企业主体性产权理论的构建 --相关和自主统一的属性所有权

企业是市场经济活动的主体，应该具有其主体属性，并且正是其主体属性决定它的主体地位和作用，并形成主体性产权。但是，学术界缺乏对这个问题的研究，主要是因为受西方经济学传统的限制，要突破这种限制必须把经济学与管理学结合起来进行研究，以构建企业主体性产权理论。企业主体性产权是其相关属性产权与自主属性产权的统一。企业相关属性及其产权是基础和结果，主要说明企业主体性产权的共性；企业自主属性及其产权是原动力和境界，主要说明企业主体性产权的个性。它们的互补和统一突出地体现在企业家及其产权上。企业主体性产权的目的是在防止“蛋糕”缩小的同时把“蛋糕”做大，其核心是基于相互关系的约束而进行自主创造的激励，其模型的运行特点是协同一自主创造。企业主体性产权理论的应用，可以保证和促使中国企业循着超越自然历史发展。     

探索京瓷“阿米巴”经营之谜——基于企业内部虚拟产权的案例研究北大核心CSSCI

近几年来,中国出现了研究和学习阿米巴经营模式的热潮,阿米巴经营是稻盛和夫在京瓷创造的一种经营模式,随后在很多企业都获得了空前的成功。本研究采用案例研究方法,以京瓷的阿米巴经营模式为基础,从企业内部产权界定的视角解释其内部激励及企业绩效机制,并提出了虚拟产权的概念。本研究最终得出结论,阿米巴经营模式是建立在企业内部虚拟产权的动态界定之上的,通过内部竞争市场机制、正式或非正式制度等进一步降低组织内部的交易成本和代理成本,并采用单位时间核算制确认内部虚拟产权收益,提高每个阿米巴组织预期收益的匹配度和时间效应,不断激发阿米巴组织领导和员工的努力水平,从而使得企业绩效最大化。通过本案例研究,能够清晰地揭示京瓷阿米巴经营机制的本质,进一步发展企业内部激励和绩效理论,并为本土企业更好地借鉴其模式创造价值。     

基于超产权理论对公司管理层收购的思考

产权理论把产权归属作为企业效率的决定因素，无疑有失偏颇。超产权理论则认为：企业的效益主要是与市场竞争程度有关，利用利润激励去驱动经理人提高努力水平要以市场竞争为前提，市场竞争有放大利润激励的作用。基于超产权理论的思想，本文认为对产权拥有所形成的利润激励得以有效发挥的关键，在于经理人必须持有足够大比例的股权；大中型国有及国有控股企业和上市公司实施MBO后，由于经理人所购股权比例不大，使得产权激励不够大，而竞争激励又大幅下降，导致经理人的能力和努力水平下降，MBO将严重影响其业绩的提高。因而，MBO不是其改革的途径；小企业实施MBO是利大于弊，MBO不失为其改革的途径之一，但从长期发展的角度来看，MBO只不过是一个权宜之计。     

企业家的透明度

尽管已经接触过柳传志许多回，但9月8日亲见他完成对联想产权改造的又一次里程碑式事件时，仍然禁不住在内心感叹：在中国做企业家，是需要点政治智慧的。（详尽报道参见本期文章《寻找下一个联想》）     

产权改革中技术股份化问题探析

1.技术产权的功能分析( 1 )创新激励功能。产权的界定可以产生一种激励——约束效应。由于技术创新成果的公共属性 ,不可避免地碰到“搭便车”问题 ,因此 ,产权制度保证了无形资产拥有者一定的独占权 ,排除仿制者对技术产权所有者利益的侵犯 ,为技术创新提供有效的激励机制。诺思指出 ,当某些资源公有产权存在时 ,对获取较多的技术和知识很少有刺激 ,相反 ,所有者的排他性产权是最经济有效和持久的创新激励手段。技术产权的垄断性特征激励人们不断地进行技术创新 ,对技术产权的法律保护是使得其具有排他性和激励效应的核心。其中 ,专利制度…     

国有企业人力资本产权激励机制缺失问题的实证分析

关于国有企业经营效率低下的原因一度被归结为：政企不分，产权不明晰、体制僵硬等因素，而随着现代人力资本产权理论以及激励理论的兴起，对此问题的研究视角逐步从“体制”因素转向“人”的因素。本文将从“人”的因素这一角度，并结合实证分析的方法对国有企业人力资本产权激励机制缺失的原因以及由此而带来的负面影响进行探讨。     

