价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

参考价格与消费者的价格感知

众多的理论与实践研究都证明，消费者内心的价格标准——参考价格是决定其价格感知和购买行为的核心因素，研究参考价格对企业合理定价、与消费者沟通价格信息、开展价格促销具有十分重要的指导意义，文章对西方学者近几十年来的关于参考价格和消费者价格感知方面的理论与实证研究进行了系统的总结，并讨论了这些研究对我国学者及管理者的启示。     

网页交互与发起人资历对农业众筹项目融资绩效的影响

众筹作为互联网金融的典型模式,与农业相结合形成了农业众筹,而农业众筹作为互联网+农业的重要组成部分对中国农业发展意义重大。为了提高农业众筹项目融资绩效、增加农民收入,利用众筹网的农业众筹项目数据,研究网页交互和发起人资历对众筹项目融资绩效的影响。结果表明：网页交互因素中的项目关注分享数、评论数和最小投资额,以及发起人资历对项目融资绩效提高有显著正向影响;但因发起人所属地域不同,各因素对项目融资绩效的影响程度表现出一定的差异性。最后,根据研究结论,提出促进农业众筹项目融资效率的相关政策建议。     

政府管制的决策分析——一个利益集团视角的管制模型

西方的利益集团理论研究存在着一些不足,限制了利益集团理论在分析问题时的应用范围.本文将利益集团概念的范围进行了适当的扩展,从而构建了一个非民主体制下的政府管制模型,并利用此模型研究了政府管制的最优定价、相应的社会福利效应以及价格结构的变动方向.研究发现,对统治者集团最优的管制定价反而造成了社会福利的净损失,生产者和管制机构在统治者心中的地位越重要,管制的均衡价格就越接近垄断定价,社会福利的损失也就越大.当消费者集团能够被区分并实行差别定价时,政府管制下的最优价格结构显示了与市场机制下的价格结构的本质差异.影响某一组消费者的参数变化往往同时对其他组别的消费者产生实质性影响,交叉补贴现象也更容易出现在政府管制的情形中.     

创业项目选择互联网众筹影响因素研究

互联网创业项目众筹是近几年刚起步的一种商业融资模式,需要众筹的创业项目首先需考虑众筹投资者决策影响因素。建立了互联网创业项目因素、投资者个人因素和众筹平台影响因素决策模型,通过理论假设、调查问卷数据采集和二分类Logistic回归方法分析众筹投资者决策行为主要影响因素。结果显示,在显著水平0.05下,性别、婚姻状况、对创业发起者的支持、对众筹项目的感兴趣程度、众筹项目前景、创业项目风险、创业项目发起人能力、众筹项目回报与投资者期望一致、众筹平台知名度、众筹平台对投资者利益的保护程度是主要影响因素。结论可为互联网创业项目众筹设计、可行性分析和获得投资提供依据,也可为互联网创业众筹研究提供理论指导。     

闭环供应链中再制造产品的价格歧视策略

主要研究闭环供应链中再制造产品的一级价格歧视策略。在考虑广告宣传影响消费者对产品质量期望的基础上,采用3阶段的动态博弈模型,得出了新件制造商的长远价格和质量决策;以及存在数量约束条件时,再制造商的最优市场覆盖选择,和双方的最优定价策略及质量水平,并探讨了广告对双方决策的影响。     

多国企业集团转移定价研究

本文分析了多国企业集团在垄断中间产品市场,同时最终产品市场上存在Cournot竞争对手状态下的最优转移定价策略。利用动态博弈的均衡求解方法,研究了差别定价和统一定价两种方式的最优内部转移价格。研究结果表明,最优的内部转移价格根据两国税率与进口关税之间关系的不同而有所差异,但是任何条件下企业集团采用差别定价法总是优于统一定价法。     

国外行为价格研究进程评介

文章结合新古典价格理论和精神物理学对价格研究的影响,回顾了国外早期的行为价格研究。随着研究的进一步深入,价格在影响买方行为方面所起的作用已经从新古典模型发展到认知模型。在当代行为价格研究中,文章提供了认知方法在行为定价研究中的一个回顾。在此基础上作者指出了当前行为价格研究的热点--参考价格研究,并且扼要概括了参考价格对于消费者品牌选择、购买数量和购买时间的影响,希望对国内的价格研究有所启示。     

