美国对华农产品反倾销贸易救济效果分析——基于第三国(地区)市场的视角

在国际贸易中,对出口方的反倾销等贸易救济措施的运用被认为能够为进口方、即反倾销发起者提供有效的贸易保护。但是,如果在对反倾销的贸易保护效果的分析中同时考量第三国市场,则反倾销的贸易救济效果很可能低于发起者预期。本文采用动态面板模型,从第三国市场的角度分析了美国对华农产品反倾销的贸易保护效果。研究结果表明,美国对中国农产品出口的反倾销措施使中国受限产品发生了贸易偏转并挤占了反倾销发起方的海外市场,从而降低了美国反倾销贸易救济预期效果。本文的研究从一个新的视角对美中的贸易摩擦和救济的效果进行了分析,为贸易政策制定及今后双边和多边贸易谈判提供了有益的研究参考。     

ITC voting behavior on sunset reviews

This paper is the first attempt to analyze ITC Commissioner voting behavior on sunset reviews of antidumping cases. Sunset determinations entail greater complexity than initial antidumping investigations because ITC commissioners must account for the impact of dumping protection as well as competitive forces on industry conditions. Empirical findings indicate that ITC voting is based on both sunset regulation and nonstatutory factors. Results reveal apparent biases against Chinese competitors and poorer nations generally, and favorable treatment toward U.S. steel producers and high-wage industries. There is also evidence of preferential treatment of industries located in states of Senate oversight committee members. JEL no. F13     

Cascading contingent protection and vertical market structure

Cascading contingent protection may occur when protection of an upstream industry transfers injury to the downstream industry and increases the likelihood that this industry asks and receives protection. This paper examines cascading protection within a sequential petitioning model where the upstream industry acts as leader. The analysis identifies market structure and the vertical linkage between the upstream and the downstream industry as important determinants of the occurrence of cascading protection. It is shown that the circumstances which make cascading protection more likely to occur also make it more likely that this protection has serious negative welfare consequences.     

澳大利亚反倾销政策及其特点探析

澳大利亚是世界上第二个制定反倾销政策的国家,其反倾销政策具有自身的特点。同时,在反倾销实践中,澳大利亚被称为全球四大传统反倾销用户之一,而中国则成为澳大利亚实施反倾销政策的首要目标国。本文从澳大利亚的反倾销管理体制出发,分析了澳大利亚反倾销政策的主要内容,进而考察了澳大利亚反倾销政策及其实践的特点。     

贵州企业遭遇反倾销案例研究

从1996年起，中国已经连续11年成为世界反倾销头号目标国。贵州省虽然属于西南欠发达省份，但是同国内沿海经济发达地区一样，面临同样的国际市场和同样的反倾销的严峻形势。针对贵州出口涉外企业遭遇的反倾销调查情况进行研究，着重分析了参与应诉的企业和案件，并提出贵州企业应对国外反倾销的策略。     

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the current world trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.     

Trade deflection and trade depression

This is the first paper to empirically examine whether a country's use of an import restricting trade policy distorts a foreign country's exports to third markets. We first develop a theoretical model of worldwide trade in which the imposition of antidumping and safeguard tariffs, or “trade remedies,” by one country causes significant distortions in world trade flows. We then empirically test this model by investigating the effect of the United States' use of such import restrictions on Japanese exports of roughly 4800 products into 37 countries between 1992 and 2001. Our estimation yields evidence that US restrictions both deflect and depress Japanese export flows to third countries. Imposition of a US antidumping measure against Japan deflects trade, as the average antidumping duty on Japanese exports leads to a 5-7% increase in Japanese exports of the same product to the average third country market. The imposition of a US antidumping measure against a third country depresses trade, as the average US duty imposed on a third country leads to a 5-19% decrease in Japanese exports of that same product to the average third country's market. We also document the substantial variation in trade deflection and trade depression across different importing countries and exported products.     

反倾销、反补贴和保障措施——三大贸易救济措施比较分析

众所周知,虽然世贸组织极力倡导国际贸易自由化,并通过多边贸易谈判机制推进国际贸易自由化的进程,但世贸组织并不排斥一定程度和形式的贸易保护,尤其是当大量进口对进口国产生消极影响时,允许进口国采取一定的贸易救济措施来限制进口。近年来,随着我国出口的持续高速增长,越来越多的国家开始频繁对我国的出口实施限制措施,本文通过对反倾销、反补贴和保障措施三大贸易救济措施的比较分析,为我国企业的应对提供了参考意见。     

Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings: evidence from four countries

This paper examines the relationship between antidumping filings and macroeconomic factors. Real exchange rate fluctuations affect the two criteria for dumping in opposite ways, making the overall effect on filings ambiguous in theory. Examining the filing patterns of the four major users of AD law during the 1980-98 period we find that real exchange rates and domestic real GDP growth both have statistically significant impacts on filings. Bilateral filing data indicate that a one-standard deviation real appreciation of the domestic currency increases filings by 33%. We also find one-standard deviation fall in domestic real GDP increases filings by 23%.     

An Econometric Analysis of U.S. Antidumping Sunset Review Decisions

This paper is the first comprehensive analysis of the U.S. antidumping sunset review process required under WTO commitments. The econometric models study determinants of decisions by three U.S. actors: the petitioning industry, the Department of Commerce (DOC), and the International Trade Commission (ITC). Domestic industries facing potential vigorous competition seem to use sunset reviews to maintain current high domestic profits. U.S. governmental institutions use criteria broadly consistent with their legal obligations. Exports involving Chinese firms may face negative bias in the ITC process. JEL no. F1, F13