Seeing is believing: analysts’ corporate site visits

This study examines the impact of corporate site visits on analysts’ forecast accuracy based on a sample of such visits to Chinese listed firms during 2009–2012. We find that analysts who conduct visits (“visiting analysts”) have a greater increase in forecast accuracy than other analysts. Consistent with the notion that site visits facilitate analysts’ information acquisition through observing firms’ operations, we find that the results are stronger for manufacturing firms, firms with more tangible assets, and firms with more concentrated business lines. Moreover, we find that the effect of a site visit is greater when the site visit is an analyst-only visit, when the current visit is preceded by fewer visits, and when visiting analysts are based far from the visited firms. Furthermore, we find that site visits partially mitigate nonlocal analysts’ information disadvantage. Collectively, these results indicate that site visits are an important information acquisition activity for analysts.     

Air pollution and analyst information production

Recent studies investigate the impact of air pollution on labor productivity. We extend this literature by showing that air pollution negatively affects equity analyst information production. Analysts exposed to air pollution are less likely to issue timely forecasts or improve their forecast accuracy. Investigating the underlying mechanism, we find that analysts exposed to air pollution are less likely to provide bold (especially, negatively bold) forecasts. We also find evidence that market pricing is less sensitive to forecast revisions issued by analysts exposed to air pollution. Our results are robust to controlling for firm/analyst and time fixed effects, as well as additional specifications employing difference-in-differences designs and placebo tests.     

Consistency in meeting or beating earnings expectations and management earnings forecasts

This paper provides evidence that firms that have consistently met or beaten analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE) provide more frequent “bad news” management forecasts than firms with no established string of MBE, particularly when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic. This suggests that firms with a consistent MBE record are more likely to guide analysts’ expectations downward to avoid breaking the consistency. Subsequent analyst forecast revisions following bad news management forecasts issued by these firms are dampened, implying that analysts suspect that these forecasts may be opportunistic. The relation between management forecasts and MBE consistency is stronger after Regulation FD.     

Learning and incentive: A study on analyst response to pension underfunding

There is a long-standing debate on whether sell-side analysts learn from their experience to improve earnings forecast skills. This study shows that incentive is an important factor for understanding the “learning by doing” effect by analysts. We examine analysts’ response to a complex type of information – corporate pension underfunding. Pension underfunding negatively impacts future earnings and analysts on average underreact to such information in their earnings forecasts. More importantly, when there is a strong incentive for analysts to deliver accurate forecasts, analyst learning effectively reduces their underreaction to pension underfunding information. On the other hand, when such an incentive is absent, the analyst learning effect is not discernible in the data. Further evidence suggests that analyst learning and incentive jointly reduce stock market mispricing associated with corporate pension underfunding.     

CDS trading and analyst optimism

This paper investigates whether and how the initiation of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) trading affects analyst forecast optimism. First, we document that the initiation of CDS trading curbs analyst forecasts optimism. Second, we find that the dampening effect of CDS on analyst optimism is stronger for firms with negative news and for firms with poorer financial performance or higher leverage, supporting a “correction effect” of CDS on non-strategic optimism. Moreover, we find that CDS also has a “disciplining effect” on strategic optimism that arises from incentives to cultivate relation with management or to please institutional investors. Overall, our evidence shows that the CDS market not only provides important information for analysts, but also alters analysts’ reporting incentives and enhances their objectivity. Additional analysis shows that this effect has disappeared after the Dodd-Frank Act.     

Analyst Forecast Consistency

We show empirically that analysts who display more consistent forecast errors have greater ability to affect prices, and that this effect is larger than that of stated accuracy. These results lead to three implications. First, consistent analysts are less likely to be demoted and are more likely to be nominated All Star analysts. Second, analysts strategically deliver downward‐biased forecasts to increase their consistency (if at the expense of stated accuracy). Finally, the benefits of consistency and of “lowballing” (accuracy) are increasing (decreasing) in institutional investors’ presence.     

Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

Do Stars Shine? Comparing the Performance Persistence of Star Sell-Side Analysts Listed by Institutional Investor,the Wall Street Journal,and StarMine

We investigate the profitability persistence of the investment recommendations from analysts listed in four different star rankings, Institutional Investor magazine, StarMine’s “Top Earnings Estimators” and “Top Stock Pickers”, and The Wall Street Journal, and show the predictive power of each evaluation methodology. We found that only Buy and Strong Buy recommendations from the entire group of Star analysts outperform those of the Non-Stars in the year after election, while Sell and Strong Sell recommendations performed as those of the Non-Stars. We document that the highest average monthly abnormal return of holding a long-short portfolio, 0.97 %, is obtained by following the recommendations of the group of star sell-side analysts rated by StarMine’s “Top Earnings Estimators” during the period from 2003 to 2014. Since earnings are one of the main drivers of stock prices, the results obtained are in line with the notion that focusing on superior earnings forecasts is one of the top requirements for successful stock picks.     

