债务契约冲突:投资过度或不足——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

过度投资和投资不足是企业债权人与股东财务冲突最常见的两种类型。笔者以2004年～2006年中国制造业上市公司为样本实证研究发现,中国企业债权人与股东之间的财务冲突既具有一般性又具有特殊性。一般性在于债权冲突类型与企业投资项目的风险水平相关。而特殊性主要表现在冲突类型与企业所有权性质相关:即相对国有控股上市公司,民营控股上市公司存在投资不足的债权冲突;相对民营控股上市公司,国有控股上市公司长期债务存在过度投资的债权冲突。     

Alternative Solutions to Underinvestment, Under Equity and Credit Rationing

We compare alternative solutions to underinvestment (UI) problems in firms subject to limited access to equity markets, interest ceilings, and constraints on the volume of debt. Collaterals (assets or compensating balances) and credit insurance ('regular' or 'outcome' insurance whereby the premium is paid at the end of the insurance period) are compared on the basis to their costs and their effective use of financial sources. It is shown that when there is no moral hazard problem, credit insurance is the most effective instrument. Otherwise, 'outcome' insurance program is the most effective one.     

债务期限结构与企业投资行为的实证研究

现行的债务期限结构与企业投资行为关系的研究通常认为,短期债务不会导致企业的过度投资行为。然而,以2007—2010年我国沪深股市的892家制造业上市公司为研究对象并利用面板数据模型进行计量分析显示:这一方面具有一定的合理性,另一方面也表明我国上市公司的过度投资行为至少有部分原因是由于债务期限偏短所导致的。     

Foreign investors versus local businesses: an urban economics model for tourist cities

Most economics and urban literature focuses on the economic aspects of foreign investors' impact on cities and defends their positive role in urban development. This paper takes a different approach by developing an urban economics model for tourist cities that illustrates how, when there is local underinvestment and a large influx of foreign labour, transnational enterprises may make their profits at the expense of local businesses. Therefore, it is the government's responsibility to regulate foreign investment in a way that is conducive to sustainable development. Macao is adopted as a case study. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Agency cost of debt overhang with optimal investment timing and size

The concept of debt overhang (that is, an equity‐maximizing levered firm will under‐invest relative to a firm‐value‐maximizing firm) is well established in the literature. A number of papers have demonstrated it as delayed investment (when investment size is specified) or smaller investment (when investment time is specified). However, there is no work on the underinvestment effect when the firm chooses both size and timing of investment, as it usually does in real life. This is what our paper focuses on. When the firm has the flexibility to choose both size and time, the effect is complicated by the fact that delayed investment results in larger investment, which suggests that the underinvestment problem might be mitigated. We find, however, that the effect depends on how underinvestment is measured. When measured by the expected present value of investment, flexibility can mitigate or exacerbate the underinvestment problem, depending on the cost of installing capacity. But when measured by the agency cost, flexibility always exacerbates the underinvestment problem. It is shown numerically that, at the optimal leverage ratio, the agency cost with plausible parameter values can be economically significant. Thus, with the flexibility of choosing both time and size of investment, the debt overhang problem can be of significant practical relevance in corporate investment decisions.     

Political Connections and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation Through Bond Financing in Chinese Listed Companies

Using a database of firms issuing short-term financing bonds and mid-term notes in China from 2007 to 2011, we uncover whether and how political connections influence the companies' capital allocation efficiency. The authors show that politically connected firms have significantly lower capital allocation efficiency, especially in the case of overinvestment subsamples. In addition, different types of political connections have different effects on firms' inefficient investments. Compared with firms connected to members of the people's congresses and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (MPCP firms), firms connected to government officials (GOF) overinvest more and underinvest less. One year after bond financing, GOF politically connected firms decreased overinvestment, while underinvestment undergoes an upward trend in the MPCP firms.     

Alternative Solutions to Underinvestment, Under Equity and Credit Rationing

We compare alternative solutions to underinvestment (UI) problems in firms subject to limited access to equity markets, interest ceilings, and constraints on the volume of debt. Collaterals (assets or compensating balances) and credit insurance ('regular' or 'outcome' insurance whereby the premium is paid at the end of the insurance period) are compared on the basis to their costs and their effective use of financial sources. It is shown that when there is no moral hazard problem, credit insurance is the most effective instrument. Otherwise, 'outcome' insurance program is the most effective one.     

债务期限与企业投资行为:一项理论分析

在单时期模型和企业投资决策中的实物期权思想的基础上构建的两时期模型,证明了短期债务其实有可能使得企业发生过度投资行为,短期债务也有可能使得企业发生投资不足行为,长期债务总是导致企业发生投资不足行为,短期债务对企业投资不足的影响较长期债务要轻,以及平均债务期限与企业投资呈负向关系等重要结论。     

信息不对称条件下商业银行在投资决策中的作用研究

现行的强制性信息披露制度与外部审计制度不能有效解决信息不对称条件下股票市场投资不足的问题。文章探讨了商业银行监督对缓解股票市场中信息不对称问题的作用，通过振企博弈模型研究了优质公司借助商业银行控制贷款规模来传递信号，向投资者表明自身为绩优企业，从而达到有效解决投资不足问题的可行性。     

基于管理者过度自信的企业投资异化研究综述

企业的投资异化现象普遍存在于各国的企业中,这种异化会给企业及其利益相关者带来损失。随着行为金融学的兴起,近年来,从管理者过度自信角度研究企业投资异化问题成为学术界一个研究的热点,逐步形成了一些理论模型,得出了相应的研究结论。就该领域主要的理论研究和实证研究,从管理者过度自信所引起的过度投资、投资不足、过度并购以及由此带来的价值损毁等问题,对相关文献进行了回顾和评述,并对未来的研究方向进行了一定的展望。