The dynamics of privatization, the legal environment and stock market development

In this paper, we examine under which conditions privatization is an effective means to develop local stock markets for a panel of 61 countries over the last twenty four years. By addressing the endogeneity between privatization and stock market development, we show for the 1980-98 period that the initial legal environment is a significant contemporary determinant of stock market development, while privatization is not. When we examine the dynamics of privatization in interaction with the legal environment, we find that privatization has a two-year-lagged effect on stock market development in emerging markets, and a one-year-lagged effect in developed countries. Results for the 1999-2003 period seem to be largely affected by the global crash that followed the Asian crisis.     

China׳s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform

The Split-Share Structure Reform granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), opening up the gate to China?s secondary privatization. The expectation of privatization quickly boosted SOE output, profits, and employment, but did not change their operating efficiency and corporate governance. The improvements to SOE performance are positively correlated to government agents’ privatization-led incentive of increasing state-owned share value. In terms of privatization methodology, the reform adopted a market mechanism that played an effective information discovery role in aligning the interests of the government and public investors.     

DOES PRIVATIZATION FOSTER CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS?

We analyze the effect of privatization on the quality of legal institutions of governance. Our findings suggest that large-scale privatization (in terms of progress and volume) increases the risk of corruption in developing countries but has no effect on the legal institutions of governance (i.e., law and order and investor protection). The method of privatization (public share issues versus private sales) helps curb corruption and improve the quality of law enforcement and of investor protection. In developed countries, the progress and volume of privatization reduce the risk of corruption, and the method of privatization enhances the quality of law enforcement.     

Testing limits to policy reversal: Evidence from Indian privatizations

We examine the effect of regime change on privatization. In the 2004 Indian election, the pro-reform BJP was unexpectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition. Stock prices of government-controlled companies that had been slated for privatization by the BJP dropped 3.5% relative to private firms. Government-controlled companies that were under study for possible privatization fell 7.5% relative to private firms. This is consistent with investor belief of a “point of no return,” where advanced reforms are more difficult to reverse. Further analysis suggests that layoffs, combined with the privatization announcement, served as a credible commitment to privatize.     

BANK PRIVATIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We trace the extent of performance deviation of privatized banks from established private banks in 30 countries from 1994 to 2005 and investigate the role of bank regulatory and supervisory norms, market competition, ownership structure, deposit insurance scheme, and governance structure affecting the deviation. Evidence shows that privatization does improve the performance of banks in the first year of being privatized, but performance gradually declines, which is consistent with the government restructuring argument before the privatization. Governance, foreign ownership, banking freedom (regulations), and the deposit insurance scheme in respective economies are found to affect performance deviation significantly.     

The political economy of residual state ownership in privatized firms: Evidence from emerging markets

We investigate the political determinants of residual state ownership for a unique database of 221 privatized firms operating in 27 emerging countries over the 1980 to 2001 period. After controlling for firm-level and other country-level characteristics, we find that the political institutions in place, namely, the political system and political constraints, are important determinants of residual state ownership in newly privatized firms. Unlike previous evidence that political ideology is an important determinant of privatization policies in developed countries, we find that right- or left-oriented governments do not behave differently in developing countries. These results confirm that privatization is politically constrained by dynamics that differ between countries.     

Privatization and globalization: An empirical analysis

This paper examines the link between globalization-measured by foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) – and privatization of state-owned enterprises, in a multi-country sample that focuses on developing countries. We hypothesize that privatization has an effect on FDI/FPI as the process of fostering private sector participation is often accompanied by liberalization reforms, and by allocations of substantial shares of newly privatized firms to foreign investors. Similarly, we expect FDI/FPI to foster privatization efforts as new capital inflows, technology and managerial skills that accompany FDI/FPI make the environment more prone to competition, providing governments with incentives to privatize inefficient firms that need to be turned around. This relation is assessed in two ways, first in a dynamic panel using a generalized method of moments approach, and second through panel causality tests. We find a bi-directional positive relation between privatization proceeds and globalization, particularly in the case of FDI.     