国有企业产权重组:几个重要理论问题的辨析

国有企业的产权重组,意味着企业产权和产权关系的改变。要想使国有企业的产权重组达到预期的目的,就必须正确理解企业的基本产权关系和企业产权的基本组织形式。长期以来,人们对产权缺乏认识,对企业的基本产权和产权关系认识模糊,常常把产权和资产混为一谈,分不清企业法人财产权和出资人所有权,对这两权的相关权利和义务也分不清楚。由于对企业产权和产权关系缺乏正确认识,国有企业在体制改革和产权重组时出现了不少问题和混乱。作者根据在数十家企业进行改制和重组的实践,就国有企业在产权重组中所涉及的几个重要理论问题进行分析和探讨。…     

国企低效的人力资本产权根源分析

改革20多年来,我国国有企业改革有一条不说自明的逻辑:通过“产权明晰”、“政企分开”,把物质资本的经营权还给企业家;企业有了经营自主权,就有责任搞好国有企业,国有企业效率低的问题也就迎刃而解。但是,从大多数改制的企业看,实际效果并不理想,国有企业效率普遍仍较低,企业虽拥有了自主经营权和部分剩余,职工的收入有了增长,但企业总产值增长比例并没有随职工收入增长比例的提高而增加。笔者认为,建立现代企业制度,物质资本产权明晰了,但人力资本产权问题根本就没有触及,人力资本产权主体表现为虚位或缺位,这是国有企业效率低下的根源所…     

接管壁垒缺失与国有企业经营者低效更替的发生

接管壁垒是治理结构的一个重要环节,它在维护企业家职位稳定性的同时,可以防止和减少低效率更替的发生。本文的分析表明,在以行政干预下的“内部人”控制为特征的国有企业治理结构中,接管壁垒的缺失使企业经营者的更替陷入“低壁垒,高更替,低效率”的恶性循环。因此,解决领导班子问题必须从治理结构的源头－产权改革开始,并为企业家阶层的形成提供金融制度的支持。     

国有企业产权制度改革路径及偏差

本文在试图突破现代西方产权经济学的基础上,提出了一个企业产权制度模型,推导出了企业产权制度的侵权性质,并以此为逻辑框架,对国有企业产权制度改革路径上的两个代表性的“节点”,即“放权让利”和建立现代企业制度进行了理论分析,认为国有企业产权制度改革,最成功的地方在于相对满足了企业私人产权的要求,最大的失误在于忽视了职工私人产权。如果职工私人产权不能随企业私人产权的扩大而扩大,国有企业产权制度改革就不可能取得成功。     

Managerial ownership and corporate diversification: a longitudinal view

Strategy and finance research suggests that managerial ownership results in increased incentive alignment and therefore is negatively related to corporate diversification. Using a longitudinal approach, we develop arguments to examine whether managerial ownership is associated with subsequent changes in diversification and/or if diversification is associated with subsequent changes in ownership. The results indicate that levels of managerial ownership in one time period are not associated with subsequent changes in corporate diversification, which raises incentive alignment questions. We also find that higher levels of corporate diversification are associated with changes in managerial ownership, which suggests support for the employment risk‐reduction perspective. This study provides important reasons to reassess the longitudinal implications of the managerial ownership‐corporate diversification link from both theoretical and managerial perspectives. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of managerial ownership on international and business diversification: Balancing incentives and risks

Research has examined the effects of managerial share ownership on business diversification, typically from the incentive alignment perspective. Yet, share ownership also shifts risk to managers (the efficient managerial contracting perspective). Furthermore, the effects of managerial ownership on international diversification are unexplored. We examine how managerial ownership influences both international and business diversification in light of the trade‐off between incentive alignment and risk bearing. Based on the differing risk profiles of the two types of diversification, we argue that incentive contracts with higher levels of managerial ownership will be inefficient, i.e., counter to shareholder interests—reducing international diversification and increasing business diversification. Our findings support our arguments for international diversification. We find no significant effect for business diversification after accounting for endogeneity and serial correlation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

