最早并且最为广泛的离散选择模型，但是其存在着三大局限性：不能表示随机口味的变化、暗含成比例的替代形式和不能处理不可观测因素在不同期间相关的情形。GEV（含嵌套logit）、probit和混合logit模型等其他的离散选择模型，很大程度上都是为了避免这些限制而产生并发展起来的。     

中国农村土地使用制度:形态变迁与实证分析

二十多年来 ,中国政府一方面强调农户承包经营土地的长期稳定 ,一方面鼓励土地使用制度的不断创新 ,因而中国农地使用制度呈现出“两田制”、“规模规营”、‘四荒’使用权拍卖”、“股份合作制”等多种形态。而“土地调整”和“使用权流转”一直是中国农地制度变迁中的普遍现象。文章对上述中国农地使用制度变迁进行了实证性的分析。     

Physical Search

Unidirectional search is an evolutionarily stable outcome in an economy where homogenous buyers and sellers can either move or stay. It is more efficient than bidirectional search. In unidirectional search, it is more efficient if the more numerous agents move and the less numerous agents stay, than vice versa.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

反向营销和反向拍卖式供应商关系管理比较分析

产品的独特性、产品对企业的重要性、企业的采购量、供应市场状况、供应商的讨价还价能力和企业风险影响供应商关系管理策略。反向营销和反向拍卖是两种不同的供应商关系管理理念,不过全球经济一体化和技术的发展决定了企业中的多数产品既可以实行反向拍卖策略,也可以实行反向营销策略。从直接采购成本、直接交易成本、关系处理成本和供应处理成本四类供应商关系成本以及两类关系收益(成本收益和收入收益)的角度探讨了两种供应商关系管理模式的选择。     

Small dimension PDE for discrete Asian options

This paper presents an efficient method for pricing discrete Asian options in presence of smile and non-proportional dividends. Using an homogeneity property, we show how to reduce an n0 dimensional problem to a one- or two-dimensional one. We examine different numerical specifications of our dimension reduced PDE using a Crank–Nicholson method (interpolation method, grid boundaries, time and space steps) as well as the extension to the case of non-proportional discrete dividends, using a jump condition. We benchmark our results with Quasi Monte-Carlo simulation and a multi-dimensional PDE     

Reduced Form Auctions Revisited

This note uses the Theorem of the Alternative to prove new results on the implementability of general, asymmetric auctions, and to provide simpler proofs of known results for symmetric auctions. The tradeoff is that type spaces are taken to be finite.