Ownership change,institutional development and performance

This paper conducts a cross-country empirical study of the impact of institutions and agency conflicts on ownership reforms and their implications for changes in performance and efficiency. We examine two main questions. First, we evaluate the effects of certain property rights and institutional quality measures on performance and efficiency. We find that property rights and contracting rights protections contribute to stronger post-privatization performance. Second, we ask whether sectors undergoing changes from state to private ownership exhibit better or worse performance than sectors remaining public. We find an insignificant effect of privatization in ordinary least squares estimates and a negative short-term effect after correcting for endogeneity of privatization decisions that disappears in the long run, consistent with recently privatized enterprises facing short-run costs of restructuring and the challenges of mitigating agency and expropriation concerns.     

Bank ownership,privatization, and performance: Evidence from a transition country

This paper combines the static effect of ownership and the dynamic effect of privatization on bank performance in China over 1995–2010, reporting a significantly higher performance by private intermediaries – joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks – relative to state-owned commercial banks. However, publicly traded banks, subject to multiple monitoring and vetting in capital markets, perform better regardless of ownership status. The privatization of banks has improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency gains in the short- or long-run (initial public offerings). The positive long-run effect is more relevant and significant for banking institutions with minority foreign ownership. Moreover, this paper innovatively estimates interest income efficiency and non-interest income efficiency at the same time. The results suggest that Chinese banks are much more efficient in generating interest income than raising non-interest revenue, although the latter aspect has improved significantly during the sample period.     

Stock market development under globalization: Whither the gains from reforms?

Over the past decades, many countries have implemented significant reforms (including financial liberalization, privatization, and regulatory and supervisory improvements) to foster domestic capital market development. Despite these policies, the performance of capital markets in several countries has been disappointing. To understand the effects of reforms, we study the impact of six capital market reforms on domestic stock market development and internationalization. We find that reforms tend to be followed by increases in domestic market capitalization and trading. But reforms are also followed by an increase in the share of activity in international equity markets, with potential negative spillover effects.     

Privatization and stock market liquidity

This paper shows that share issue privatization (SIP) is a major source of domestic stock market liquidity in 19 developed economies. Particularly, privatization IPOs have a negative effect on the price impact – measured by the ratio of the absolute return on the market index to turnover. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls for other observable and unobservable factors, having also considered the endogenous nature of the decision to privatize.     

The real effect of partial privatization on corporate innovation: Evidence from China's split share structure reform

We examine the real effect of partial privatization on corporate innovation. To establish causality, we explore plausibly exogenous variation in the expectation of further partial privatization generated by China's split share structure reform, which mandatorily converts non-tradable shares into freely tradable shares and opens up the gate to the further privatization of state-owned enterprises. We find that partial privatization prospects have a positive effect on corporate innovation. A better alignment of the interests of government agents with those of private shareholders and improved stock price informativeness appear to be two plausible underlying mechanisms. Our paper sheds new light on the real effects of partial privatization.     

Insider trading law enforcement and gross spreads of ADR IPOs

Using American Depositary Receipt (ADR) IPOs from 34 countries during 1980-2004, we find that, on average, the enforcement of insider trading laws reduces the underwriter gross spread by 49-61 basis points, which is about 10-12% of the average gross spread for ADR IPOs. This relation is present regardless of whether issuers have a prior listing or whether issuers are from developed or emerging markets. The association becomes stronger for ADRs underwritten by less prestigious underwriters and for issuers that are involved in privatization. The political institutions in the issuers’ home markets also affect gross spreads.     

Operating and stock market performance of state-owned enterprise privatizations: The Spanish experience

We investigate the operating and stock market performance of Spanish state-owned enterprises (SOEs) privatized through public share issue offerings (SIPs) from 1990 to 2001, when the last SIP was conducted. We compare the performance of SOEs and privately-owned firms. We find significant operating improvements in Spanish SOEs after the privatization. Specifically, they show significant increases in income efficiency, real sales and employment. Spanish governments tried to minimize the foregone proceeds when selling SOE shares and underpriced them lower than private firms. We relate these results with the pressure of the Maastricht Treaty fiscal criteria, as well as lower information asymmetries between firms and investors. Finally, we do not find long-term abnormal stock market performance after SIPs.     

