机密还是专利?

在传统社会中,为保护创新成果,人们通常只能将其保留为技术机密或他人无法共享的私有知识,这不但降低了创新效率,也会增加技术的失传风险.有识于此,本文将专利看做政府向创新者提供的一种机密交换契约,并借此论证了引入"事后"专利保护的合理性:人们为了要获得排他性的专利保护,就必须将其私有知识公开披露,而这消除了技术失传风险.但只有当专利利润高于商业机密利润时人们才会申请专利,故专利保护会导致更大的垄断扭曲.社会最优专利期限就是在机密失传风险和垄断定价扭曲之间权衡的结果,只要存在技术失传风险,事后最优专利期限就必须是正的.In?a?traditional?society?innovations?were?often?held?as?secrecy,?i.?e.?,?private?knowledge?that?can?not?be?shared?by?others.?This?approach?not?only?lowers?social?efficiency,?but?also?leads?to?the?risk?of?technology?oblivion.?Based?on?this?observation,?we?offer?a?novel?justification?of?"ex?post"?patent?protection.?In?order?to?obtain?exclusive?patent?protection,?innovators?have?to?disclose?their?technological?knowledge?to?the?public.?This?approach?eliminates?oblivion?risks.?However,?patent?protection?may?lead?to?more?deadweight?loss?because?an?innovator?would?not?apply?a?patent?unless?the?profit?from?doing?that?is?higher,?i.?e.?,?unless?the?patent?duration?is?longer?than?the?expected?duration?of?the?secrecy.?The?optimal?patent?policy?in?our?model,?therefore,?results?from?the?tradeoff?between?oblivion?risk?and?monopoly?distortion.?The?optimal?patent?protection?should?be?positive?as?long?as?oblivion?risk?exists.?We?also?discuss?how?some?parameters?affect?the?optimal?patent?policy.     

专利保护期限设置的技术经济分析

企业如果严格遵守专利保护制度就可以有足够的动力投入技术研发,新技术的产生会相应的增加社会总的剩余量。但是,专利保护制度在激励企业创新技术的同时还形成了潜在效率方面的损失。长久以来,我们想要找到一个权衡点,经过长期的研究分析,得到了专利保护期限的设置。本文主要分析在社会总剩余最大化跟企业利润最大化的相互作用的前提下使用动态的局部均衡权衡模型来确定社会最优专利保护的期限。在分析动态的局部均衡权衡模型的过程中,得到这样的理论,研发投入水平是专利保护制度的内在生成物。     

最优专利期限问题研究

本文参照挪德豪斯分析方法,借用社会福利贴现值的模型,引入创新成功概率来研究专利保护的最优期限问题。研究认为在给定需求函数和边际成本的条件下对于具有不同投资风险、不同创新成功率的行业,由于参数不同,模型求解的结果不尽相同,设定专利保护期限的效果可能不同。同时,针对R&D风险的不同,分析了最优专利期限应该如何设计等问题。     

创新风险、创新环境与三维最优专利制度设计

借鉴已有研究方法和成果,引入创新风险、创新环境,从专利长度、专利宽度和专利高度3个维度探讨持续创新中最优专利制度的设定,最后结合实际提出模型的应用。通过分析发现:最优专利制度是一种动态的制度而不是静态的制度;新兴行业的专利制度组合方向为长期限、宽范围和高距离;最优专利制度必须合理融合专利长度、专利宽度和专利高度。     

专利与产品品种博弈浅析

专利概述近年来,经济学非常注重对知识产权的研究,其中对专利的研究最具有代表性,但经济学理论界真正在这一问题的研究上取得实质性进展,要从偌德豪斯(Nordhaus)算起。诺德豪斯是采取了最具有代表性的专利保护年限,他认为在设计最优的专利保护期限时,必须对保护年限的增加所带来的边际社会成本和边际社会收益进行权衡。后来的经济学家对专利的研究可以分成三大主线。第一条主线是试图建立更能增进社会福利的专利保护期限;第二条主线是将衡量专利制度保护程度的指标拓展到除专利保护期限外的其他方面,如专利保护范围;第三条主线是围绕专利制…     

专利保护宽度和累积创新竞赛中的信息披露

该文将专利保护宽度定义为累积创新厂商之间的许可比率,考察其对累积创新竞赛中厂商信息披露决策的影响.我们发现:强的专利保护宽度有利于信息披露,但其对社会福利和技术进步率的影响却呈近似的倒U型,故在不同的情况下都存在一个专利保护宽度的最优取值区间.与事后许可相比,事前许可能在反托拉斯法的框架下导致社会福利的帕累托改进.如果双方对专利诉讼的结果具有相同的预期,则专利保护宽度的确定和实施就是无成本的.     

