Self-serving dictators and economic growth

We study the effect of fair institutions on growth. In our model, individuals are endowed with unequal entitlements to the economy's output. They can free-ride or cooperate. Cooperation is individually costly, but increases aggregate output and growth. Experimentally, we observe significantly less cooperation, when dictators chose high instead of low inequality. This effect is not observed when the degree of inequality is chosen randomly. Simple cross-country regressions provide basic macroeconomic support for interaction effects between the degree and the genesis of inequality. We conclude that economies granting equal opportunities are less likely to suffer retarded growth due to free-riding than economies with self-serving dictators.     

创造性破坏与收入差距的振荡式扩大

本文试图运用熊彼特的技术创新和“创造性破坏”理论来解释收入差距振荡式扩大的动态特征。研究的结论是在以“创造性破坏”为特征的经济增长过程中,收入差距会扩大,而且创造性破坏的程度越强,经济增长速度越高,收入差距越大。其社会基础和原因是社会分工和阶层差异,这种差异会在经济增长过程中再度拉大。在方法上,本文用物理模型形象地描述了差距扩大过程,揭示了增长模型中定点状态分析方法的缺陷。对具体过程进行分析表明,收入差距扩大的方式为振荡式,这种振荡特征由个体和技术之间的动态竞争性质———“创造性破坏”决定。美国家庭收入的经验分析证实,在动态竞争的经济增长过程中,收入差距确实在振荡中扩大。     

产学合作对粤港澳大湾区高校双元知识产出增长的影响

利用2011-2020年粤港澳大湾区67所高校纵向数据,采用随机系数模型,考察高校双元活动效率增长趋势、产学合作对高校双元知识产出增长的影响以及制度环境的调节作用。研究结果表明：(1)随着时间推移,粤港澳大湾区高校创新研发与学术研究的双元知识产出整体呈现出显著提升趋势;(2)不同制度环境下高校双元活动产出效率的增长存在明显差异,其中,广东高校创新研发的产出效率增长高于港澳高校,港澳高校学术研究的产出效率增长则高于广东高校;(3)产学合作对粤港澳大湾区高校双元知识产出增长具有显著正向作用,良好的制度环境强化了产学合作对双元知识产出的促进作用,使得产学合作对广东高校双元知识产出的促进作用强于港澳高校。     

Status Aspirations, Wealth Inequality, and Economic Growth

This paper argues that an increase in the inequality of wealth prompts a stronger quest for status that in turn fosters the accumulation of wealth. It proposes a measure for an individual's want of social status. For a given level of a population's wealth, the corresponding aggregate measure of want of social status is shown to be positively related to the Gini coefficient of wealth inequality. Hence, the Gini coefficient and growth are positively correlated, holding the population's wealth constant.     

Functional components of public expenditure,fiscal consolidations,and economic activity

This paper analyses how the functional components of public expenditure and spending‐driven consolidations affect the economic growth, unemployment, and income inequality. A dynamic panel data least squares dummy variable estimator estimator is employed over a sample of 15 European Union countries during the period 1990–2012. The empirical results show that real GDP growth decreases when fiscal austerity measures are implemented, especially if they are spending‐driven. Cuts in public expenditure undermine economic growth, namely if they slash spending on public order, recreation, and education. Spending cuts on education, in particular, affect the investment in human capital, harming not only growth but also economic, social, and human development. The unemployment rate also proved to be significantly boosted when austerity measures restrict spending on education, whereas income inequality rises when social protection expenditures are cut.     

Social polarization, fiscal instability and growth

We present a dynamic model of fiscal policy in a simple growth framework where social polarization (of preferences) plays a central role in the evolution of fiscal instability and growth collapse. In a highly polarized society, a deficit occurs endogenously, fiscal spending path becomes more volatile, output collapses, and economic growth rate is reduced along the transition path to a new lower level of output. One novel feature is that the size of fiscal deficit, the magnitude of fiscal volatility, and the size of reduction in output and growth rate are explicitly shown to be increasing functions of the degree of social polarization. This is because of the positive relationship between the polarization of preferences and the incentive for policymakers (or socio-economic groups) to overexploit the government resources in a common pool setting (polarization effect). Thereby, we offer a fiscal instability channel that negatively links social polarization and growth, which is an alternative yet distinct explanation for the empirical finding that social polarization is harmful to growth. Moreover, we fully distinguish the incentive to engage in such short-term policies under political uncertainty from that under polarization. Polarization and political uncertainty are shown to be distinct yet critical to the dynamic coordination failure in the common pool setting.     