Overseas listing as a policy tool: Evidence from China’s H-shares

We investigate why the Chinese government chooses to perform share issue privatization (SIP) of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Hong Kong, despite the benefit of facilitating the domestic stock market development if performing SIP in China (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999) and the higher cost to list in Hong Kong. We address this issue by arguing that the positive effect of SIPs on the development of the domestic market may have limitations, especially when the domestic market is not well developed and cannot absorb rapid and large-scale SIP activities. To maintain domestic market order, it may be optimal to carry out SIP in overseas markets. Furthermore, by listing shares in developed overseas markets, SOEs from the less developed countries could leverage on the overseas markets’ better accounting, governance, and legal standards. By examining a sample of 92 Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and the relevant control samples of purely domestically listed Chinese firms during the period of 1993–2006, we find supporting evidence for both arguments.     

The productivity effects of privatization: The case of Polish cooperatives

This paper evaluates the productivity effects associated with privatization of producer cooperatives. The results, based on a sample of 2164 Polish cooperatives, indicate that privatized cooperatives have: (1) 1% lower total factor productivity (TFP) the year prior to privatization and 3-20% higher TFP in the year of privatization and three years post-privatization, (2) 9-36% higher labor productivity, (3) capital productivity effects of − 16-6%. The evidence is consistent with governance and incentive mechanisms of cooperatives being more effective outside of state interference, and with competition and hard budget constraints leading to pressure to restructure and adopt practices that improve productivity.     

The choice of ADRs

We study the determinants of a firm’s decision to issue one of the four available ADR programs (Level I, Level II, Level III, and Rule 144A). We find that the firm’s attributes (size, income, asset growth, leverage, privatization, ownership structure, and country-of-origin) and the firm’s home-country institutional variables (accounting rating and legal protection of minority shareholders) condition this choice. We also examine the issuing activity and the determinants of the ADR choice before and after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act. Following this structural change, we provide evidence of a reallocation between ADR programs. Compared to the pre-SOX period, firms from emerging markets, and those from countries with weak legal protection of minority shareholders, are more likely after SOX to choose Rule 144A and Level III, respectively.     

Listing regulations in China and their effect on the performance of IPOs and SOEs

China started to reform her state-owned enterprises (SOE) in 1990s. As a result of these reforms, some of the companies are partially privatized, while the others are fully privatized. The state kept certain profitable and strategically important SOEs under state control. This paper investigates the privatization progress, the listing requirements for those companies that are listed on two national stock exchanges and the performance of the privatized companies.     

Institutional Environment,Blockholder Characteristics and Ownership Concentration in China

Using a sample of China's A-share listed companies for the period 2001-2004, this paper investigates the influence of institutional environment variables, including the process of marketization, level of local government intervention, and local legal environment, on blockholder characteristics and ownership concentration, and the relation between the endogeneity of ownership structure and institutional environment. Our results indicate that the effects of these variables on ownership concentration are (1) positive for listed companies controlled by state asset management bureaus affiliated with local governments, (2) negative for listed companies controlled by state-owned enterprises affiliated with local governments and (3) unclear for listed private companies. These variables also positively affect the degree of privatization of listed companies in China.     

Privatization and Corporate Governance: Principles, Evidence, and Future Challenges

Unless developing countries embrace a corporate governance perspective,privatization is unlikely to provide the benefits of improvedperformance with accountability. This article introduces theconcept of governance chains that can constrain the grabbinghands of public and private actors by providing informationand accountability mechanisms to help investors monitor managers.Empirical data on established firms from 49 countries provideestimates of the relative importance and strength of privateand formal chains of governance. The framework and empiricalbenchmarks help explain the outcomes of past privatizationsand suggest certain steps that governments can pursue to besure to get the most out of future privatization activity.