Tournaments of financial analysts

We argue that financial analysts can be viewed as participants of two tournaments (the “All-Star” tournament and the intrafirm tournament) and examine whether analysts are incentivized by the tournament compensation structure. Using data from 1991 to 2007, we find that interim losers are more likely to increase the boldness of their forecasts in the remainder of the tournament period than interim winners. This finding survives several robustness checks and is more pronounced when the interim assessment date is closer to the end of the tournament period, when analysts are inexperienced, and when the market activity is high. In addition, we show that interim losers’ changes in boldness are less informative than interim winners’. Collectively, our findings suggest that viewing financial analysts as participants of tournaments provides a useful framework for understanding analysts’ behavior.     

Do investor expectations affect sell-side analysts’ forecast bias and forecast accuracy?

We examine the association between investor expectations and its components and sell-side analysts’ short-run quarterly earnings forecast bias and forecast accuracy. To measure investor expectations, we use the Index of Consumer Expectations survey and decompose it into the “fundamental” component related to underlying economic factors (FUND) and the “sentiment” component unrelated to underlying economic factors (SENT). We find that analysts are the most optimistic and the least accurate when SENT is higher. Management long-horizon earnings forecasts attenuate the effects of SENT on forecast optimism and forecast accuracy. Analysts are also the most accurate when FUND is higher. Last, the market places more weight on unexpected earnings when SENT is high. These findings suggest that analysts are affected by investor sentiment and the market reacts more strongly to unexpected earnings when analyst forecasts are the least accurate. The last result potentially explains why prior research (for example, Baker and Wurgler, The Journal of Finance 61:1645–1680, 2006) finds an association between investor sentiment and cross-sectional stock returns.     

The role of “other information” in analysts’ forecasts in understanding stock return volatility

This study identifies “other information” in analysts’ forecasts as a legitimate proxy for future cash flows and examines its incremental role in explaining stock return volatility. We suggest that “other information” contains information about fundamentals beyond that reflected in current financial statements and reflects firms’ fundamentals on a more timely basis than dividends or earnings. Using standardized regressions, we find volatility increases when current “other information” is more uncertain and increases more in response to unfavorable news compared to favorable news. Variance decomposition analysis shows that the variance contribution of “other information” dominates that of expected-return news. The incremental role of “other information” is at least half of the effect of earnings in explaining future volatility. The results are more pronounced for firms with poor information environments. Overall, our results highlight the importance of including “other information” as an additional cash-flow proxy in future studies of stock prices and volatility.     

Analyst characteristics, timing of forecast revisions, and analyst forecasting ability

We first examine whether analysts with certain characteristics that prior research has identified are related to superior forecasting ability systematically time their forecast revisions later in the fiscal quarter. We then examine whether this superior ability persists after controlling for the timing advantage by using relative forecast error, a measure that largely eliminates the timing advantage of recent forecasts. Using a sample of quarterly earnings forecast revisions over the 20-year period from 1990 to 2009, we find that analysts with more firm-specific and general experience and more accurate prior-period forecasts, analysts employed by larger brokerage firms, and analysts who follow fewer industries and companies tend to revise forecasts later in the quarter. We also find that analyst characteristics that are positively correlated with revision timing are negatively related to relative forecast errors. These results are consistent with analyst characteristics being useful proxies for analyst forecasting ability and analysts with greater ability revising forecasts later in the quarter.     

Under watchful eyes: Analyst site visits and firm earnings management

This paper investigates whether analyst site visits, where sell-side analysts visit corporate sites and interact with management, reduce earnings management by host firms. Taking advantage of the disclosure of analyst site visits by Chinese listed firms, we find that the intensity of analyst site visits is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, and this relation is robust to controlling for endogeneity. Furthermore, we find that site visits attended by star analysts and including factory tours are associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals than those without these features. We also report that the number and coverage of questions posed during site visits are negatively associated with discretionary accruals. Our results demonstrate that site visits by sell-side analysts perform a vital monitoring role and exert significant constraints on firms' opportunistic financial reporting.     

