控股股东“掏空”与“支持”:企业所得税的影响

源于企业所得税的征收,国家某种意义上是公司最大的“小股东”。本文将“国家股东”纳入控股股东与小股东间博弈行为的分析框架,检验企业所得税征收对控股股东“掏空”与“支持”的影响。结果表明,在“掏空”与“支持”的选择上,企业所得税会产生两方面效应:税率提高会增强控股股东“掏空”的倾向;而税收征管则能够抑制其“掏空”的倾向。区分“掏空”与“支持”两类情形,当控股股东试图“掏空”时,税率越高,税收征管强度越低,“掏空”程度越高;当控股股东试图“支持”时,税率越高,税收征管强度越高,“支持”程度越高。本文不仅提供了“掏空”与“支持”影响因素方面新的经验证据,且丰富了税与代理问题相关的学术文献。     

Related party transactions and firm value: The moderating role of corporate social responsibility reporting

This study investigates the influence of related party transactions (RPTs) on firm value. Further, it examines whether a firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting reflects its corporate values and ethical concerns, therefore mitigating the value-destroying effects of RPTs. Based on 274 observations from publicly listed firms in Indonesia, our results show that RPTs (i.e., related party sales) are negatively related to firm value. Further, we find that in the presence of better CSR reporting, the relationship between RPTs and firm value becomes more positive. This is in line with the view that CSR reporting, which reflects firms’ ethical concerns, may serve as a mechanism against managers’ opportunism. However, we find that related party payables have a positive relationship with firm value. Further investigation reveals that, although certain RPTs show a short-term, value-enhancing effect, these transactions seem to result in subsequent tunneling activities, suggesting managerial opportunism in the long term.     

控制股东的掏空行为与公司的股权结构及公司价值——基于双层委托代理模型的分析

本文构建了一个小股东、控制股东和经理人之间的双层委托代理理论分析框架来分析我国上市公司中同时存在的两类代理问题:股东与经理人的利益冲突以及控制股东与小股东的利益冲突。在此基础上着重研究了控制股东掏空行为与公司股权结构及公司价值之间的关系。通过分析指出:(1)均衡状态下,公司的所有权集中程度由公司股东所受投资者法律保护程度决定。随着投资者法律保护程度的增加,小股东最优的投资数量也会增加,公司的所有权结构趋于更加分散。(2)在公司的现金流所有权结构确定的情况下,由股东和经理人之间的信息非对称性引起的股东和经理人之间的利益冲突会减少公司价值,使得控制股东和小股东的利益均受到损害。控制股东掏空资产收益的比例随着其自身现金流所有权的增加而减少,随着其控制权和所有权之间的分离程度而增加,随着投资者法律保护的增加而减少。(3)相对于公司中仅仅存在股东和经理人之间的利益冲突的情形,控制股东的掏空行为会进一步降低公司的价值,而且降低的程度会随着控制股东的控制权和所有权的分离程度的增加而增加。(4)当控制股东完全不能进行掏空时,即使小股东仍然面临由于公司中的第Ⅰ类代理问题引起的利益损害,但均衡时,由于控制股东和小股东之间不存在利...     

Is Merge and Acquisition Tunneling or Propping？ Evidence from Asset Appraisal

本文以评估增值率和评估方法的选择作为掏空或支持行为的观测变量，实证检验了2001-2010年上市公司并购重组过程中控股股东与地方政府的掏空或支持行为，并考察了不同盈亏状况下所存在的行为差异。研究发现，关联并购交易和同属并购交易中存在控股股东的掏空行为和地方政府的支持行为；盈利企业的控股股东将通过操纵资产的评估增值率来实现其对上市公司的掏空，并试图通过选择评估方法来掩盖其行为，而亏损公司所属地方政府则可能通过干预同属公司问并购交易的资产评估实现对上市公司的支持。     

云南省公路隧道塌方原因及对策分析

云南省公路隧道相当部分需要穿越滑坡、断裂破碎带等不良地质,隧道塌方情况时有发生,塌方处治加大了工程资金投入,影响工期,同时对施工人员的生命安全也构成了巨大威胁。隧道塌方的原因较为复杂,只有掌握工程地质条件,充分了解设计意图,严格控制施工方法、施工程序,才能有效地规避隧道塌方的发生。     

Are regulations the answer for emerging stock markets? Evidence from the Czech Republic and Poland

