Unobserved ties between corporate executives and mutual fund managers

After corporate executives relocate from origin firms to destination firms, only 3.6 percent of mutual fund managers follow the departing executives: they divest from origin firms while initiating investments in destination firms. This phenomenon is more pronounced for those funds that earned superior returns from investments in the origin firms, and that demand more information regarding the destination firms. Further, comigration funds’ holding changes in destination firms more accurately predict cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements than do their investments in other stocks and non‐comigration funds’ new investments. Hiring the migrating executives does not improve the destination firms’ operating performance.     

Do mutual fund flows affect the French corporate bond market?

We study whether investors’ withdrawals from mutual funds affect corporate bond prices. As mutual funds have become major players in the financial markets, they are likely to exert downward pressures on asset prices when facing investors’ redemptions, particularly in the less liquid markets such as corporate bonds. We use a novel dataset on the French bond funds and show that both flows in and out of mutual funds lead to a significant effect on the corporate bond yields. This effect is asymmetric as redemptions provoke a change in yields of greater magnitude than inflows. Moreover, all corporate bonds are not equally affected by investors’ withdrawals from funds: The more a bond is detained by funds, the higher the impact of redemptions on its yield. These three results are robust to various changes in econometric specifications.     

Capital gains lock-in and governance choices

Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.     

Does High Stock Price Synchronicity Always Hurt Mutual Fund Industry? Sentiment Matters

Investors have agreed that high synchronicity of stock returns adversely influences professional funds' profitability. However, different market conditions where high synchronicity exists may have different effects on this relationship. This study incorporates aggregate investor sentiment as a market condition in the equation to explore whether and when the negative association between synchronicity and fund performance holds. The authors use a sample of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds from 2000 to 2014 and employ a portfolio of 11 passively managed funds as the benchmark to measure fund performance and fund management skill. They find empirical evidence that synchronicity negatively impacts mutual funds' profitability when the investor sentiment is low. This negative relationship disappears in high-sentiment periods. They also find that in both low- and high-sentiment states, fund managers with superior stock selection skill make more profits from high synchronicity than the average.     

Mutual monitoring and corporate governance

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin’s Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the No. 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; and (3) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on CEO power.     

Determinants of Inflow to Mutual Funds: Criterion and Methodology for Their Application to the Mainland China Market

This study is based on the Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes [2001] and Hsieh, Yang and Yu [2008] as foundations to study which reasons and control factors cause herding behavior of mutual fund inflows. The study uses the most popular Asian emerging market, China, as the sample to determine the real attractive reason behind the mutual fund inflows to China. The significant determinant of the mutual fund inflows to China is stock returns for both Shanghai and Shenzhen A stock markets.     

Gold price risk and the returns on gold mutual funds

A model is presented for estimating the theoretical gold price elasticity of the value of mutual funds investing in gold mining companies. The theoretical elasticity shows that if the funds invest in companies whose assets are comprised primarily of operating gold mines, then the return of an investment in the fund will be at least as great as an investment in gold (i.e., the gold price elasticity of the gold fund is greater than 1). Empirical tests of the above propositions are presented. Empirical tests also show, however, that the gold mutual funds contain a substantial amount of risk which is not explained either by market risk or gold price risk. Accordingly, gold mutual funds and gold bullion do not bring identical risks to an investor's portfolio.     

Socially responsible investment fund performance: the impact of screening intensity

Perhaps the most common criticism of socially responsible investment funds is that imposing non‐financial screens restricts investment opportunities, reduces diversification efficiencies and thereby adversely impacts performance. In this study we investigate this proposition and test whether the number of screens employed has a linear or curvilinear relation with return. Moreover, we analyse the link between screening intensity and risk. Screening intensity has no effect on unadjusted (raw) returns or idiosyncratic risk. However, we find a significant reduction in α of 70 basis points per screen using the Carhart performance model. Increased screening results in lower systematic risk – in line with managers choosing lower β stocks to minimize overall risk.     

The path to Project Darwin: The evolution of the AMP's organisational structure

Demutualisation became a global trend amongst financial sector firms in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Changes to the organisational foundations of mutual firms represented a shift in operational cultures and have often been viewed as an end point or demise of the co-operative business model. It is the intention of this article to investigate the extent to which this was the case within a major mutual institution, the Australian Mutual Provident, Australia's oldest and largest mutual insurer. The article's key argument is that the concept of mutuality is organic, and that within this organisation it evolved as the structure of the firm became more sophisticated as it developed from a supplier of life insurance products into a sophisticated financial services provider, which ultimately generated internal pressures to demutualise.     

Mutual fund flows and window-dressing

We use a sequential game to analyze an agency problem in the mutual fund industry where a representative fund manager considers window-dressing his portfolio holdings for the purpose of attracting fund flows from a representative investor. The manager is motivated to window-dress to improve the investor's perception of managerial skill which may positively affect fund flows in the next period. However, the investor may suspect window-dressing and thus downgrade perceived managerial skill. The model supports a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the manager window-dresses only when receiving a low return in the first period and the investor withdraws funds only when observing low returns in both periods. Consequently, we show that window-dressing is a rational behavior even when fund outflows may result.