成都创建国家环境保护模范城市的启示

成都市创建国家环境保护模范城市活动进一步改善了城市创业环境和人居环境,全面提升了城市服务功能与综合价值,提高了公众生活质量,使成都市初步走上了环境和经济相互促进,人与自然和谐共生的可持续发展道路,呈现出经济快速发展、环境清洁优美、生态良性循环的良好态势。从成都创建国家环境保护模范城市实践中,我们可以得到以下启示:创建国家环境保护模范城市是构建和谐社会,落实科学发展观,全面建设小康社会,提高城市综合实力与城市竞争力的前提;创建国家环境保护模范城市必须承担发展经济和保护生态的双重任务,并且需要建立持续增长的投入机制;国家环境保护模范城市建设更需要注重生态型社会的建设。     

A coopetitive model for the green economy

The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper the complex construct of coopetition is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a Pareto solution in a win–win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low technologies, will suggest a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at balancing the environmental imbalances.     

中国经济改革的经验与启示

中国经济改革最根本的经验就是发展社会主义市场经济,社会主义基本经济制度与市场经济相结合,实现国有经济的市场化与发挥国有经济的主导作用相结合,国家的宏观调控与市场机制的基础作用相结合,提高效率与促进公平相结合,坚持独立自主同参与经济全球化相结合,坚持公共部门的公益性与利用市场运作相结合。中国经济学的建设与发展要坚持以马克思主义为指导,建设具有中国特色的经济学理论,走自主发展的道路。     

冲突管理方式对团队绩效的影响研究

通过实证验证了不同冲突管理方式影响不同类型团队绩效的研究模型与假设,并进行了讨论。采用陈国权（Guoquan Chen,2000）团队绩效以及Rahim和Magner开发的包括整合式、帮助式、支配式、折衷式、逃避式的冲突管理方式的5因子量表,通过有效的问卷调查,应用SPSS进行数据分析,进而验证工作团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈不显著负影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著负影响;并行团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈显著正影响,支配式呈正影响,折衷式呈显著负影响,逃避式呈显著负影响;项目团队中整合式呈显著正影响;帮助式呈不显著负影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著正影响;管理团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈不显著正影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著正影响。     

Efficiency and prices in economies of overlapping generations

In a general economy of overlapping generations, I introduce a notion of uniform inefficiency, corresponding to the occurrence of a Pareto improvement with a small uniform destruction of resources [G. Debreu, The coefficient of resource utilization, Econometrica 19 (1951) 273-292]. I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for uniform inefficiency in terms of prices at a competitive equilibrium: an allocation is uniformly inefficient if and only if the relative price of the aggregate endowment in a given period into the aggregate endowment up to that period does not vanish over periods of trade, a sort of Modified Cass Criterion [D. Cass, On capital overaccumulation in the aggregative neoclassical model of economic growth: a complete characterization, J. Econ. Theory 4 (1972) 200-223]. Minimal assumptions on fundamentals are needed for such a complete characterization. Furthermore, proofs reduce to simple and short direct arguments. Finally, I verify that uniform inefficiency is preserved under perturbations, a property that might fail for the canonical notion of inefficiency. Remarkably, an allocation is uniformly inefficient if and only if a non-vanishing redistribution, like a social security mechanism, is welfare improving.     

Incentive efficient risk sharing in a settlement mechanism

The purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management in continuing, multi-party, contractual, clearing and settlement arrangements through which large-value payments are typically made. We are particularly interested in the issues of incentive compatibility when a third party possesses a private information concerning the riskiness of transfers being made. If a third party possesses private information that would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment, how does the exposure of that party to the settlement risk affect the quality of information that the party chooses to provide? In this paper, we address this question by analyzing a specific class of parametric environments of a schematic, formal, model of a settlement arrangement or a payment network.     

SMOKE-FREE ORDINANCES INCREASE RESTAURANT PROFIT AND VALUE

This study estimates the value added to a restaurant by a smoke-free policy using regression analysis of the purchase price of restaurants as a function of the presence of a smoke-free law and other control variables. There was a median increase of 16% (interquartile range 11% to 25%) in the sale price of a restaurant in a jurisdiction with a smoke-free law compared to a comparable restaurant in a community without such a law. This result indicates that contrary to claims made by opponents of smoke-free laws, these laws are associated with an increase in restaurant profitability. (JEL I120 , H000 , D780 )     

Subjective probability over a subjective decision tree

A state space has been assumed as a primitive for modeling uncertainty, which presumes that the analyst knows all the uncertainties a decision maker (DM) perceives. This is problematic because states are private information of the DM, and hence are not directly observable to the analyst. Dekel et al. [Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space, Econometrica 69 (2001) 891-934] derive, rather than assume, the subjective state space from preference over suitable choice objects.In a dynamic setting, a decision tree, that is, a pair consisting of a state space and a filtration, has been taken as a primitive. This assumption is also problematic—a decision tree should be derived rather than assumed as a primitive. We formulate a three-stage extension of the above literature in order to model a DM who anticipates subjective uncertainty to be resolved gradually over time. We identify also subjective beliefs on the subjective state space.     

