布置实施调查失业率是经济社会发展的必然选择

实际失业人口和失业率是社会在一定时期内真实发生失业情况的客观反映,是统计工作中的基础指标,它们的准确性是经济学家做出劳动就业建议和政府进行就业决策的最基本前提。由于我国城镇登记失业统计在指标设定和方法上存在较大缺陷,已不能真实反映当前我国的实际失业情况。通过采取较为科学的调查失业率统计方法获得的调查失业人口,能够更加真实地反映当前我国城镇的实际失业情况,从而对政府制定宏观经济决策提供重要的依据。     

我国不同口径失业状况的估算

本文首先讨论不同口径失业率的界定,并尝试依据有关公开数据估算中国城镇的真实失业率,再对其影响因素建立相关模型并进行讨论与评价.     

我国失业的五大特征与对策

一、我国当前失业的五大特征 我国当前失业主要具有五个基本特征: 1.城镇登记失业率不断攀升,城镇真实失业人口创建国以来之最。我国当前的失业问题集中表现在城镇。根据国家统计局公布的数字,我国城镇登记失业率(过去称待业率)最高的是1952年(13.2％)。然而,当时我国城镇登记的失业人口     

我国实际城镇失业率测算方法研究

就业作为经济和社会发展的优先目标和民生之本,其重要性不言而喻,但我国当前所采用的城镇登记失业率指标难以反映真实的就业状况.为此,本文引入名义国内生产总值指数和人口因素作为参数构建模型,测算我国1990-2014年实际城镇失业率,进而检验奥肯定律在我国的适用性,并与已有文献数据和结论进行对比分析.结果显示,本模型测得的数据是准确的,能够较好地衡量我国城镇真实的就业情况,可以为国家制定政策提供更精确的数据依据.     

基于抽样调查失业指标的失业比重与产业发展关系研究

由于我国公布的城镇登记失业率难以真实地反映失业状况,本文选取了与失业率相关的抽样调查指标"城镇失业人员失业前的行业构成百分比",通过联系宏观经济数据分析,得出了第一产业快速发展能有效抑制第一产业失业比重增长,第二产业快速发展对控制第二产业失业比重上升有一定正面影响,应重点保证第一、第二产业快速发展的结论。     

我国失业测量体制探析

人力资源和社会保障部公布2008年的我国城镇登记失业率4.2%,中国社科院发布的2009年<社会蓝皮书>中显示我国2008年的调查失业率高达9.4%,是前者的两倍多.城镇登记失业率公布20多年来曾一度受到公众的质疑,随着市场经济的不断完善,登记失业率的弊端也更加突显出来.本文通过分析我国现行失业率测量体系存在的不足,提出对构建科学的失业测量体系的一些思考.     

大力发展小企业促进我国当前就业

根据有关部门的资料显示 ,2 0 0 2年我国的城镇登记人口失业率为 3 .8% ,但这并不包括未登记失业和隐性失业。文章详细分析了我国当前的就业形势的特点 ,并对小企业促进就业进行了分析 ,同时提出相应措施。     

中国城镇自然失业率和对策研究

在给定工资水平的条件下,良好运作的劳动力市场意味着较低的自然失业率。静态的自然失业率取决于下岗比例和失业者中重新找到工作者的比例,动态的自然失业率则取决于初始失业率、经济增长率、就业弹性和劳动人口增长率。未来中国城镇自然失业率有上升趋势,转换政策是提高城镇劳动力市场绩效的唯一选择,因而也是建设和谐社会的重要手段。     

中国失业率水平的适度调控目标区间研究——基于面板门限模型的实证分析

本文从适度失业的理论分析着手,回顾和论述了适度失业问题研究的重要意义。在此基础上,根据1992—2010年间我国各省、市、自治区的面板数据,在控制了城镇失业率水平和经济增长之间的间接效应的条件下,利用面板门限模型对中国城镇登记失业率最优门限值水平进行估计,得到我国城镇登记失业率的最优调控目标区间为[2%,4.2%]。在城镇登记失业率的最优区间内,失业率的下降对经济产出的拉动效果明显。最后,根据实证分析的结果,提出了一些问题和建议。     

我国就业与人力资源开发面临的教育制约

当前,在全面、协调、可持续发展的进程中,我国面临的一个突出问题是社会就业压力日益增大。从20世纪90年代中后期开始,我国城镇失业率在经历近10年较低水平之后开始反弹,到2002年时城镇失业率已达4％,城镇失业人口总量达到681万人。如果再考虑到广大农村地区存在的农民失地又     

Image and Reality in Economic Development

Since the financial meltdown of 2007, unemployment has consistently been above 6.0 percent. On one level, long-term unemployment can be accounted for by structural changes. But, on another level, the problem of long-term unemployment is really no more complicated than the absence of effective demand. This study looks at the demographics of the long-term unemployed for the years 2007-2010, and compares them to the years 1991-1994 to see what changes have occurred specifically among the long-term unemployed. The data shows that, in terms of structural changes, the 1991-1994 and 2007-2010 periods were not much different. Rather, the nature of this recession resulted in an altered composition of the long-term unemployed. Because long-term unemployment in this recession is a function of a particularly deep recession, a new approach is needed. Based on the data, this study argues for a wage policy that would allow for people to increase their effective demand for goods and services.     

Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment*

This paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy. We consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment. Job search behavior is unobservable, which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance (UI) benefits intended for unemployed workers. As a consequence, pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment. We show that requiring unproductive activities (workfare) in exchange for UI benefits may generate a Pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers, and we characterize the situations where this is the case.     