INFORMATION AGGREGATION,GROWTH, AND FRANCHISE EXTENSION WITH APPLICATIONS TO FEMALE ENFRANCHISEMENT AND INEQUALITY

We develop a model of voluntary gradual franchise extension and growth based on the idea that voting is an information aggregation mechanism. A larger number of voters means that more correct decisions are made, hence increasing output, but also implies that any incremental output must be shared among more individuals. These conflicting incentives lead to a dynamic model of franchise extensions that is consistent with several real world episodes, including female enfranchisement. The model also predicts that in certain circumstances growth and enfranchisement will be accompanied by Kuznets curve type behaviour in inequality. Contrary to the preceding literature these conclusions do not rest on incentives for strategic delegation.     

The dynamics of inequality and social security in general equilibrium

This paper analyzes the dynamic politico-economic equilibrium of a model where repeated voting on social security and the evolution of household characteristics in general equilibrium are mutually affected over time. In particular, we incorporate within-cohort heterogeneity in a two-period Overlapping-Generation model to capture the intra-generational redistributive effect of social security transfers. Political decision-making is represented by a probabilistic voting à la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). We analytically characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium, in which social security tax rates are shown to be increasing in wealth inequality. A dynamic interaction between inequality and social security leads to larger social security programs. In a model calibrated to the U.S. economy, the dynamic interaction is shown to be quantitatively important: It accounts for more than half of the social security growth in the dynamics. We also perform some normative analysis, showing that the politico-economic equilibrium outcomes can be fundamentally different from the Ramsey allocation.     

POLITICAL INEQUALITY,CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS,AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS

Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality.     

Taxation,redistribution, and observability in social dilemmas

In the presence of social dilemmas, cooperation is more difficult to achieve when populations are heterogeneous because of conflicting interests within groups. We examine cooperation in the context of a nonlinear common pool resource game, in which individuals have unequal extraction capacities and have to decide on their extraction of resources from the common pool. We introduce monetary and nonmonetary mechanisms in this environment. The two monetary mechanisms are tax extraction and redistribution of the tax revenue. These include a Pigovian per‐unit tax mechanism and an increasing block tax that only taxes units extracted above the social optimum. Another mechanism varies the observability of individual decisions. We find that the two tax and redistribution mechanisms reduce extraction, increase efficiency, and decrease inequality within groups. In contrast, observability impacts only the baseline condition by encouraging free‐riding instead of creating moral pressure to cooperate.     

The Effect of Inequality on Growth: Theory and Evidence from the Indian States

The paper examines the effect of inequality on growth among the subnational states in India. Theoretically, growth of the regional economy is driven by productive public investment in the provision of health and education services financed by a linear output tax, and the optimum tax rate is determined by the median voter. In contrast to existing results, the authors obtain an ambiguous relationship between initial inequality and subsequent economic growth. Analysis of the Indian state‐level data suggests that rural inequality influences growth of total output more than urban inequality, and does so negatively. The indicator of intersectoral inequality is more important in explaining sectoral output growth.     

基于泰尔指数的江苏省区域差异多指标测度

基于泰尔指数测度方法对江苏省1978—2004年人均GDP、人均农业总产值、人均城乡居民储蓄存款和人均社会商品零售总额等4方面指标的区域差异进行测度分析,得出江苏省人均农业总产值的差异变化平缓且略有降低、人均城乡居民储蓄存款变化趋势呈U型、人均GDP和人均社会商品零售总额的差异不断扩大。除人均农业总产值外,江苏省三大区域间的差异程度均呈现不断扩大趋势,且对区域差异影响较大。同时,三大区域内部的差异也各不相同,苏南地区除人均农业总产值差异较大外,其余3项指标的差异程度较小,与改革初期相比均呈缩小趋势;苏中地区各项指标的差异程度变化不大;而苏北地区除人均农业总产值外其余3项呈现扩大趋势,且区域内部差异最大。     

Soviet interrepublican capital transfers and the republics' level of development, 1966–1991

Conclusions We suggest the following interpretation of the results obtained. In the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet investment policy, directly countered the tendency towards economic divergence between the republics. Gradually, however, the aim ofoutput maximization gained in importance with respect to that ofequality. In the late 1970s, Soviet planners began to regard their economic growth rates as insufficient. Capital redistribution from rich to poor was done away with so as to improve overall Soviet economic performance, and interrepublican economic inequality began to rise soon after. After 1985, the effort to accelerate Soviet economic growth (output maximization in a dynamic setting) came to be referred to by the termuskoreniye. By increasing interrepublican economic inequality, this policy released latent centrifugal forces. We may cautiously conclude that the dissolution of the Soviet empire should be attributed not only toperestroika, but also touskoreniye. In the near future, capital transfers can be expected to come to a complete halt. As a result, interrepublican inequality will increase further still.     

Employment and Productivity Growth in Europe and North America: The Impact of Labor Market Institutions

In this paper, we examine long-run employment and productivity growth in the major economies of North America and Europe from 1960 to the early 1990s. We develop a model in which output growth is determined by the growth of aggregate demand, and the relative contributions of employment and productivity growth to the growth of output depend on country specific labor market institutions. We find that institutions that promote collective bargaining, employment security and social protection have roughly equal and opposite effects on employment growth (negative) and productivity growth (positive), giving rise to an inverse relationship between these variables. The welfare implications of this finding are that labor market deregulation could result in more work and greater inequality and insecurity for workers, without significantly increasing the rate of economic growth.     

