Government support and bank performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis

Though previous studies suggest a state participation has a negative impact on banks, this paper highlights the potential benefits of state ownership for confidence and stability in the post-crisis period that can outweigh the inefficiencies and potential for corruption of political intervention. We find that the state guarantees are valuable during the crisis. The negative (positive) relation between state ownership and bank profitability (risk) is mitigated in the post-crisis period. Financially troubled banks that receive a transfer payment or capital injection experience improved performance during the post-bailout period.     

The Crash of 1882 and the Bailout of the Paris Bourse

The crash of the French stock market in 1882 presented the Paris Bourse with its worst crisis of the nineteenth century. Its structure was similar in key respects to today’s futures markets, with a dominant forward market leading the Bourse to adopt a common fund to guarantee transactions and liquidity. While this mutualization of risk protects clients and brokers from idiosyncratic shocks, it is generally assumed that it also provides considerable protection against systemic shocks, as no twentieth century exchange has been forced to shut down. Using new archival data, this paper shows how a stock market crash overwhelmed the Bourse’s common fund. Only an emergency loan from the Bank of France, intermediated by the largest banks, prevented a closure of the Bourse.

WHICH INDUSTRIES TO BAIL OUT FIRST IN ECONOMIC RECESSION? RANKING US INDUSTRIAL SECTORS BY THE POWER-OF-PULL

There have been intense debates regarding which industrial sectors should be prioritized for receiving bailout in economic recessions. This paper takes a network perspective to rank sectors according to the Power-of-Pull (PoP), i.e. a sector's power to pull the overall economy. An eigenvector method is employed to assess the PoP of sectors in the USA, using input–output data from 1998 to 2010. The results support bailout to the motor vehicle sector, but argue against bailout to public infrastructure, health care and information technologies design and service sectors, and also reveal the continual decline of PoP ranking of computer and electronics manufacturing sector over time. These results confirm some but also show little support to some other economic revival policies of the Obama Administration in the USA.     

违约与杠杆周期——一个带有救助的金融加速器模型

我国为应对2008年国际金融危机的冲击采取了一系列经济刺激政策,在发挥“稳增长”作用的同时,也在一定程度上导致我国企业部门杠杆水平快速上升,但与此同时,不良贷款率并没有随企业部门杠杆的上升而显著增加。为了解释企业部门违约与杠杆的周期特征,本文在金融加速器模型(Bernanke et al.,1999)基础上,引入政府对企业部门的违约救助机制,建立DSGE模型进行讨论。进一步地,本文还通过一个不合意的去杠杆政策试验表明,忽略资产价格稳定(或者说金融稳定)前提下的去杠杆政策,反而会使企业部门的杠杆和违约率同时上升到一个较高水平。最后,引入一个盯住预期资产价格的动态救助规则能够发挥稳定经济的作用,并提高社会福利水平。     

"大而不倒"救助政策的理论和实证研究

由于大银行倒闭的巨大破坏性,最后贷款人在救助中通常奉行"大而不倒"政策。考虑到救助成本是银行资产规模的增函数,如果救助银行是最优的,那么救助任何一个更大的银行将也是最优的,这也意味着"大而不倒"救助政策在理论上的成立。在"大而不倒"政策下,规模和风险之间存在相互影响的关系。"大而不倒"救助政策影响银行的规模选择和资产风险的组合选择,导致银行追求变得更大且更具风险。     

金融危机救助方案与成本分担机制分析

各国政府应对本轮金融危机的救助虽取得一定成效,但仍然引发了关于救助方案的选择和救助成本等相关问题的探讨。英美等发达国家的救助基本遵循了依靠市场或私人机构进行救助,政府尽量不采取直接的干预,以减少政府救助成本。资产负债表重构这一救助方式能将救助成本分担到私人机构,在合适的条件下应用,可以降低救助道德风险发生的可能性,并且极大地减少政府的救助成本。     

A Simple Model of Corporate Bailouts in a Globalized Economy*

In this paper, we explore how globalization influences the decision of governments to rescue inefficient domestic firms when bailouts affect firms’ markup. We develop a model of international trade in which immobile domestic-owned enterprises (DOEs) compete with foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) in an oligopolistic market. The decision to bail out DOEs leads to lower corporate tax revenues if FOEs are immobile, whereas tax revenues might increase if FOEs are mobile. Interestingly, the mobility of FOEs makes governments more prone to rescuing inefficient domestic firms because tax competition reduces the opportunity cost of a bailout policy in terms of public good provision.     

The state as the investor of last resort: a comparative study of banking crises in Denmark and Sweden

This article addresses the role of the state in bailouts, i.e. government objectives and measures during banking crises. Our main question concerns the incentives and measures that governments pursue in a state of a systemic banking crisis, and why they are launched. What have been the objectives and operations when a government has decided to act as an investor of last resort and take control of commercial banks? The answer is limited to cover the financial history of two countries. The study unveils government interventions in the latest crises in Denmark and Sweden, and critically analyse which objectives justified the setting up of organisations for financial stability. The two country-cases differ in terms of historical experience, context, and time-period. We compare intrinsic principles and perceptions for government intervention, with a focus on bailouts and state-owned banks. We argue that the implementation of measures dates back to the early phases of capitalism in the 19th century i.e. is part of a historical institutional pattern. The similarities shown indicate that there is an international standard for a public–private arrangement ensuring financial stability. Our results relate to the discussion of launching effective and legitimate state policies during and after a systemic banking crisis.     

Ireland’s 2010 EU/IMF intervention: Costs and benefits

This paper examines the costs and benefits of the EU/IMF rescue package for Ireland, on November 29, 2010. We analyze the costs of the intervention and the subsequent increase in value of debt and/or equity issued by Irish banks, the Irish government, and European banks with substantial holdings of Irish debt. The total initial value increase around the announcement amounts to €5.59bln at a realized taxpayers’ cost of €4.23bln. While the value increase depends on somewhat generous assumptions, it further increases by €2.8bln up to Ireland’s exit in December 2013. About €3.1bln of the value created indirectly supports the European banking sector, indicating that substantial benefits arise from systemic risk containment.     

Bank liquidity regulation and the lender of last resort

Banks can make suboptimal liquidity choices and gamble for lender of last resort (LOLR) support. Endogenous bailout rents are driven by the need to preserve bankers' incentives under uncertain net worth. In equilibrium, banks can herd in risk management, choosing suboptimal liquidity when they expect others to do so. Optimal liquidity can be restored by quantitative requirements, but such regulation is costly. An LOLR policy incorporating bank capital information can reduce distorting rents and allow for a more efficient solution, but may only be possible in transparent economies.