高管薪酬、董事会治理与分类转移

本文研究了高管薪酬和董事会治理对分类转移的影响。研究表明,货币薪酬会诱使高管向上转移利得,股权激励和缺乏区分度的薪酬制度会诱使高管同时向下转移费用和向上转移利得;而勤勉、独立和两职分离的董事会能够在一定程度上识别并抑制这两种不同方式的分类转移;但董事会对分类转移的抑制程度小于高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发程度。进一步地,良好的市场、法制和媒体监督环境能够有效缓解高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发作用,而董事会能够有效弥补法制建设和媒体监督不足导致的分类转移治理缺陷,并在较高质量的审计环境下对分类转移发挥更强的抑制作用。本文首次结合制度背景和媒体监督研究了公司核心治理机制对不同分类转移方式的影响和原因,并创新性地对向上转移利得的程度进行了衡量,为监管部门及公司治理机制、会计准则的制定者提供经验证据。     

Strategic insider trading around earnings announcements in Australia

This paper tests, within the Australian setting, whether directors strategically time trades in their own firms, around earnings announcements, in the context of impediments to trading in the immediately preceding period. I show that both signed and unsigned trade activity are insignificantly different from zero in the preceding period, and significantly negative and positive after the event. Further, directors in Australia significantly sell following positive earnings news, and buy after negative news, providing evidence of ‘indirect’ trading. Directors’ trades in the longer-term pre-announcement period are also negatively related to the news content sentiment, contrary to expectation. Finally, I find evidence of positive autocorrelation between directors’ trades over the longer-term past, and those executed after earnings announcements, which, in the absence of the ‘short-swing’ rule in Australia, casts doubt over short-term strategic insider trading, more generally.     

非公允关联交易中董事责任问题研究——兼评世行营商环境评估之董事责任程度指标

在关联交易中,对关联董事的追责应采用忠实义务标准。然而,当前立法存在"程序公平倾向"以及"忠实义务追责标准狭窄"的问题,导致无法对已履行法定程序的关联董事进行追责。对此应将忠实义务下追责标准改为全面公平标准,对关联董事课以承担非公允关联交易中公司所受损失的义务;对非关联董事的追责应采用勤勉义务标准。因为当前立法过于原则化,缺乏适用空间,所以应在信义义务两分法下积极拓展勤勉义务即"知情"的基础上决策的内涵,衍生出对于公司造成损失的直接故意、间接故意以及重大过失三种追责情形,以弥补董事问责空隙,并将"商业判断规则"作为法院介入而非排除审查的判断标准,进一步激活董事追责的路径。     

集权式股权结构会影响信息技术企业创新吗——非执行董事的中介效应

中国企业普遍具有高股权集中度。基于双重委托代理理论，以Osiris和CSMAR数据库中国信息技术类全球上市公司为样本，研究不同集权式股权结构对企业创新的差异化影响，以及非执行董事在二者关系中的作用机制。结果显示，绝对集权式股权结构更易形成控股股东的“支持效应”和大股东间“同舟共济”，体现为保守的创新投入和较高的创新产出；相对集权式股权结构更易形成控股股东的“掏空效应”和大股东间“同床异梦”，体现为较高的创新投入和较低的产出。基于中介效应机制的研究表明，非执行董事对创新投入的决策效应不显著，但对创新产出的“监督效应”显著，且非执行董事具有显著中介效应。进一步分析表明，两职分离能够抑制相对集权式企业控股股东的“掏空”行为；家族企业在相对集权式股权结构下的“掏空效应”和“同床异梦”更明显。     

"名人"独立董事履行职责状况分析——来自中国上市公司的证据

本文以2006～2007年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了我国上市公司聘请的独立董事的知名度是否会影响其履职效力.结果发现,上市公司聘请的"名人"独立董事确实存在"知名度效应":学界"名人"独立董事对提高财务报告质量和抑制公司高管违规有显著影响,但同时发现学界"名人"独立董事和企业界"名人"独立董事在发表意见时没有履行好勤勉的职责,发表独立意见的可能性较小.此外,本文还发现具有财会背景和法律背景的独立董事有助于减少公司和高管个人违规事件的发生.这一结果表明上市公司聘请"名人"独立董事具有信息后果,支持独立董事能够降低代理成本的逻辑.     

论我国实施独立董事制度的主要障碍及相关建议

独立董事制度在公司治理中发挥着极其重要的作用,然而,它的具体实施存在着诸多障碍。首先,必须对法律、证券监管机构制定的行政法规等进行必要的修改,构建出合理的立法体系。其次,必须尽快完善对该制度作用发挥有较大影响的相关制度,使独立董事制度与其它公司机关及法律制度较好地协调起来,共同改善上市公司的治理。     

Corporate governance,accounting and finance: A review

We review accounting and finance research on corporate governance (CG). In the course of our review, we focus on a particularly vexing issue, namely endogeneity in the relationships between CG and other matters of concern to accounting and finance scholars, and suggest ways to deal with it. Given the advent of large commercial CG databases, we also stress the importance of how CG is measured and in particular, the construction of CG indices, which should be sensitive to local institutional arrangements, and the need to capture both internal and external aspects of governance. The ‘stickiness’ of CG characteristics provides an additional challenge to CG scholars. Better theory is required, for example, to explain whether various CG practices substitute for each other or are complements. While a multidisciplinary approach to developing better theory is never without its difficulties, it could enrich the current body of knowledge in CG. Despite the vastness of the existing CG literature, these issues do suggest a number of avenues for future research.     

Effects of agency risks and procedural justice on board processes in venture capital-backed firms

This paper builds a model of the effects of agency risk and procedural justice in the boards of directors of venture capital-backed firms. Such boards are unique in that they consist of managers and outside owners with significant power and incentive to be highly involved in venture governance. The authors integrate agency theory and procedural justice perspectives to develop propositions regarding the effects of agency risk and board processes on the responses to poor performance and conflicts of interest. This integrated perspective suggests that factors that increase perceived agency risks will increase outsiders' tendency to focus efforts on monitoring and controlling board decisions and their propensity to resort to formal means to resolve conflicts. However, the authors suggest that through their effects on trust and positive attributions, fair procedures and interactions will reduce these tendencies. A discussion of the practical and theoretical implications of the proposed model concludes the paper.     

Insolvent trading and voluntary administration in Australia: economic winners and losers?

Australian directors who incur debts while their companies are insolvent can be pursued by the corporate regulator for compensation when their companies fail. Under the Australian insolvent trading laws, directors no longer experience ‘true’ limited liability, and as expected, they adjust their behaviour as a result. Identifying director's rational behaviour in an insolvent trading world is difficult as there are no formal economic models of director decision-making under Australian current corporate law. In this paper, we develop such a model primarily for private companies. We incorporate the threat of insolvent trading as well as director's tactical use of voluntary administration to avoid insolvent trading litigation. We show that neither a combination of insolvent trading or voluntary administration can simultaneously ensure creditors-best outcomes, eliminate insolvent trading and reduce director underinvestment.     

高校就业指导人员应具备的素质能力

随着大学生就业制度改革的深入,就业市场的不断开放,高校就业工作面临许多新情况和新问题.因此,也对高校就业指导人员的素质能力提出了更高的要求.高校就业指导人员必须具有强烈的服务意识、良好的思想政治素质和职业道德素质、精湛的业务素质以及良好的心理素质,才能完成新的就业机制赋予的艰巨使命.