中国集体林产权制度改革回顾与展望

采用历史产权制度研究方法,利用详实的历史数据与信息,系统地分析改革开放以来中国集体林产权制度改革每个重要时期的改革内容与进程以及集体林地林木流转制度演化历程,发现改革开放四十年中国集体林所有权和家庭经营的基因没有变,变的是集体林地承包经营权的实现形式;指出集体林产权制度变迁道路中的困惑;提出未来集体林产权制度的选择路径。     

生态文明建设背景财政扶持、林权改革对林业生产效率的影响

基于2000—2016年中国省际面板数据,利用DEA-Malmquist指数法对中国林业生产效率的区域差异和时序变化进行研究,运用面板Tobit模型检验财政扶持对林业生产效率的影响并验证林权改革对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现:在生态文明建设背景下,林业生产效率存在显著的区域差异;技术进步对于全要素生产率的提升起到重要推进作用;财政扶持与林权改革均对林业生产效率产生了正向影响,但林权改革并没有对财政扶持与林业生产效率的关系产生积极调节作用。因此,各省份应当通过加大政府扶持力度、优化投资方式、深化集体林权制度改革等措施促进林业生产效率提升。     

Property Rights Reform in Rangeland China: Dilemmas On the Road to the Household Ranch

This paper contributes to the debate over land tenure in rural China by extending its spatial coverage to the country’s extensive rangeland regions. Key characteristics of pastoral tenure, identified from field appraisals in western China, include group tenure and fuzzy boundaries. Although these characteristics give rise to efficiency concerns, from a new institutional economics perspective they also facilitate the realization of certain benefits, benefits that could represent opportunity costs of further exclusiveness. The strengthening of rangeland co-management may constitute a more appropriate path to institutional improvement than the establishment of the household ranch, the current goal of national rangeland policy.     

CEO power and annual report reading difficulty

We examine the impact of CEO power on reading difficulty of corporate annual reports. We find that CEO power is positively related to reading difficulty, implying that annual reports of corporations with powerful CEOs are difficult to read and understand. More importantly, we find that the relation between CEO power and reading difficulty is moderated by earnings performance or corporate governance. Additional findings suggest that this relation becomes stronger for firms with lower financial reporting quality or for CEOs with shorter tenure. Our study not only joins the debate on the consequences of powerful CEOs but also uncovers several factors that moderate the relation between CEO power and annual report reading difficulty.     

中国城镇家庭住房来源与产权的省际差异——基于2000年人口普查资料的分析

根据中国2000年人口普查资料,分析了中国城镇家庭住房来源与产权的省际差异。住房来源与产权选择省际差异不明显;基本是沿海经济发达地区住房来源中商品房来源与产权选择中租赁商品房比重高。相关分析表明:地区市场化指数与市场型住房正相关,收入和产权关系不明显,国有经济比重与行政型住房正相关,城市化率与购商品房比正相关,价格和住房产权负相关。这说明了制度变迁和地区经济差异对住房选择的影响。     

CEO任期、CEO权力集中度与中国制造企业自主创新能力——基于中国制造业上市公司2006—2017年的经验证据

本文以中国制造业上市公司2006—2017年数据为研究对象,以CEO权力集中度为调节变量探讨了CEO任期与中国制造企业自主创新能力之间的关系,研究发现:①长期意义上CEO任期越长,越有利于自主创新能力提升;②CEO权力集中度越高,越有利于自主创新能力提升;③CEO权力集中度与CEO任期有"伴随效应",能够扩张CEO任期对自主创新能力的正向效应,正所谓"用人不疑,疑人不用";④在当前,国有制造企业更应注重CEO任期对自主创新能力的积极作用,应考虑增加国企CEO任期;而民营制造企业要注重公司治理结构中CEO权力集中度。结论具有稳健性。     

Top Management Team Characteristics and Accrual-Based Earnings Management

This study examines how top management team (TMT) knowledge and average tenure affect accrual-based earnings management by investigating 4791 Taiwanese listed companies from 2006 to 2010. TMT members with more knowledge (higher education level, more accounting expertise, and greater prior top management experience) and longer average tenure have better performances and higher reputations, and are more aware of the litigation costs of earnings manipulations; therefore, they reduce managers' incentives to manage earnings (incentive-reduction effect). On the other hand, these TMT members are also likely to become entrenched and engage in more earnings manipulations (entrenchment-enhancing effect). The empirical results show that firms' TMT knowledge and average tenure are negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that the incentive-reduction effect is stronger than the entrenchment-enhancing effect, which makes TMT members less likely to engage in earnings management. Moreover, the above results are robust when employing different earnings management measures and suspect firm analyses, as well as considering endogeneity issues. Finally, the study suggests that the presence of a founding family may reduce the influences of TMT knowledge and average tenure on earnings management.     

Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance

We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U‐shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that directors’ on‐the‐job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a sample of firms in which an outside director suffered a sudden death, and find that sudden deaths that move board tenure away from (toward) the empirically observed optimum level in the cross‐section are associated with negative (positive) announcement returns. The quality of corporate decisions also follows an inverted U‐shaped pattern in a sample of firms affected by the death of a director.     

Audit Firm Tenure and Audit Quality in a Constrained Market

We examine the relation between audit quality and audit firm tenure in the Iranian audit market, which is constrained by government policies that create intense competition for clients among many small audit firms. We develop arguments that these circumstances create cost pressures that entrench low audit quality and render auditors' plans more predictable to managers wishing to misstate their accounts. Using publicly available data for the audits of listed companies in Iran prior to mandatory audit firm rotation and the incidence of misstated financial reports identified by the Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants Inspection Office, we find that the likelihood of a misstatement is lowest in the first two years of audit firm tenure. We also find that the likelihood of misstatement is not associated with the year preceding a mandatory audit firm rotation, suggesting outgoing auditor effort is not sensitive to the prospect of subsequent revelations of deficiencies. Although our results from a pre-mandatory rotation period show that frequent rotations appear to improve the financial reporting quality in our sample, we are wary of interpreting these results as support for the mandatory audit firm rotation policy in Iran. Rather, we suggest this is a peculiar consequence of deficiencies in audit quality inherent in the Iranian market.