企业差异化战略对价格和质量竞争博弈均衡解的影响研究

消费者在购买商品时不仅考虑商品价格而且还要考虑商品质量水平的需求市场,如果存在两寡头企业提供某商品,必然会导致价格和质量的竞争博弈。本文研究表明:为了达到纳什均衡状态,两企业必须采取一定的差异化策略。而且在均衡状态下,如果市场是价格敏感市场,企业的差异化程度越高,对企业和消费者都越有利;如果市场是质量敏感市场,当敏感程度相对很低时,企业的差异化程度越高,对企业和消费者也都越有利;当敏感程度一般时企业可选择适当的差异化程度使得企业和消费者同时达到最大的均衡利润;但当敏感度非常高,企业差异化程度越高对企业的均衡利润越大,可对消费者的均衡利润却越小。     

社会资本对众筹项目融资成功率影响的实证研究

利用中国4个主流众筹平台(点名时间、众筹网、淘梦网、中国梦网)上的365个项目的信息以及318个项目发起人在两大社交平台(新浪、腾讯)上的社交网络数据,从众筹项目发起人的角度研究了其个人社会资本和地域社会资本对众筹项目融资成功率的影响。研究结果显示:发起人的个人社会资本和地域社会资本均与项目融资成功率正相关;整个融资过程中存在明显的地域歧视现象,且在融资临近截止期"地域歧视现象"最为显著。     

Optimal Advance Selling Strategy under Price Commitment

This paper studies a two‐period model of advance selling with experienced and inexperienced consumers. It concludes that advance selling weakly dominates no advance selling, and the optimal advance selling price may be at a discount, at a premium or at the regular selling price. Conditions for each possible advance selling strategy to prevail are characterized. However, without experienced consumers in the market, there are no incentives for the retailer to implement an advance selling price premium. How the consumer composition affects the retailer's optimal pricing strategy and profit is also examined.     

Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input

What price should downstream entrants pay a vertically integrated incumbent monopoly for use of its assets? Courts, legislators, and regulators have at times mandated that incumbent monopolies lease assets required for the production of a retail service to entrants in efforts to increase the competitiveness of retail markets. This paper compares two rules for pricing such monopoly inputs: marginal cost pricing (MCP) and generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR). The GECPR is not a fixed price, but is a rule that determines the input price to be paid by the entrant from the entrant's retail price. Comparing the retail market equilibrium under MCP and GECPR, the GECPR leads to lower equilibrium retail prices. If the incumbent is less efficient than the entrant, the GECPR also leads to lower production costs than does the MCP rule. If the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, however, conditions may exist in which MCP leads to lower production costs than does the GECPR. The analysis is carried out assuming either Bertrand competition, quantity competition, or monopolistic competition between the incumbent and entrant in the downstream market.     

Commitment to a strategy of uniform pricing in a two-period duopoly with switching costs

This paper studies decisions by firms of whether to attempt “behavior-based” price discrimination in markets with switching costs by using a two-period duopoly model. When both firms commit themselves to a pricing policy and consumers are “sophisticated” and have rational expectations, there is a dominant strategy equilibrium with both firms engaging in uniform pricing. Both firms are better off in the uniform pricing equilibrium, compared with the discriminatory equilibrium.      

Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences

A basic assumption of economics is that consumers choose what they want. However, many consumers find it difficult to stop overeating, overspending, smoking, procrastinating, etc, even though they want to. In reality, consumers have temptation and it is psychologically costly to exercise self-control. To clarify the implications of the existence of temptation and self-control costs, this paper studies a firm's optimal selling strategy exploiting the behavioral features of consumers. We characterize optimal nonlinear pricing schemes for a monopoly when self-control is costly for consumers. Since consumers have a preference for commitment, the firm faces a trade-off between offering a small menu that makes the consumers’ self-control easier and offering a large menu that achieves better price discrimination. We show that the optimal menu resembles the one in the standard nonlinear pricing problem with a price ceiling, where the upper bound on prices is determined endogenously by a participation constraint. The ceiling motivates the firm to offer a relatively flat and compact price schedule, serving more consumers with low demand. The characterization also shows that the firm may earn less if consumers have temptation.     

