中央银行沟通与金融市场预期:一个文献综述

中央银行沟通是中央银行思想与实践的重要革命,已成为全球性现象,并成为中央银行管理预期的关键工具。围绕中央银行沟通影响金融市场预期的理论研究、金融市场对中央银行沟通的反映的实证分析、管理金融市场预期的有效沟通三个角度梳理国内外学者关于中央银行沟通与金融市场预期的研究成果,并进一步提出该领域的研究发展趋势。     

中央银行政策沟通的传导机制与实践效果评价

完善中央银行政策沟通机制,引导市场预期,提高货币政策有效性是当前深化金融体制改革的重要任务之一,针对中国人民银行政策沟通引导市场预期作用有限的现象,本文从传导机制和政策实践的角度分析中央银行政策沟通在预期管理领域的正向作用并就中央银行沟通在一致性、可信度以及经济前景预测方面提出针对性建议。     

预期、资产价格泡沫与中央银行沟通

预期在资产价格泡沫的形成、膨胀、破灭以及中央银行的危机救助中扮演相当重要的角色,而中央银行沟通在管理市场预期方面具有独特的优势.本文以2006年10月-2012年9月中国人民银行的沟通实践为样本,采用EGARCH模型进一步检验金融市场对中央银行沟通的反应,并从中央银行有效沟通角度探讨中央银行应对资产价格泡沫的沟通策略.     

中央银行沟通、实际干预与通货膨胀稳定

近年来,中央银行沟通已成为一种重要的货币政策工具。本文把中央银行沟通因素引入修正的卢卡斯总供给函数,发现加大中央银行沟通力度有利于引导通货膨胀预期,稳定通货膨胀。采用2003-2009年月度数据,利用结构向量自回归方法对中央银行沟通及实际干预在稳定通货膨胀中的作用进行实证研究,主要结论如下:(1)正的中央银行沟通冲击能有效降低通货膨胀预期以及名义通货膨胀率,且时滞短;(2)正的实际干预(包括银行贷款利率、央票利率及货币供应量)冲击,在短期内不但不能降低通货膨胀预期及名义通货膨胀率,反而会加剧通货膨胀,出现"价格之谜"现象。此外,本文对大多数情况下我国中央银行沟通模棱两可的合理性进行了解释。     

中央银行沟通:基于预期管理的视角

成功的沟通,对于有效引导市场预期、促进币值稳定和金融稳定,都富有积极的意义。随着"预期管理"成为货币政策的核心任务,沟通成为了管理预期的重要工具。中央银行沟通无疑在引导市场预期,从而改善经济运行方面发挥着重要的作用。     

关于我国中央银行沟通策略选择的思考

随着金融实践的不断发展,中央银行沟通的重要性逐渐被人们所认识。通过成功的沟通,有效引导市场预期,促进货币政策有效性的提高,已经成为各国中央银行的共识。从世界范围看,近十多年来,中央银行沟通的实践取得了显著的进展。沟通不仅受到了各国中央银行的重视,也成了国内外学界关注的热点之一。当前我国中央银行沟通的现状鉴于沟通在预期管理方面所具     

异质预期条件下中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的影响

在外汇市场交易者预期异质性的假设条件下,以2005年7月至2015年12月中国人民银行沟通频数和人民币汇率数据为样本,采用异质预期汇率模型考察中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的总体影响。研究发现：在异质预期条件下,中央银行沟通通过信息机制和协调机制影响外汇市场交易者的异质预期,从而对人民币汇率波动产生较为显著的影响,但由于我国外汇交易者预期向基本面预期转换的发生概率小于技术分析交易者预期,中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的平稳作用效力受到一定的局限。     

建立我国通胀预期管理体系的思考

通胀预期是公众对未来通货膨胀变动方向和幅度的事前估计和判断.通胀预期会从需求和供给等方面推动实际通货膨胀水平.西方国家中央银行大多通过问卷调查和计量模型对通胀预期进行测量,并采取多种方法对通胀预期进行管理.我国目前尚缺乏针对通胀预期的调查制度和专门的通胀预期管理手段.为了有效管理通胀预期,我国需要借鉴国际经验,构建适合我国国情的通胀预期管理体系.     

关于通胀预期形成模式及其管理对策的研究

该文在对通胀预期三种形成方式进行比较分析的基础上,认为不完全理性预期是较为符合实际的预期形成方式;而通货膨胀持久性、经济主体获得信息并进行有效分析的能力、中央银行信誉是影响不完全理性预期的主要因素。中央银行应在货币政策目标上赋予币值稳定更高的权重,并通过进一步加强与公众的沟通,尽量向公众提供能使其形成合理预期所需的信息量等方式来管理通货膨胀预期。     

央行如何有效管理金融市场预期?北大核心

1990年以来,中央银行理论与实践发生着一场影响深远的革命,现代央行对金融市场的预期管理愈发重视。探索央行如何有效管理金融市场预期,对于实现货币政策传导、维护金融稳定、促进金融市场长期健康发展均有重大意义。本文聚焦于央行针对金融市场的沟通和预期管理,关注其沟通边界和策略问题。在边界问题上,本文认为央行应该加强市场沟通的两类情形:一是当市场存在明显非理性和羊群效应时;二是当央行对该领域具有信息优势时。在策略问题上,本文认为我国央行应加强市场预期管理,需要对货币政策反应函数进行充分沟通,加强投资者教育,对于新政策的推出进行事前的预期引导,并可在沟通形式上进行更多的创新尝试,提升沟通效果。     

Central bank communication,corporate maturity mismatch and innovation

This paper analyzes the relationship between central bank communication and corporate innovation. The results show that: (1) Communication in a loose direction of the central bank will promote corporate innovation. (2) The higher the degree of consistency between words and deeds, the stronger the positive impact of central bank communication on corporate innovation. (3) The increase in the proportion of policy continuity words in the central bank communication text will amplify the positive impact of the loose communication on corporate innovation. (4) Communication in the loose direction of the central bank will inhibit the corporate behavior of “Corporate Maturity Mismatch”, so as to promote corporate innovation. (5) The positive impact of central bank communication on corporate innovation is more significant in companies with stable investor sentiment and a high degree of management myopia. (6) The period of low moderation of monetary policy will help to strengthen the role of central bank communication in promoting corporate innovation.     