高管薪酬激励、产权性质与企业绩效——基于股权集中度的调节效应

本文以高管薪酬激励为视角，将高管薪酬激励、股权集中度与企业绩效放在一个统一的分析框架下，以产权性质为依据，收集了 2007~2015 年国有企业与民营企业的面板数据，分别实证检验了高管薪酬激励与企业绩效的关系，以及股权集中度是否在其中发挥调节作用。研究发现：高管薪酬激励对企业绩效有显著的促进作用，并且国有企业中的促进作用要强于民营企业；股权集中度在国有企业中对于高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间的关系有显著的负向调节作用，而在民营企业中不存在显著调节作用。     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

纵向一体化与联合所有权——通用一费希尔公司收购案例研究

纵向一体化可以很好地解决物质资本的专用性问题,然而对人力资本专用性造成的“套牢”无能为力。通过降低交易双方对一般性投资的激励,从而提高专用性投资的激励,联合所有权使得“套牢”的收益最小而成本最高。因此,联合所有权不仅可以解决物质资本专用性问题,也是解决人力资本套牢问题的有效途经。     

Strategic investments in Japanese corporations: do foreign portfolio owners foster underinvestment or appropriate investment?

This paper investigates the effect of foreign ownership on strategic investments in Japanese corporations. Foreign owners are typically portfolio investors who frequently buy and sell shares and hold diversified portfolios of small stakes in many firms. Prior research has presented two conflicting perspectives on the role of such investors: (a) their frequent trading leads to pressure for short‐term returns that fosters underinvestment; (b) their active trading fosters appropriate investments. We investigated the relationship between foreign ownership and strategic investments using dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of 146 Japanese manufacturing firms from 1991 to 1997. We found that foreign ownership enhances strategic investments (in R&D and capital intensity) to a greater extent when firms have growth opportunities than when they lack such opportunities. We conclude that foreign ownership fosters appropriate investment. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation in EU telecom companies: Does the state design the right incentives?

This paper analyzes the structure of CEO pay in European fixed telecommunication companies, focusing on the impact of state ownership. Results show that, under the (partial or total) control of the state, the level of CEO compensation is lower and pay-performance sensitivity is higher than in privately-controlled firms. This finding suggests the state provides an incentive as well as a monitoring effect. However, when the state holds the majority of the shares, the pay level is significantly affected by the CEO power, suggesting that in these firms, CEOs are more likely to be entrenched with boards and succeed in raising their pay.     

Tax Reform and Organizational Forms for Holding Investment Real Estate: Corporation vs. Partnership

Following the ERTA of 1981, partnership ownership of real estate dominated corporate ownership. This study concludes that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 provides incentive for holding real estate investments that produce sizable tax losses and/or that are eligible for large tax credits in corporate rather than partnership form. Perpetuity cash flow models are employed initially to identify key tax and cash flow variables favorable to each organizational form. The perpetuity assumption is then relaxed to consider a more representative real estate investment. A sensitivity analysis examines the extent to which the base case results are dependent on the assumed values of selected model parameters.     

The Gains from Corporate Selloffs: The Case of Real Estate Assets

Recent financial economics literature has hypothesized that variations in market structure influence the distribution of gains from corporate restructuring between buyers and sellers. We test this hypothesis using data on restructuring involving real estate assets by isolating the effects depending on multiple versus single bidders, acquisition frequency and transaction type. While we find gains for both buyers and sellers, the buyers gain only when they make few purchases. Those firms pursuing an acquisition strategy show no gains around the specific acquisition announcements. Additionally, both buyers and sellers are more likely to have a positive reaction to the announcement when the transaction is property rather than a division or subsidiary.     

我国企业创新模式的选择——基于公司治理的视角

本文将企业创新模式分为探索式创新和利用式创新,通过风险偏好与创新模式选择的研究,探讨了公司治理结构与创新模式选择的关系。得到的结果是：国有企业相比非国有企业,更倾向于选择风险小,见效快的利用式创新模式;大股东持股比例与探索式创新模式选择显著负相关,这与发达国家的情形正好相反;高管持股的股权激励机制可以在一定程度上激励企业进行探索式创新,但需要一个持股临界值。这些结果反映出非国有控股和高管持股的企业更有动机进行探索式创新,政府政策应为其搭建出必要的制度基础。