组织信息体制、制度化关联与高技术企业集群治理效率

高技术企业集群是一种网络式中间体组织，其组织结构更多的表现为组织之间垂直方向和水平方向的信息关联关系。不同的信息关联形成不同的信息体制。高技术企业集群治理合约分为VC捆绑武治理合约、转换者式治理合约、主导企业式治理合约等三种典型形式．其治理合约的选择受制于信息体制的交易费用大小。信息体制有其特定的制度生存环境，并且具有不同的交易费用结构特征．必须使制度环境与信息体制相匹配。制度化关联与信息体制的耦合互动可以弥补组织信息体制内生的体制缺陷．降低总交易费用。制度环境的扰动和制度的历时关联影响治理合约的治理效率．治理合约需要做出相应的调遣．     

提升企业国际竞争力的主要因素分析与对策

一、国际竞争力的内涵企业国际竞争力是指在全球性竞争市场中,一个企业所具有的能够持续地比其他企业更有效地向市场提供产品或服务,并从中获得盈利和自身发展的综合素质。包括有利于在全球性竞争市场中长期生存与发展的资源、能力和环境因素。影响企业国际竞争力的因素主要有企业内部因素和外部环境因素。企业内部因素包括企业资源和能力两大类,外部环境因素包括政府行为和市场环境两大类。企业竞争力的高低主要决定于企业内在的资源和能力水平,环境的变化属于外生变量,企业可以对不同环境进行能动地适应性选择,但要改变环境却不是单个企业…     

在市场竞争中推进公司治理改革

一、问题的提出 经过20多年的改革,总体上来看,中国企业的国际竞争力在不断提升,但我国企业同世界上的大企业相比,还比较弱。之所以出现这种情况,主要有两个方面的原因:一是我国企业尤其是大企业治理机制很不完善,所有者和经营者之间缺乏有效的制衡关系;二是缺乏有效的市场竞争体制,国有企业、外资企业、民营企业在市场中的竞争地     

集体主义文化维系下的柔性组织与模糊契约--浙江民营企业发展的自组织模式揭示

浙江民营企业在自我发展的过程中，通过竞争和协同会自发形成与市场体制适应的组织形式，这种有效的市场组织形式可以明确表述为一种与集体主义文化相适应的柔性组织和模糊契约，通过对柔性组织和模糊契约问题的详细分析，可以对浙江民营企业的超强竞争力和发展壮大给一个合理的解释和演绎。     

全球化背景下公司治理模式的演进趋势分析

全球化背景下各种公司治理模式是否趋同的问题，是比较公司治理学派争论的核心。通过选取六个定量指标来分析20年来世界上四种典型的公司治理模式的演进趋势，可以发现经验数据并不支持趋同论的观点。全球化会导致各种公司治理模式相互学习和相互影响，但这并不意味着各种公司治理模式将会趋同。这一研究结果的重要意义在于：我国在选择公司治理模式时绝不能刻意模仿和盲目照搬，只有很好地适应我国政治、法律、经济、历史、文化等环境因素的公司治理模式才可能发挥最佳治理效率。     

建设三个平台 推进基层党建

正国通电建依托红色讲台、模范引领、社会责任三个平台,不断夯实基层党建基础,着力构建大党建工作格局,有效发挥基层党组织战斗堡垒作用和党员先锋模范作用,推动企业持续健康发展。加强民营企业党建工作,使之有机融入民营企业治理结构、生产经营和职工需求,服务和推动民营经济高质量发展是贯彻新时代党的建设总要求,不断提高党建质量的内在要求。     

市场经济与市场营销

无论哪种社会,只要有商品经济,就必定存在着市场;随着社会分工和商品经济的不断发展,市场也日益发展和扩大,并发挥着它对社会生产和商品经济发展的应有作用。 市场经济是指社会经济的组织方式,其特征是通过市场来组织和分配生产要素,自然资源和收入分配,它是依靠市场价格,供求和竞争关系配置社会经济资源,组织与调节社会经济运行的经济形式。党的十四大和十五大分别就建立社会主义市场经济体制作了重要论述,尤其是十五大,就企业面向21世纪加快改革步伐等作了周密布置,作为市场营销的研究者,首先就必须明确社会主义市场经济体制的内涵和覆盖,研究市场经济的基本特征,研究企业面对市场经济体制的建立应如何生存等,只有在此基础上,才能     