Dynamic demand and noncompetitive pricing strategies

This paper studies optimal noncompetitive pricing strategies when the evolution of demand is the result of intertemporal considerations. Two different hypotheses of price expectations (myopia and perfect foresight) are treated. The major implication is that the slight modification from an instantaneous to a very fast consumer reaction may completely modify a monopolist's price strategy. More precisely, the price strategy should be volatile if the equilibrium demand is convex, independent whether the consumers act myopically or employ rational expectations. On the other hand, asynchronous dynamics (e.g., due to competitive fringe supply or different segments of demand) cannot explain even damped price oscillations. The equilibrium price strategy of the noncompetitive supplier exceeds the static rule if consumers employ myopic expectations; rational expectations may lead to prices above or below the static rule depending on the rate of discount.I am grateful for the helpful and elaborate comments from three anonymous referees.     

Pricing decisions and strategies selection of dominant manufacturer in dual-channel supply chain

This paper investigates the dominance strategies exerted by the dominant manufacturer for maintaining its dominant position in the channel system which is operating substitutable products and what influences they have on members of the whole channel system and the consumers. As to the channel system with two manufacturers and one retailer, the pricing decisions are depicted to compare the optimal choices made by the system members under the dominant manufacturer's wholesale price dominance strategy and channel dominance strategy, respectively. It shows that only the dominant manufacturer can necessarily benefit from the wholesale price dominance strategy. Furthermore, both dominant manufacturer and retailer can benefit from the channel dominance strategy, and consumers can also benefit from it. The channel dominance strategy, however, is not always the optimal choice for the dominant manufacturer. Whatever dominance strategy is it, the weak manufacturer will suffer loss, but in the channel dominance strategy, the market share proportion of the weak manufacturer will increase under certain circumstances.     

High Price Strategy and Quality Signalling

I investigate a high price strategy by a durable‐goods producer for signalling the high quality of goods. It is assumed that two types of monopolists exist: high‐quality and low‐quality. The monopolist's type is assumed to be unknown to consumers in the first period. Before the beginning of the second period, a product reputation established in the past period enables consumers to recognize the real type of the monopolist. I show that there occurs a signalling equilibrium where the high‐quality type monopolist uses a high price strategy. An interaction between the new and old products peculiar to the durable‐goods markets plays an important role in the pricing strategy.     

Rethinking real-time electricity pricing

Most US consumers are charged a near-constant retail price for electricity, despite substantial hourly variation in the wholesale market price. This paper evaluates the first program to expose residential consumers to hourly real-time pricing (RTP). I find that enrolled households are statistically significantly price elastic and that consumers responded by conserving energy during peak hours, but remarkably did not increase average consumption during off-peak times. The program increased consumer surplus by $10 per household per year. While this is only one to two percent of electricity costs, it illustrates a potential additional benefit from investment in retail Smart Grid applications, including the advanced electricity meters required to observe a household’s hourly consumption.     

Optimal pricing when rational consumers anticipate monitoring cost

This article considers a monopolistic firm’s optimal pricing decision over two periods among dynamic pricing, preannounced pricing and single pricing. In the models, consumers rationally determine whether to exhibit strategic waiting by weighing their costs against prospectively lower price. Our analysis yields three main results. First, single pricing that completely eliminates strategic waiting surely would be dominated by intertemporal pricing when facing rational consumers. Second, preannounced pricing may actually yield lower revenue than dynamic pricing when considering its effect on the reduction of consumer monitoring cost. Only when monitoring costs under dynamic pricing and under preannounced pricing are equal, is firm revenue weakly greater under preannounced pricing than under dynamic pricing. Third, in dynamic pricing equilibrium, increasing monitoring cost may increase firm revenue, consumer surplus and social welfare simultaneously.