最优专利制度研究

本文构建了一个动态一般均衡模型来研究最优专利长度和最优专利宽度的问题。研究结论表明,最优的专利长度和专利宽度都是有限的。专利长度的增加会通过促进创新来提高社会福利水平,同时,也会导致市场扭曲,从而降低社会福利水平,但随着专利长度的不断增加,前者的效应会小于后者的效应,因此,有限的专利长度是最优的。有效的专利宽度应该一方面使得模仿产品的质量水平不要太低,从而保证模仿产品对专利产品形成潜在的威胁,逼迫专利产品的价格低于垄断价格,减小市场扭曲;另一方面使得模仿产品的质量不要太高,从而保证专利产品能够制定较高的垄断价格,促进创新。     

内生经济增长理论框架下的市场失效与财政政策

内生经济增长理论认为,知识和人力资本的外部效应与创新带来的垄断势力推动经济增长的同时,也会带来非帕雷托最优的经济增长收入分配的不公平,将阻碍经济增长;加快知识和人力资本积累、促进技术进步以及缓解收入分配不公平的财政政策能纠正市场失效,使长期经济增长达到社会最优.     

专利保护宽度和累积创新竞赛中的信息披露

本文将专利保护宽度定义为累积创新厂商之间的许可比率，考察其对累积创新竞赛中厂商信息披露决策的影响。我们发现：强的专利保护宽度有利于信息披露，但其对社会福利和技术进步率的影响却呈近似的倒U型，故在不同的情况下都存在一令专利保护宽度的最优取值区间。与事后许可相比，事前许可能在反托拉斯法的框架下导致社会福利的帕累托改进。如果双方对专利诉讼的结果具有相同的预期，则专利保护宽度的确定和实施就是无成本的。     

从买标准到卖标准，路还多远？——中国产业：挑战国际标准话语权

“国际大型跨国企业和企业集团在各个科研领域形成了强大的经济科研实力，依托知识产权制度，将自身的专利与标准紧密结合在一起，创立了一条‘技术专利化，专利标准化，标准垄断化’的‘一条龙’获利道路。” 在国际竞争下，中国产业必须拥有有自主知识产权之标准，否则就会成为别人的附属国和OEM，只能做世界的配角。 而当中国企业再不仰人“标准”生存，对于国际企业来说，这将意味着他们失去源源不断的坐收专利费用。 赢得标准，就赢得巨量金钱!     

Innovation and imitation under imperfect patent protection

The paper develops a model in which the spillover of R&D is a consequence of a rational investment in imitation. The model incorporates the innovator's choice between patenting and secrecy as a protection device. The analysis demonstrates that an increase in patent breadth always discourages resorting to secrecy, whereas the influence of increased patent life is the opposite with large spillovers. An increase in patent life can also reduce innovative activity with large spillovers. Under endogenous imitation, short patents are socially optimal.     

Licensing to a durable-good duopoly in patent litigation

Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing contract on a cost-reducing innovation. We find that both the optimal licensing contract and the innovator's licensing revenue are closely related to the patent's strength, i.e., the probability it would be found valid if tested in court. It is shown that, for a relatively weak patent (patent's strength is low), it's optimal for the innovator to charge the royalty rate as high as possible coupled with a negative fixed fee. But for a relatively strong patent (patent's strength is high), contract involving the combination of a medium level royalty rate and a positive fixed fee is optimal. We also discuss how the patent's strength affects the social welfare of a patent. Finally we present two policy suggestions that may alleviate the social welfare loss raised by the licensing of weak patents.     

Do innovative firms rely on big secrets? An analysis of IP protection strategies with the CIS 4 survey

Innovative companies have a variety of instruments at their disposal to protect themselves from imitators, and this paper investigates the determinants of the protection choices with a focus on highly innovative respondents. While the patent system's aim is that firms apply to patent their innovations, especially the most important ones, theoretical results in the existing literature suggest that large innovations will rather be protected by secrecy because of the legal uncertainty surrounding intellectual property rights. In line with the predictions of their model, our probit analysis conducted using data from the Community Innovation Survey 4 shows that, in the intermediate goods industry, small innovations are patented while secrecy is used to protect large ones. For very innovative small firms, the share of innovative sales in total sales has a negative effect on patent application. These findings support the view that many innovative firms regard patent filing as no more secure than secrecy, which therefore limits the diffusion of knowledge.     

Measuring knowledge persistence: a genetic approach to patent citation networks

The aim of this paper is to propose a new empirical method for identifying technologically important patents within a patent citation network and to apply it to the telecommunication switching industry. The method proposed is labelled the genetic approach, as it is inspired by population genetics: as geneticists are interested in studying patterns of migration and therefore the common origins of people, in innovation studies we are interested in tracing the origin and the evolution of today knowledge. In the context of patent and citation networks, this is done by calculating the patent’s persistence index, i.e., decomposing patent’s knowledge applying the Mendelian law of gene inheritance. This draws on the idea that the more a patent is related (through citations) to “descendent” patents, the more it affects future technological development and therefore its contribution persists in the technology. Results show that the method proposed is successful in reducing the number of both nodes and links considered. Furthermore, our method is indeed successful in identifying technological discontinuities where previous knowledge is not relevant for current technological development.     