Does the emergence of a stock market require a well-developed legal and/or regulatory system? Although historical work by Neal and Davis [Neal, L., & Davis, L. (2005). The evolution of the rules and regulations of the first emerging markets: The London, New York, and Paris stock exchanges, 1792–1914. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 45, 296–311] and Stringham [Stringham, E. (2003). The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth century Amsterdam. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43, 321–344] suggests that securities markets have successfully developed with little government oversight, numerous authors [including Black, B. (2001). The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. University of California Law Angeles Law Review, 48, 781–855; Coffee, J. (1999). Privatization and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure. Journal of Corporation Law, 25, 1–39; Frye, T. (2000). Brokers and bureaucrats: Building market institutions in Russia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Glaeser, E., Johnson, S., & Shleifer, A. (2001). Coase versus the Coasians. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 853–899; Mlčoch, L. (2000). Restructuring of property rights: An institutional view. In L. Mlčoch et al. (Eds.), Economic and Social Changes in Czech Society After 1989. Prague: The Karolinum Press; Pistor, K. (2001). Law as a determinant for equity market development – the experience of transition economies. In Peter Murrell (Ed.), The Value of Law in Transition Economies (pp. 249–287). Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press; Stiglitz, J. (1999). Whither reform. Ten years of the transition. Keynote Address, Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, April 28–30, 1999; Zhang, X. (2006). Financial market governance in developing countries: Getting the political underpinnings right. Journal of Developing Societies, 2, 169–196] argue that the Czech Republic and other Eastern European governments need more regulation for their newly created stock markets. They maintain that the Warsaw Stock Exchange, which is seen as more regulated, has outperformed the Prague Stock Exchange which is seen as largely unregulated. Thus increased regulations are a key to increased performance. This article, however, maintains that the evidence from the Czech experience has been misinterpreted. This article provides an in depth case study of the Czech stock market and finds that (a) Czech capital markets have been hindered by government intervention from their beginning, (b) that the evidence on Poland's superior performance is not as strong as suggested, and (c) that Czech regulators seem to be unqualified, lack the proper incentives, and are unlikely to benefit the market. Under these circumstances it appears that Neal and Davis (2005:311) are correct that increased government involvement is unlikely to improve the situation.     

上市公司资本运营过程及价值分析——基于飞天系的案例

控股股东利用对上市公司的控制权,通过关联交易、资金占用、资产置换等手段掏空上市公司,获取私有收益的案例层出不穷。本文通过对飞天系资本运营过程的描述分析和特点归纳,揭示其对上市公司和中小股东价值的影响,并在此基础上对我国证券市场的健康发展提出建议。     

大股东对上市公司掏空与支持的经济学分析

在公司的所有权安排中,大股东拥有公司的控制权,有能力为获取控制权的私人利益而侵占上市公司的资源。但是,当上市公司陷入经营困境时,大股东可能通过减少自己的侵占行为而使公司具有偿债能力,甚至会用自己的资源进行支持以防止公司破产。如果上市公司的投资回报率低于大股东的预期水平,或者预期上市公司无法继续生存下去时,大股东会以公司外部股东和债权人的利益为代价而对上市公司进行掠夺。     

Health benefits of tunneling through the Chinese environmental Kuznets curve (EKC)

In this paper, we first add to what is a growing literature on the existence and nature of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) model for developing countries, by testing for the existence of an EKC for China using a panel data set of city-specific, annual ambient levels of SO₂ pollution. We find some support for both the typical inverted-U-shaped relationship and an N-shaped, cubic configuration. More significantly, we then explore the possibility of China's “tunneling” through the EKC, by using newer, cleaner technologies, and thereby avoiding some of the environmental degradation that had often accompanied economic growth. Specifically, we estimate and economically value the health benefits realizable to Chinese cities from successful efforts to “tunnel” under the EKC over the next generation.     

大股东资金占用与审计师的监督

本文研究审计师对大股东占用上市公司资金行为的监督作用。通过对1997年到2002年间的上市公司进行分析,我们发现随着大股东资金占用程度的加大,审计师更加倾向于出示非标准意见。在大股东占用资金最多的10%的公司年度中,审计师出示非标准意见的概率高达近50%。在控制了其他影响审计师意见的变量以后,大股东资金占用程度仍然是决定审计意见的一个非常显著的因素。这说明我国的审计师对中国资本市场出现的大股东资金占用问题有一定的认识,并且将其反映到审计师意见中去。我们进一步的分析发现: (1)被审计师出具了非标准意见的公司,其大股东占用资金反而更加持续。这说明审计师意见对公司的监督意义不大,公司并没有因为审计师的意见而减轻占用程度。(2)被审计师出具了非标准意见的公司,其大股东占用对未来的股票收益的负影响与其他公司并没有区别。这说明投资者对审计师的意见并没有给予足够的重视。本文的研究结果说明,审计师对大股东盘剥中小股东的现象进行了监督、对大股东资金占用严重的公司出示了更多的非标准意见,然而这些非标准意见并没有引起各方面的重视,一方面公司的治理并没有改善,另一方面投资者也没有因审计师的意见而避免更多的损失。