一种特殊制度变迁的组织演进与组织效率分析

本文对军队后勤保障社会化制度变迁的组织形态演进及其组织效率进行了分析,认为等级组织和市场组织构成我军后勤保障制度变迁过程的基本组织形态,并且存在许多中间性组织;分析了军队后勤保障社会化制度变迁的逻辑起点既有的科层制后勤保障组织的低效率和组织内部无效交易费用膨胀的特征;通过图解模型分析,揭示了我军后勤保障社会化制度变迁的过程,是从既有的计划经济体制下形成的封闭式保障等级组织内部的管理交易向社会化保障市场组织的外部交易的转化过程;进行了两种后勤保障制度的组织费用比较模型分析;通过重复博弈模型分析,本文认为实施军队后勤保障社会化避免地方服务企业“机会主义”行为的策略选择应是合理控制单次交易数量,适度增加交易次数,通过重复博弈使地方服务企业的交易行为更多的基于未来收益的考虑,改变其行为的“机会主义”倾向,以提高后勤保障效率。     

产业链治理架构及其基本模式研究

全球化的发展使得产业链日益成为竞争的主要形式,公司治理已由企业治理、企业集团治理,发展到了产业链的治理。现有产业链治理模式的研究还是侧重于管理模式方面,而对于产业链层面的董事会、经营层等内部治理架构研究方面则存在不足。本文首先界定了产业链的三种基本类型,即资源驱动型、市场主导型和技术主导型,提炼出资源、市场、技术、协调四种关键要素;然后在此基础上构建产业链治理的架构及三种基本治理模式,重点是产业链董事会和经营层的结构安排和机制设计,对其构成要素和运行机制进行了系统阐述。案例实证以三种基本治理模式为基础,针对最复杂的技术主导型产业链治理的实现问题,以上广电和比亚迪为例从正反两方面进行论证;两种基本产业链组合的治理问题,则选取中粮集团资源驱动型产业链、市场主导型产业链治理的典型案例展开分析。     

邹锦标 二线城市商业地产面临供给过剩

住宅市场持续的调控促使更多发展商转向商业地产领域投资;国内主要二线城市目前均有轨道交通在建或业已开通,轨道交通的拓展将促进商务区及商圈的成熟,特别是为地铁上盖项目带来充沛的客流;而高铁的加速建设更将扩大区域中心级的二线城市的辐射范围;长期来看潜在需求依旧旺盛。就写字楼市场而言,中国整体经济正逐步向第三产业转型,对写字楼的需求也将随之逐步上涨,特别是国有企业及民营企业对优质写字楼的需求正在不断增强,加之随着经济的飞速发展,外资需求渗透力度将进一步加大。     

Family firms and internationalization‐governance relationships: Evidence of secondary agency issues

This article documents that blockholders with both ownership and management control in family firms have different goals compared to blockholders with only ownership (but no management) control. We theorize and find evidence that family controlled and family managed (FCFM) firms negatively moderate the relationships between internationalization and governance mechanisms, while family controlled and nonfamily managed (FCNFM) firms do not. The findings indicate that family owners in FCFM firms have greater opportunities to reap private benefits of control indicating the presence of secondary (principal‐principal) agency problems, while these problems are mitigated in FCNFM firms. In emerging economies like India where family firms are ubiquitous, they highlight the need to recognize differing blockholder influences on internationalization‐governance relationships and to develop more nuanced theorizing for understanding them. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic benefits to firms issuing private equity placements

For young technology firms, acquiring resources can often be costly due to the information asymmetry and uncertainty that exist surrounding the new technology. We contend that firms able to issue private equity can better manage their ability to mobilize three kinds of resources: capital, research partners, and commercial partners. We investigate the existence of long‐term, strategic benefits to private placements, and a number of factors may determine the long‐term effectiveness of this governance form. Overall, the empirical analyses demonstrates that private placements provide long‐term benefits to firms by reducing hazards associated with information asymmetry. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The consequences of voluntary traceability system for supply chain relationships. An application of transaction cost economics

This paper analyses the effects of voluntary traceability on vertical relationships within food supply chains using a transaction cost perspective. The analysis makes reference to the Italian situation where the national standard organization has introduced a private standard for traceability that provides a higher degree of information associated with the individual product than the European mandatory traceability system. A survey was conducted by questionnaire to assess changes in transaction characteristics, costs and governance after the introduction of voluntary traceability. The sample represents all Italian firms applying this standard. Factorial and cluster analyses were applied to find the different reorganizations of transactions. The results highlight an increase in asset specificity and a decrease in the uncertainty level throughout the supply chains. The introduction of voluntary traceability shows increased vertical coordination for firms that previously used oral agreements and variation in transactions conditions for firms using contracts. Instead vertically integrated firms do not reveal any variation in the governance of transactions as they are already internally safeguarded.     