The Beveridge curve in Europe: new evidence using national and regional data

The Beveridge curve depicts the empirical negative relationship between job vacancy rate and unemployment rate, and reflects the efficiency of the job matching process. Movements along a fixed downward sloping Beveridge curve are associated with cyclical shocks, while shifts of the curve arise from structural factors that alter the matching efficiency between job vacancies and unemployed workers. National and regional data on job vacancies and unemployment are combined to estimate the Beveridge curves of five European countries and their regions, focusing on the period 1975 to 2004. I also analyse whether shifts in European Beveridge curves are due to changes in the composition of the unemployed pool, labour market rigidities or cyclical and structural shocks. The empirical evidence suggests that changes in labour market rigidities, long term unemployment, as well as cyclical shocks are responsible for outward shifts in European Beveridge curves. I also find evidence of nonlinearities in the relation between unemployment and labour market institutions.     

Unemployment Durations in West Germany Before and After the Reform of the Unemployment Compensation System during the 1980s

Abstract. This paper analyzes empirically the distribution of unemployment durations in West Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. It therefore covers periods before and after the changes during the mid‐1980s in the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits for older unemployed. The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample containing administrative data for about 500,000 individuals. Since these data only partly reveal the unemployment duration in an economic sense, we use a narrow and a wide proxy for unemployment. Our empirical analysis finds significant changes in the distribution of non‐employment durations for older unemployed. At the same time, the distribution of unemployment durations between jobs remained unchanged after the reforms. Our findings clearly show that many firms and workers used the more beneficial laws as a part of early retirement packages. Surprisingly, for those workers who found and accepted a new job, we do not observe a prolongation of their search periods to a sizeable extent.     

工人离职、失业波动与失业保险文献评述

失业不仅涉及失业波动的影响,还包括在职工人的离队。为减少工人搜寻过程中产生的负外部性,应降低工人的信息成本。失业保险政策的实施又降低了失业工人再就业的激励性,应确立有效的失业保险水平,实现产出与社会福利的最大化。     

Why Unemployment Insurance Might Not Only Be Good for the Soul,It Might Also Be Good for the Economy

Contrary to the conventional view that unemployment insurance serves to directly increase the rate of unemployment as well as reducing an economy's competitiveness by increasing the market wage of labor, the argument presented in this paper is that this worldview critically depends on unrealistic behavioral assumptions. A more realistic modeling suggests that unemployment rates need not rise and competitiveness need not deteriorate with the introduction of or improvements in unemployment insurance, which can also induce increases in economic efficiency. These analytical predictions are consistent with the empirics of unemployment insurance. Unemployment insurance can therefore protect the unemployed without damaging the economy.     

Return Versus onward Migration: Go Back or Move On?

This paper examines the impact of unemployment on out-migration by distinguishing between return and onward migration and controlling for total earnings. We use Timing-of-Events models and control for the endogeneity of total earnings, unemployment and out-migration using administrative data from the Netherlands. Our findings suggest that unemployment triggers return migration more than onward migration. When total earnings are low unemployment increases the hazard of return migration. When total earnings are high the hazard rate of onward migration for unemployed immigrants increases. Thus, these findings highlight that out-migration is affected both by unemployment and by total earnings as well as by the interaction between the two.     

不完全劳动市场、政府干预与失业率

本文针对我国不完全的劳动市场,建立了一个短视一搜寻模型,目的是要说明,第一,虽然政府直接干预下的就业率高于无政府干预的劳动市场的均衡就业率,但是后者的社会总福利水平高于前者,而且,无政府干预情形下失业者的福利水平不会低于政府干预时在低工资岗位上的就业者的福利水平.这说明政府直接干预劳动市场虽然有可能降低失业率,但可能导致整个社会福利损失,也不利于提高低收入人群的福利水平.第二,我国现行的社会保障制度、户籍制度以及地方保护政策妨碍城乡劳动力自由流动,造成城市居民一般占据了工资较高的岗位,农村居民一般只能找到工资较低的岗位.这种匹配过程达到的劳动市场均衡,虽然有可能最大限度降低城镇失业率,但不是使得全国总失业率最低的均衡.     

Equilibrium unemployment, search behaviour and unemployment persistency

Unemployment persistency and high equilibrium unemployment isoften assumed to be caused by rigidities and low search efficiencyin the labour market, especially in European welfare stateswith generous income replacement schemes. These arguments aretested on data from Sweden, an old welfare state with a longperiod of full employment that has changed into a situationwith high unemployment. Data show a clear and very strong unemploymentduration dependency, but it is not possible to prove that thisis a result of low employability among the long-term unemployed.Getting a job is most of all associated with relative qualifications,recall expectations and local labour market conditions, andnot with search behaviour or high wage demands. It is arguedthat unemployment duration when unemployment is high can bestbe understood as a selection process rather than a search process,and that econometric estimations of equilibrium unemploymentare too pessimistic about the potential for an expansive economicpolicy. It is also argued that an active labour market policyis a more efficient compliment to such a policy than changesin income replacement ratios.     

The impact of unemployment on inequality and poverty in OECD countries

The purpose of this research is to examine the contribution of unemployment to income inequality and poverty in various OECD countries. These relationships have been explored using Luxembourg Income Study micro-data. Considerable differences across OECD countries are revealed through the use of within-household unemployment distributions. These differences help to explain most of the observed divergences in the relationship between unemployment and income distribution, in conjunction with the heterogeneous influence of social benefits on the economic position of the unemployed in these countries. A sub-group decomposition analysis corroborates the limited effect of unemployment on income distribution in most of the considered countries. However, it seems clear that the unemployed are among those with the highest risk of experiencing poverty.
JEL classification: D31, I32, J31.