银保合作程度的宏观实证检验与微观机制探讨

文章分析了改革开放30年来银行和保险两大金融行业多类宏观指标相互间的关系和影响,发现银行保险业随着各自发展进入成熟期,其协整关系也越来越明显,但是银行与保险业中财产险和人身险的相互影响的关系是不一致的。通过对全国30个省份的研究发现,银保的比例关系与经济发展程度有一定关系,经济发达地区保险业占比反而较小。实证结论对于银保融合中出于不同动机的不同利益诉求者的决策提供了依据,宏微观结合的方式为银行保险的研究提供了更为广阔的思路。     

基于博弈论的电子商务团购信任问题研究

尽管互联网络是一种商家向消费者提供商品和服务的革命性的工具和途径,但市场研究表明,消费者对此的认可程度却是有限的,究其根源就是一个信任问题,信任问题也是电子商务发展的主要障碍。文章首先对电子商务中信任问题研究进行了简单回顾,然后建立了基于博弈论的团购信任分析模型,通过分析发现,团购模式可以抵制电子商务中失信行为的产生,促进电子商务诚信交易环境的建立。     

中国农村土地制度历史变迁的进化博弈论解释

研究目的：解读中国农村土地制度历史变迁规律,分析现阶段农村土地制度改革的取向。研究方法：通过构建中央政府、地方政府、农民集体、农民4方动态进化博弈模型,分析新中国成立后农村土地制度历史变迁中各利益主体博弈进化关系特征及约束条件。研究结果：生成了各利益主体进化博弈关系表及策略对比趋势图。研究结论：（1）新中国成立后农村土地制度以中央政府强制性制度变迁为主导;（2）中国农村土地制度变迁是一个由强制性向诱致性过渡的历史过程,中国农村土地制度的改革应该顺应这种趋势;（3）农民集体是中国农村土地制度历史变迁中中央政府策略选择不完全的产物,其产权关系不清、权能缺失。（4）应该有针对性地完善现行土地产权制度,促使现行农村土地制度由城乡二元体制向一元体制过渡。     

A development bank’s choice of private equity partner: a behavioural game-theoretic approach*

ABSTRACT

We develop a formal game-theoretic analysis of the economic (value-adding abilities) and behavioural factors (empathy, emotional excitement, passion) affecting a development bank’s choice of private-equity partner when investing into emerging market entrepreneurship. Triple-sided moral hazard (TSMH) problems occur in the form of effort-shirking, since the bank, the PE-manager, and the entrepreneur all contribute to value-creation. The bank’s investment choices are crucially affected by a) the relative abilities and the potential level of empathy, excitement and passion that may be generated between a PE-manager and an entrepreneur, and b) the personal emotional attachment that the bank develops towards a PE. The severity of TSMH increases inefficiencies in decision-making. Finally, we consider, in addition to political risk mitigation, an additional impact that the bank may have on PE/E value-creation: the bank may have a coaching/mentoring role. Our analysis has implications for academics and practitioners alike.     

政府监督与企业披露环境信息行为的博弈分析

本文在经典监督博弈模型基础上对政府监督下企业披露环境信息行为进行论述,通过对模型的求解和分析,提出改善我国环境信息披露现状的几点建议。     

土地非农化过程中的博弈关系

研究目的：模拟土地非农化过程中中央政府与地方政府以及地方政府之间的博弈关系。研究方法：斯坦克尔伯格模型和库诺特竞争模型。研究结果：土地税费政策监管不力和地方政府间的过度竞争是造成土地过度非农化的一个重要原因。研究结论：要协调好经济发展与土地资源保护间的关系必须从两方面着手：一是完善土地非农化过程中的税费政策,加强税费监管;二是引导地方政府改变经济发展模式,避免以牺牲土地资源为代价的恶性竞争。     

Friendship,not altruism: an economic theory with cross-cultural applications

Friendship is both ubiquitous and economically important, but neglected in the economic literature. We provide a definition of friendship supported by anthropology research that we believe is plausible, widely accepted, and distinct from altruism. This motivates a game-theoretic model of friendship that provides a characterization of how friendship in a bilateral relationship can explain cooperation in a finite-horizon setting without the aid of altruism or pro-social preferences. We highlight the difference between two key equilibria of our model: opportunistic friendship that is short-lived and driven by material support, and sustained friendship that is long-lived and is distinguished from opportunistic friendship by the provision of support without the expectation of return. Opportunistic friendship seems more likely in environments characterized by economic uncertainty such as in developing countries or immigrant communities. We provide cross-cultural examples of friendship that are consistent with the conditions underpinning opportunistic versus sustained friendship equilibria.     

企业技术标准之争的博弈分析

面对技术标准给我国出口企业带来的冲击，企业的技术标准问题越来越受到理论界的关注。采用博弈论的方法对企业标准之争进行分析，并给我国企业参与国际标准竞争提供策略及建议。     

政府部门人力资本投资的博弈分析

政府部门人力资本投资是政府提高行政效率、公务员个人发展的核心因素之一,但现实情况却是政府及公务员个人对人力资本投资动力不足。本文根据经济学的成本一效益原则,应用博弈论的分析方法探究其成因,提出相应的对策,并建立政府及公务员个人人力资本投资的激励机制,从而加大对政府部门人力资本的投资力度,使政府、公务员及社会达到“三赢”状态。     

The Manufacturing Sector’s Environmental Motives: A Game-theoretic Analysis

What motivates manufacturing companies to make costly investments in producing in an environmentally clean manner? The traditional argument is that such behaviour is value reducing, and that therefore, firms must be forced by regulation to invest in “green” production processes. A counter-argument is that firms have an incentive to make environmental investments in an attempt to attract “green” consumers and investors, hence gaining competitive advantage over their rivals. In this paper, we employ a game-theoretic approach that demonstrates that competing firms’ incentives to make voluntary investments in environmental “clean-up” are affected by the size of the investment costs and the extent of consumer and investor “green” awareness. We argue that an increase in green behaviour can be induced by a combination of governmental subsidies for firms that invest in environmentally clean production processes, together with an education program that promotes “green” awareness amongst consumers, investors and the managers themselves.