技术扩散模型中的发展中国家最优专利保护

本文在Barro and Sala-I-Martin(1997)的技术扩散模型基础上,构建了一个Ramsey问题模型讨论发展中国家内生的动态最优专利保护问题。本文给出了Ramsey问题的均衡解并讨论了其动态特征,克服了现有文献只用比较静态方式分析讨论外生最优专利保护政策的缺陷。本文的主要结论是,发展中国家在发展早期阶段,理应设定相对较低的专利保护程度,然后随着经济成长不断地提高专利保护水平,但其长期的稳态专利保护水平有可能比发达国家高,也可能比发达国家低。     

Exploring technological resilience at the country level with patents

Resilience is critical to stabilise and reduce shocks and create advantages over competitors in environments with dramatic change and unexpected crises. There is no generally agreed-upon definition of technological resilience, and there is not yet a well-developed theory of technological resilience at the country level. The objective of this paper is to contribute to technological resilience research based on patent indicators by analyzing OECD countries’ technological resilience. This paper provides a framework to analyze the quality of selected patent indicators used for estimating technological crisis. More specifically, four sets of patent indicators, i.e. collaboration, knowledge, diversity, and legal protection, are employed to evaluate technological resilience, which is characterised as crisis probability, intensity, and duration. We found that higher technological coverage leads to higher crisis probability, more original technology leads to higher crisis intensity, and interpersonal collaboration enhances the chance of passing a crisis.     

Does intellectual monopoly stimulate or stifle innovation?

This study develops an R&D-based growth model with vertical and horizontal innovation to shed some light on the current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or stifles innovation. We analyze the effects of patent protection in the form of blocking patents. We show that patent protection changes the direction of innovation by having asymmetric effects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement) and horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion). Calibrating the model and simulating transition dynamics, we find that strengthening the effect of blocking patents stifles vertical innovation and decreases economic growth but increases social welfare due to an increase in horizontal innovation. In light of this finding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and welfare implications of patents, it is important to consider their often neglected compositional effects on vertical and horizontal innovation.     

假冒生产对专利制度的伤害

本文是对中国年轻的专利制度的经济学分析。通过一个包含假冒生产行为的理论模型和相应的计量检验 ,我们研究了中国普遍存在的假冒生产活动对专利保护的影响 ,并得出结论 :中国 1 993年以延长专利保护时间为主的专利法修改未使地区专利申请和研究开发投入的倾向上升 ,反而有所下降 ,原因在于专利保护时间的延长刺激了更多的假冒企业进入那些具有较大假冒潜力的行业 ,从而专利开发企业的利益受到了损害 ,也就没有动力进行进一步的研究开发和专利申请。对一切行业实行相同的专利保护期T与相同的惩罚假冒力度K ,必定违反最优专利制度设计原则。应该针对不同行业的假冒生产特点 ,通过制定相应的法律政策使假冒潜力最大的行业假冒成本提高。另外 ,就当前关于计算机软件保护的争论 ,本文认为软件行业过去保护不足。     

The patent paradox – New insights through decision support using compound options

By considering the patent from the perspective of a compound option it is possible to offer useful insights into what a patent does, when it is worth patenting, and the effects of changes to patent regulation and enforcement in terms of maximizing economic and societal benefits. A paradox exists because stronger patent laws with longer durations allow greater profit to the inventor, but strong and long patent protection discourages related innovation as the protection for the underlying technology becomes broader and duration is longer. Through the demonstration that under current regulation the net present value of a sample patentable invention must be a little over half a million dollars ($556,000) at the time of patent filing, insight is offered into when it is economically advisable to patent. The effect of changes to patent regulation can also be rapidly assessed using this technique. Consequently, the compound option provides value to policy makers for decision support in assessing the impact of changes to patent policy and to inventors and patent attorneys on assessing whether it is economically rational to patent.     

专利运营基金:域外实践与本土探索

开放式创新加速了价值链的专业化分工,专利价值的实现方式也呈现多元化趋势,各种新兴的专利基金不断塑造出崭新的商业模式。对国外典型专利基金类型进行了系统分析,梳理了中国政府近年来在促进专利基金运营方面的政策努力,选取深圳中彩联科技有限公司、天津滨海国际知识产权交易所和睿创专利运营基金为样本,探讨了本土专利基金的实践探索与运营瓶颈。在《专利法》第四次修改的背景下,具体从专利运营的政策优化、专利诉讼的法律因应、专利投资的风险管控以及专利滥用的反垄断规制4个层面,提出了专利运营基金的完善路径。