Consumer surplus and the reform of network industries: a primer

Starting from an industry where production is provided by a public monopolist, we observe the effects of a sequence of reforms within the network industry on consumer surplus. Using a simple comparative statics framework, we find the indifference conditions for the consumer surplus under the following regimes: a public monopoly, an unregulated private monopoly, a regulated private monopoly, a vertically disintegrated monopoly, a duopoly and a liberalized market. The results are determined by the relative size of the x-inefficiencies of the public monopolist, allocative inefficiencies of the private monopoly, the cost of unbundling and the costs related to establishing a competitive market.     

Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening

The design of strategic rent-extracting trade policies requires information that may be private, such as the cost structure of an industry or parameters of the demand function. As a consequence, under asymmetric information, the design of these policies is problematic. We propose screening menus consisting of different instruments (tariff vs. quota) designed to solve this informational issue. We first use a simple model that examines a Cournot duopoly between a domestic firm and a foreign firm with linear demand and cost functions, with both firms supplying a homogeneous good on the domestic market. In this scenario, if the government does not have information regarding the demand parameter, which is known by both firms, a menu consisting of a rent-extracting tariff for a low demand parameter and a rent-extracting quota for a high demand parameter maximizes the government's objective function. This menu leads the domestic firm to reveal private information. We then generalize this framework to a scenario with imperfect information regarding the firms' marginal cost. Finally, we discuss the issue of quotas generating public revenues and study the case of a menu consisting of a tariff and a free quota.     

A larger country sets a lower optimal tariff

We develop a new optimal tariff theory that is consistent with the fact that a larger country sets a lower tariff. In our dynamic Dornbusch–Fischer–Samuelson Ricardian model, the long‐run welfare effects of a rise in a country’s tariff consist of the direct revenue, indirect revenue, and growth effects. Based on this welfare decomposition, we obtain two main results. First, the optimal tariff of a country is positive. Second, the optimal tariff of a country is likely to be decreasing in its absolute advantage parameter, implying that a larger (i.e., more technologically advanced) country sets a lower optimal tariff.     

Models of Capital Requirements in Static and Dynamic Settings

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we generalize the notion of capital requirement, originally formulated in a regulatory framework, in order to unify other apparently diverse financial concepts. Second, we stress the interpretation of a capital requirement as a measure of risk, providing a link with the theory of coherent risk measures. We define a capital requirement as the minimal initial cost of a hedging action that makes the original position acceptable. Three basic elements are involved in such a methodology: a system of prices, a class of permitted hedging actions and a criterion of acceptability. Our approach is very general, because we construct capital requirements on vector spaces. However, we will give some concrete applications related, in particular, to the availability of a financial market, to the presence of different business units in an institution or to the fact that pay-offs are spread over different dates.     

Quantitative Import Restrictions and Optimal Capital Taxes Under a System of Tax Credits

This paper examines the optimal capital tax policy under quantitative import constraints, and international capital tax credits. For a small capital-importing country, the optimal capital tax equals the foreign tax under a quota, and equals or exceeds the foreign tax under a VER. For a small capital-exporting country, the optimal policy towards capital is a zero tax under a quota, and a tax or a subsidy under a VER. Also examined are the welfare effects of capital taxes and trade liberalization, and the joint setting of the two policies, when both instruments are available to the government.     

Junk-food,home cooking,physical activity and obesity: The effect of the fat tax and the thin subsidy

In an effort to reduce the growing prevalence of obesity, a tax on junk-foods, known as ‘fat tax’, has been proposed, the revenue from which could be used to finance a ‘thin subsidy’ for healthy foods or exercising equipment. The present paper addresses the fat tax and thin subsidy within a food-intake rational-choice model. Assuming that healthy meals are cooked at home with purchased ingredients and time input, the paper examines the effects on obesity of a tax on junk-food meals and a subsidy to cooking ingredients, distinguishing between a weight-conscious and a non-weight conscious individual, and between a weight-conscious individual who is physically active and physically inactive. The results show that for a non-weight conscious individual a fat tax will unambiguously reduce obesity, whereas a thin subsidy may increase obesity. However, for a weight-conscious individual, particularly one who is physically active, even a fat tax may increase obesity, as it may reduce not just the consumption of junk-food, but also the time devoted to physical activity. The paper explores conditions under which obesity will rise, fall, or remain intact following the introduction of a fat tax or a thin subsidy.     