Credit constraints,growth and inequality dynamics

This paper examines how credit constraints affect the dynamics of wealth and thereby the dynamics of capital and output growth. We develop standard Ak growth models that display transitional dynamics, contrary to general belief, once the complete credit markets assumption is relaxed. The mechanism is that credit constraints make individual productivity differences persist, which in turn leads to the persistence of income inequality. The dynamics of inequality is jointly determined with the dynamics of aggregate capital. The economy thus passes through a transitional period of inequality, individual and aggregate capital dynamics before it converges to a long-run balanced growth path. The application of the model to the analysis of intergenerational mobility and inequality dynamics suggests substantial economic and policy significance. In particular, introducing credit constraints to the Barro Ak model, public investment could have an indirect impact on growth via its effect on inequality and mobility.     

R＆D、R＆D溢出、内生增长和内生收敛

根据强调知识与技术创新、知识与技术溢出重要性的当代内生增长理论，本文建立了一个将R＆D和R＆D溢出与资本积累之间、R＆D和R＆D溢出与总产出增长之间直接关联起来的动态模型。面板数据协整检验实证分析结果表明R＆D和R＆D溢出与资本积累之间、R＆D和R＆D溢出与总产出增长之间分别存在显著的正面长期协整关联。进一步的分析表明，R＆D与资本积累之间、R＆D与总产出增长之间分别存在显著的长期双向格兰杰因果关系。由此观知，R＆D乃长期经济增长源泉之所在。另一方面，尽管资本积累或总产出增长并不格兰杰导致R＆D溢出，证据表明R＆D溢出格兰杰导致资本积累和总产出增长。这种由R＆D溢出到资本积累和总产出增长的单向格兰杰因果关系意味着尽管知识与技术的跨国传播并非必然发生。其实为世界经济增长的重要动力。     

Social norms,cooperation and inequality

This paper analyzes the outcomes that can be supported by social norms in a society of infinitely lived and patient agents that are randomly matched in pairs every period to play a given game. I find that any mutually beneficial outcome can be supported by a self-enforcing social norm under both perfect information and a simple local information system. These Folk Theorem results explain not only how social norms can provide incentives that support cooperation in a community, providing support to the concepts of social capital and corporate culture, but also how they can support inequality and discrimination.I am grateful to David Levine for invaluable guidance and ideas. I also thank Anna Aizer, Hongbin Cai, Walter Cont, Ernesto Dal Bó, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Federico Weinschelbaun, William Zame, anonymous referees and seminar participants at Universidad de Buenos Aires, UCLA, Universidad T. Di Tella, Harvard Business School and Stockholm School of Economics for very useful comments and discussions     

不确定性、通货膨胀与产出增长

基于中国1952—2004年的数据,通过GARCH-M模型和广义脉冲响应函数对不确定性、通货膨胀与产出增长进行实证分析。结果发现:通货膨胀不确定性与产出增长负相关;产出增长不确定性与产出增长负相关;产出增长不确定性与通货膨胀正相关;通货膨胀不确定性与通货膨胀负相关;产出增长冲击和通货膨胀冲击对产出增长不确定性和通货膨胀不确定性的影响存在滞后性和非对称性;产出增长对产出增长冲击的动态响应最大,通货膨胀对产出增长冲击的动态响应以及产出增长对通货膨胀冲击的动态响应最小,通货膨胀对通货膨胀冲击的动态响应居中。     

Ability transmission,endogenous fertility and educational subsidy

In this study, we attempt to investigate how educational subsidy, childcare allowance and family allowance affect economic growth and income distribution on the basis of simulation models which incorporate intergenerational ability transmission and endogenous fertility. The simulation results show that financial support for higher education can both increase economic growth and reduce income inequality, especially if the abilities of parent and child are closely correlated. In contrast with educational subsidy, raising childcare allowance or family allowance has limited impacts on growth and income inequality.     

Equal,proportional, and mixed sharing of cooperative production under the threat of sabotage

This paper analyzes the consequences of a parametrized class of sharing rules on the propensity of individuals to sabotage each other in a cooperative production framework. The considered sharing rules include equal and proportional sharing as special cases and are parametrized with respect to their sensitivity to relative input contributions. This parameter affects the equilibrium provision of productive individual labor (that increases the respective individual input contribution) but also the propensity to sabotage others (which decreases the input contributions of sabotaged individuals). The theoretical analysis shows that sharing rules in which more weight is put on equal sharing induce zero sabotage in equilibrium; however, they might also lead to inefficient underproduction. In contrast, sharing rules that are highly sensitive with respect to relative input contributions lead to destructive sabotage activities and moreover to inefficient overproduction.