Who does private equity buy? Evidence on the role of private equity from buyouts of divested businesses

Research Summary: We examine the role of nonventure private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high‐powered incentives, patient capital, and business independence makes private equity firms uniquely suited to correcting underinvestment problems in public corporations, and that they will therefore systematically target divested businesses that are outside their parents’ core area, whose rivals invest more in long‐term strategic assets than their parents, and whose parents have weak managerial incentives both overall and at the divisional level. Results from a sample of 1,711 divestments confirm these predictions. Our study contributes to our understanding of private equity ownership, highlighting its advantage as an alternate governance form. Managerial Summary: Private equity firms are often portrayed as destroyers of corporate value, raiding established companies in pursuit of short‐term gain. In contrast, we argue that private equity investors help to revitalize businesses by enabling investments in long‐term strategic resources and capabilities that they are better able to evaluate, monitor, and support than public market investors. Consistent with these arguments, we find that when acquiring businesses divested by public corporations, private equity firms are more likely to buy units outside the parent's core area, those whose peers invest more in R&D than their parents, and those whose parents have weak managerial incentives, especially at the divisional level. Thus, private equity firms systematically target those businesses that may fail to realize their full potential under public ownership.     

幸福感、社会资本与代理成本

幸福感是社会学和经济学领域关注的热点问题,但较少研究幸福感对公司治理行为影响的经济后果。本文运用中国A股上市公司的经验数据,在对幸福感与代理成本的关系进行理论分析的基础上,首次检验了幸福感与代理成本之间的关系。研究发现:地区幸福感能够显著降低地方政府控制上市公司的代理成本,与之相反,地区幸福感加剧了民营控制上市公司的代理成本,并从幸福感的社会资本视角对地区幸福感与代理成本的关系进行了解读。本研究在一定程度上增进了企业代理成本问题的研究积累,研究结论对国民福利的公共政策和企业员工福利计划的制定具有一定的启示意义。     

Financial and stock market variables as predictors of management buyouts

This paper investigates whether publicly held firms which change to private ownership through management buyouts (ex-public firms) possess characteristics prior to the change which differentiate them from firms which remain publicly owned. The financial characteristics of ex-public firms for the year immediately prior to going private were analyzed. A multivariate framework was developed to determine which attributes best distinguished firms going private via management buyouts from similar firms not going private. A discriminant function was developed using seven ratios: (1) concentration of ownership, (2) cash flow to net worth, (3) cash flow to total assets, (4) price/earnings ratio, (5) price/book value ratio, (6) book value of depreciable assets in relation to original costs, and (7) dividend yield. The model demonstrated a classification accuracy of 77.8 percent for the original sample and 81.4 percent in a hold-out sample validation. These findings imply that financial characteristics alone provide a means by which firms going private via management buyouts can be separated from others. Therefore one can argue that, regardless of the stated motive for going private, financial characteristics either are explicit decision variables or directly reflect non-financial reasons for management buyouts.     

Does ownership matter in private equity? The sources of variance in buyouts' performance

We study the impact of ownership on firm performance in an unexplored governance context: private equity (PE) firms and the buyouts in which they invest. We employ a multiple‐membership, cross‐classified, multilevel model on a unique database of 6,950 buyouts realized by 255 PE firms between 1973 and 2008 in 77 countries. The results document a significant PE firm effect (4.6%), the importance of which grows as time passes. We then study three contingencies that increase the importance of the PE firm effect: (1) value addition vs. selection strategies; (2) developed vs. emerging economies; and (3) economic downturns. Our findings shed new light on the sources of variance in buyouts' performance. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relationship marketing and contract theory

The theoretical foundation of contracts and their limitations in governing exchange between firms is a current area of research in economics and business. The relationship marketing approach in business-to-business markets focuses on aspects in interfirm exchange that contracts cannot deal with efficiently. However, the ability to use contractual forms of governance where possible is crucial to the enhanced scope of relationship marketing management. We argue that contracts and relationships are complementary and that contracts provide an evolving governance structure for relationships. We examine the evolution of interfirm exchange theories in this framework and illustrate the convergence between contract theory and relationship marketing management, with examples from procurement in the supply chain, capacity reservation contracts, and program management.     

创始人权威、控制权配置与家族企业治理转型——基于国美电器“控制权之争”的案例研究

以国美电器"控制权之争"为背景,采用案例研究方法探讨了家族企业的控制权配置模式及治理后果。研究表明:随着规模扩大、参与国际竞争程度提升,传统家族权威治理的局限性日益显现,引入职业经理人是我国家族企业治理转型的必然趋势;诸如国美等治理实践中频发的"控制权冲突",根源并不在创始家族的控制权让渡,而是源于权力制衡缺失引发的控制权私利;优化权力配置,形成核心控制权、一般控制权和现金流权之间的合理匹配与均衡,是实现创始家族和职业经理人互惠相容,确保治理转型成功的关键与微观基础。本文从控制权视角深化了对家族企业治理的理解,也为化解当前我国家族企业"集体转型之痛"提供了必要的理论借鉴。     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.