A Logic for Suspicious Players: Epistemic Actions and Belief–Updates in Games

This paper introduces a notion of 'epistemic action' to describe changes in the information states of the players in a game. For this, ideas are developed from earlier contributions. The ideas are enriched to cover not just purely epistemic actions, but also fact–changing actions ('real moves', e.g. choosing a card, exchanging cards etc.) and nondeterministic actions and strategies (conditional actions having knowledge tests as conditions). The author considers natural operations with epistemic actions and uses them to describe significant aspects of the interaction between beliefs and actions in a game. A logic is used that combines in a specific way a multiagent epistemic logic with a dynamic logic of 'epistemic actions'. The author presents a complete and decidable proof system for this logic. As an application, the author analyses a specific example of a dialogue game (a version of the Muddy Children Puzzle, in which some of the children can 'cheat' by engaging in secret communication moves, while others may be punished for their credulity). Also presented is a sketch of a 'rule–based' approach to games with imperfect information (allowing 'sneaky' possibilities, such as cheating, being deceived and suspecting the others to be cheating).     

Privatisation in Russia Has Led to Criminalisation

Abstract
Russia has recently embarked on a dramatic program of privatisation as part of the process of shock therapy which aims to convert the command economy to a market economy. This program has been undertaken in the absence of a well-developed set of institutions needed for the proper functioning of a market economy. These institutions include a legal system, a related system of property rights, a credit system, a system of commercial banks, classified advertising, an accounting system and others including a sound currency and a social safety net. In the absence of these institutions the incentives facing agents in economic transactions have been perverted. This has led to criminalisation of the economy, dramatic falls in production, loss of confidence in all aspects of commerce, and political instability. The recent Russian experience of privatisation has important lessons for other economies in transition, for developing economies and for economic theory.     

Lock-in and break-out from technological trajectories: Modeling and policy implications

The prevailing models explaining how technologies develop along a specific trajectory largely focus on the circumstances that lead to technological lock-in. We contribute substantially to this area of research by investigating the circumstances under which technological development may break-out of a trajectory. We argue that for this to happen, a third selection mechanism—beyond those of the market and of technology—needs to upset the lock-in. We model the interaction, or mutual shaping among three selection mechanisms, and thus this paper also allows for a better understanding of when a technology will lock-in into a trajectory, when a technology may break-out of a lock-in, and when competing technologies may co-exist in a balance. As a system is conceptualized to gain a (third) degree of freedom, the possibility of bifurcation is introduced into the model. The equations, in which interactions between competition and selection mechanisms can be modeled, allow one to specify conditions for lock-in, competitive balance, and break-out.     

Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs

We construct an endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive probability in equilibrium. In this setting, a bank run has a permanent effect on the levels of the capital stock and of output. In addition, the possibility of a run changes the portfolio choices of depositors and of banks, and thereby affects the long-run growth rate. These facts imply that both the occurrence of a run and the mere possibility of runs in a given period have a large impact on all future periods. A bank run in our model is triggered by sunspots, and we consider two different equilibrium selection rules. In the first, a run occurs with a fixed, exogenous probability, while in the second the probability of a run is influenced by banks’ portfolio choices. We show that when the choices of an individual bank affect the probability of a run on that bank, the economy both grows faster and experiences fewer runs.     

Hurdle models of repayment behaviour in personal loan contracts

This paper proposes a hurdle model of repayment behaviour in loans with fixed instalments. Using information on previous and current contracts, the approach yields a model of customer behaviour, useful, for example, in assessing the impact of determinants of default, a natural concern for credit and behavioural scoring. Under plausible assumptions, a debtor in each period faces a number of missed payments, which depends on his previous repayment decisions; meanwhile, as most debtors are expected to meet financial obligations, the number of missed payments is bound to display excess zeros, with reference to a single-part law. Each sequence of missed payments is modelled by using the binomial thinning, a conceptual tool that allows for dependence between integers by defining the support of consecutive counts. Under suitable assumptions on heterogeneity, the model can be produced under a random effects approach, leading to a two-part panel data model, estimable by quasi-maximum likelihood. The proposed approach is illustrated using a panel data set on personal loans granted by a Portuguese bank.     

A middle income trap in a small open economy: Modeling the Argentinean case

This paper presents a model of the conditions that may lead a small open economy towards a middle income trap. This situation has shown to be pervasive in Latin America. As Argentina is a salient instance of this phenomenon, we develop a stylized model of its economy at the first decades of the XXth century. It consists of a general equilibrium model of an open emerging economy, which is a price-taking primary goods exporter. A growth process is triggered by an increase of commodity prices, due to an upward jump of the world demand of these goods. The economy goes through several phases of growth, starting from a subsistence stage. Once decreasing returns set in, the economy reaches a steady state. Only a sustained high demand of its export products allows the economy to thrive. Otherwise, the economy gets entrapped in a middle income level.