央行货币政策报告文本信息、宏观经济与股票市场

本文利用金融情感词典和文本分析技术,分析中国人民银行货币政策执行报告的文本情绪、文本相似度和文本可读性等多维文本信息,刻画央行货币政策执行报告的文本特征,探究货币政策报告的文本信息与宏观经济和股票市场的关系。实证研究发现,货币政策报告的文本情绪的改善会引起显著为正的股票市场价格反应,报告文本相似度的增加会引起股票市场波动性的显著降低,报告可读性对公布后股票市场的波动性影响不显著。货币政策报告文本情绪还与诸多宏观经济指标显著相关。进一步研究发现,引起股票市场显著反应的是报告文本情绪中反映货币政策指引的部分,而反映宏观经济历史状态的部分对股票市场的影响不显著。本文从文本大数据分析角度证明了我国央行沟通的有效性,对国内央行沟通相关研究形成了有益补充。     

央行沟通、宏观经济环境与企业投资——利率渠道、信贷渠道与预期渠道货币政策的对比分析

本文对比研究央行沟通对企业投资的短周期引导能力。结果显示:在短周期内由于传导时滞,利率渠道的货币政策难以引导企业增加投资;信贷渠道的货币政策对企业投资有一定的引导作用;央行沟通能够通过预期渠道引导企业投资,但单独实行央行沟通的引导作用仍然有限。如果在进行央行沟通的同时配合信贷政策影响企业持有现金,就可能在短周期引导企业增加投资。此外,企业财务杠杆会减弱央行沟通的效果,企业投资价值对央行沟通效果没有显著影响。     

The impact of central bank independence on the performance of inflation targeting regimes

This paper examines the effects of inflation targeting on inflation in both advanced and emerging economies. We do not detect significant effects in advanced economies and only find small benefits in emerging economies, in line with previous studies. However, when we differentiate the impact of inflation targeting based on the degree of central bank independence, we find large effects in emerging economies with low central bank independence. Our results therefore suggest that central bank independence is not a prerequisite for countries to experience significant declines in inflation following the adoption of inflation targeting. Furthermore, we provide evidence that one channel through which inflation targeting lowers inflation more in countries with low central bank independence is the reduction of budget deficits following the adoption of an inflation target.     

中央银行沟通可以作为货币政策工具吗——基于中国数据的分析

本文通过检验我国中央银行沟通对金融市场的影响,间接考察了其是否具有货币政策工具的效力。分析结果表明:我国中央银行沟通对短期利率和股票日收益率水平及波动性具有显著的、与预期一致的影响,但对长期利率的影响不明显;书面沟通与口头沟通相比,后者的效力更强一些,并且在口头沟通中,中央银行行长比其他人更能影响金融市场。主要的政策含义是沟通可以作为我国货币政策一种新的工具,与传统的工具配合使用有利于提高货币政策的有效性。     

Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting Performance versus Signals

Focusing on a set of central banks that publish inflation forecasts in real time, this paper aims to establish whether central bank inflation forecasts influence private inflation forecasts. The response is positive in the five countries studied: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and Japan. Three hypotheses may explain this central bank influence: central bank forecasts are more accurate than private ones, are based on different information sets, and/or convey signals about future policy decisions and policymakers’ preferences and objectives. We provide evidence that the source of these central banks’ influence is not linked to their forecasting performance.     

Dynamic central bank independence indices and inflation rate: A new empirical exploration

It has been argued that economies with more independent central banks experience lower inflation over time. In this paper we show that this relationship is sensitive to the methodology through which central bank independence indices are constructed. We stress the importance of employing dynamic central bank independence indices in two ways. First, we perform unit root tests with structural breaks to verify if the implementation of central bank reforms represents a structural break for the inflation rate dynamics. Second, we implement a panel data analysis.We find evidence that legislative reforms that modify the degree of independence of a central bank have a strong impact on the inflation rate dynamics. Moreover, underlying the importance of employing dynamic central bank independence indices, we confirm the negative relationship between the latter and inflation for a sample of 10 OECD countries.     

Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes

Making the central bank an agency with the mandate and reputationfor maintaining price stability is a means by which a governmentcan choose the strength of its commitment to price stability.This article develops four measures of central bank independenceand explores their relation with inflation outcomes. An aggregatelegal index is developed for four decades in 72 countries. Threeindicators of actual independence are developed: the rate ofturnover of central bank governors, an index based on a questionnaireanswered by specialists in 23 countries, and an aggregationof the legal index and the rate of turnover. Legal independence is inversely related to inflation in industrial,but not in developing, countries. In developing countries theactual frequency of change of the chief executive officer ofthe bank is a better proxy for central bank independence. Aninflation-based index of overall central bank independence contributessignificantly to explaining cross-country variations in therate of inflation.