Key performance indicators as supplements to earnings: Incremental informativeness,demand factors,measurement issues,and properties of their forecasts

The documented decline in the information content of earnings numbers has paralleled the emergence of disclosures, mostly voluntary, of industry-specific key performance indicators (KPIs). We find that the incremental information content conveyed by KPI news is significant for many KPIs yet diminished when details about the computation of the KPI are absent or when the computation changes over time. Consistent with analysts responding to investor information demand, we find that analysts are more likely to produce forecasts for a KPI when that KPI has more information content and when earnings are less informative. We also analyze the properties of analysts’ KPI forecasts and find that KPI forecasts are more accurate than mechanical forecasts and their accuracy exceeds that of earnings forecasts. Our study contributes to the literature on the information content of KPIs as well as research on the properties of analysts’ forecasts. We provide evidence on whether and how to regulate voluntary disclosures.

     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

The effect of consistency in book-tax differences on analysts’ earnings forecasts: Evidence from forecast accuracy and informativeness

This study examines the relationship between the consistency of book-tax differences and the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts. We find that the consistency of book-tax differences is associated with more accurate and informative forecasts. This suggests that the information embedded in the consistency of book-tax differences plays an important role in elevating the quality of analysts’ forecasts. Furthermore, the effect of consistency in book-tax differences on analyst forecast quality is greater for firms with noisier information environment. Finally, we find that the relation between consistency in book-tax differences and improvements in forecast accuracy and informativeness is stronger after the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure, which increased the role of public information in analysts’ forecasts.     

Measure for Measure: The Relation between Forecast Accuracy and Recommendation Profitability of Analysts

We examine the contemporaneous relation between earnings forecast accuracy and recommendation profitability to assess the effectiveness with which analysts translate forecasts into profitable recommendations. We find that, after controlling for expertise, more accurate analysts make more profitable recommendations, albeit only for firms with value‐relevant earnings. Next, we show that conflicts of interest from investment banking activities affect the relation between accuracy and profitability. In the case of buy recommendations, more accurate forecasts are associated with more profitable recommendations only for the nonconflicted analysts. For hold recommendations, higher levels of accuracy are associated with higher levels of profitability for conflicted analysts, provided these recommendations are treated as sells. Finally, we find that regulatory reforms aimed at mitigating analyst conflicts of interest appear to have improved the relation between accuracy and profitability. Specifically, the integrity of buy and hold recommendations has improved and the change is more pronounced for analysts expected to be most conflicted.     

Inflation,earnings forecasts,and post-earnings announcement drift

We examine whether financial analysts fully incorporate expected inflation in their earnings forecasts for individual stocks. We find that expected inflation proxies, such as lagged inflation and inflation forecasts from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, predict the future earnings change of a portfolio long in high inflation exposure firms and short in low or negative inflation exposure firms, but analysts do not fully adjust for this relation. Analysts’ earnings forecast errors can be predicted using expected inflation proxies, and these systematic forecast errors are related to future stock returns. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the Chordia and Shivakumar (J Account Res 43(4):521–556, 2005) hypothesis that the post-earnings announcement drift is related to investor underestimation of the impact of expected inflation on future earnings change.     

Are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts?

We examine whether analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate when they also issue cash flow forecasts. We find that (i) analysts’ earnings forecasts issued together with cash flow forecasts are more accurate than those not accompanied by cash flow forecasts, and (ii) analysts’ earnings forecasts reflect a better understanding of the implications of current earnings for future earnings when they are accompanied by cash flow forecasts. These results are consistent with analysts adopting a more structured and disciplined approach to forecasting earnings when they also issue cash flow forecasts. Finally, we find that more accurate cash flow forecasts decrease the likelihood of analysts being fired, suggesting that cash flow forecast accuracy is relevant to analysts’ career outcomes.     

Tests of Analysts' Overreaction/Underreaction to Earnings Information as an Explanation for Anomalous Stock Price Behavior

This study examines whether security analysts underreact or overreact to prior earnings information, and whether any such behavior could explain previously documented anomalous stock price movements. We present evidence that analysts' forecasts underreact to recent earnings. This feature of the forecasts is consistent with certain properties of the naive seasonal random walk forecast that Bernard and Thomas (1990) hypothesize underlie the well-known anomalous post-earnings-announcement drift. However, the underreactions in analysts' forecasts are at most only about half as large as necessary to explain the magnitude of the drift. We also document that the “extreme” analysts' forecasts studied by DeBondt and Thaler (1990) cannot be viewed as overreactions to earnings, and are not clearly linked to the stock price overreactions discussed in DeBondt and Thaler ( 1985 , 1987 ) and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (Forthcoming). We conclude that security analysts' behavior is at best only a partial explanation for stock price underreaction to earnings, and may be unrelated to stock price overreactions.