Financial distress, bankruptcy law and the business cycle

This paper explores the business cycle implications of financial distress and bankruptcy law. We find that due to the presence of financial imperfections the effect of liquidations on the price of capital goods can generate endogenous fluctuations. We show that a law reform that ‘softens’ bankruptcy law may increase the amplitude of the cycle in the long run. In contrast, a policy of bailing out businesses during the bust or actively managing the interest rate across the cycle could stabilize the economy in the long run. A comprehensive welfare analysis of these policies is provided as well.      

Control rights, debt structure, and the loss of private benefits: the case of the UK insolvency code

We show how the efficiency of reorganization is affected bythe distribution of control rights under the U.K insolvencycode. Control rights raise particular problems when creditorshave different incentives to keep the firm as a going concern.Such differences may arise from the possession of private benefitsby particular creditors which are lost if the debtor firm isliquidated. The incidence of inefficient liquidations is influencedby the size and seniority of creditors' claims. The currentU.K. code is widely thought to give rise to inefficient liquidations.We show, however, that inefficiency depends upon the debt structureand whether the controlling creditor in formal bankruptcy hasprivate benefits.     

Secured and unsecured debt in creditor-friendly bankruptcy

This article develops a continuous-time asset pricing model for valuing corporate securities in the presence of both secured and unsecured debt. We consider a framework where creditors dominate the negotiation process. This is consistent with the increasing influence of creditors in bankruptcy. We show that the unsecured creditors are incentivized to liquidate the firm prematurely relative to the first-best threshold. However, if the firm’s liquidation value is very low, it should complement its secured debt with unsecured debt as a form of insurance to avoid early liquidations. Our results have important implications for the debt structure and the resolution of financial distress of modern firms with substantial intangible assets.     

Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests

I develop and estimate a model of cash auction bankruptcy using data on 205 Swedish firms. The results challenge arguments that cash auctions, as compared to reorganizations, are immune to conflicts of interest between claimholders but lead to inefficient liquidations. I show that a sale of the assets back to incumbent management is a common bankruptcy outcome. Sale-backs are more likely when they favor the bank at the expense of other creditors. On the other hand, inefficient liquidations are frequently avoided through sale-backs when markets are illiquid, that is, when industry indebtedness is high and the firm has few nonspecific assets.     

A note on noise in the market for bankrupt firms' securities

The well-documented phenomena of departures from the absolute priority rule (APR) have provoked an important public policy debate over their consequences. Some scholars argue that APR violations increase economic efficiency because they play an important role in the avoidance of inefficient liquidations and also mitigate inefficient risk incentives. Another group argues that APR violations should be abolished because they add greater uncertainty to the security valuation process; that is, they increase noise in security prices. To date, however, no evidence has been presented on the issue of how much noise APR violations add. We develop a theoretical model that allows an empirical test of the effect of APR violations on noise; our results suggest that APR violations importantly increase noise. Indeed, at least 30 percent, and as much as 85 percent of the noise in security prices may be attributable to APR violations. This does not suggest that the beneficial effects of APR violations are nonexistent or unimportant, but it does imply that failing to account for the effect of APR violations on noise in any modelling of optimal bankruptcy rules may lead to a suboptimal design. We also find that the amount of noise in this market appears to have declined over time as more institutional/informed investors have entered the market for bankrupt firms' securities and the effect of change in the bankruptcy law has become clearer, both consistent with the noisy rational expectations hypothesis.     

Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries

We show that the prospect of a debt renegotiation favorable to shareholders reduces the firm's equity risk. Equity beta and return volatility are lower in countries where the bankruptcy code favors debt renegotiations and for firms with more shareholder bargaining power relative to debt holders. These relations weaken as the country's insolvency procedure favors liquidations over renegotiations. In the limit, when debt contracts cannot be renegotiated, equity risk is independent of shareholders' incentives to default strategically. We argue that these findings support the hypothesis that the threat of strategic default can reduce the firm's equity risk.     

Unsecured debt with public insurance: From bad to worse

In U.S. data, income interruptions, the receipt of public insurance, and the incidence of personal bankruptcy are all closely related. The central contribution of this paper is to evaluate bankruptcy protection and public insurance in a unified setting where each program alters incentives in the other. Our analysis delivers two striking conclusions. First, we find that U.S. personal bankruptcy law is an important barrier that prevents the public insurance system from improving welfare. Second, contrary to popular belief, we find that increases in the generosity of public insurance will lead to more, not less, bankruptcy.     

Corporate Insiders and the Death of the Firm: Evidence on the Incidence of Insider Trading in Corporate Dissolutions

To date, little attention has been devoted to the relationship between the transactions of corporate insiders in the periods preceding corporate dissolutions and the form of dissolution taken. This study examines the transactions of corporate insiders preceding two forms of dissolution: bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation. The evidence suggests that prior to voluntary liquidations corporate insiders have been heavy net purchasers of their firms' shares. In contrast, heavy selling by corporate insiders was observed for a sample of firms that filed for bankruptcy.     

Fresh Start or Head Start? The Effects of Filing for Personal Bankruptcy on Work Effort

The key feature of the modern US personal bankruptcy law is to provide debtors a financial fresh start through debt discharge. It has long been believed that the primary goal of the discharge policy is to preserve human capital by maintaining incentives to work. We provide the first test of this fresh start argument by estimating the effect of personal bankruptcy filing on work effort using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Our econometric approach controls for the endogenous self-selection of bankruptcy filing. We find that filing for bankruptcy does not have a positive impact on annual work hours for bankrupt households, a result mainly due to the wealth effects of debt discharge.      

A comparative analysis of the Australian and New Zealand liquidation schemes

On September 28, 2022, Australia announced an inquiry into the effectiveness of its corporate insolvency laws. The Australia and New Zealand corporate insolvency frameworks have similar objectives and operate in a similar context where, as is the case the world over, most companies are small to medium enterprises. Despite liquidation being just one of several collective and formal corporate insolvency procedures, it is the most frequently occurring procedure in both countries by a large margin. The Australian and New Zealand liquidation schemes have many similarities but also some key differences. Differences include the structure of the respective schemes; the levers prompting liquidation of companies in appropriate circumstances; the role of creditors, the court and the regulator; and the management of low-value and assetless liquidations. These differences are analysed to determine what, if anything, the New Zealand scheme might contribute to development and/or reform of Australian corporate insolvency law. As consistency and coordination with Australian insolvency law is a New Zealand policy aim, the lessons the Australian scheme might have for New Zealand are also considered. Many of the points on which the Australian and New Zealand liquidation schemes differ are of universal concern (such as the management of low-value liquidations), meaning that the nature and success (or otherwise) of the Australian and New Zealand responses are of wider, comparative interest.     

Design and valuation of debt contracts

This articles studies the design and valuation of debt contractsin a general dynamic setting under uncertainty. We incorporatesome insights of the recent corporate finance literature intoa valuation framework. The basic framework is an extensive form game determined bythe terms of a debt contract and applicable bankruptcy laws.Debtholders and equityholders behave noncooperatively. The firm'sreorganization boundary is determined endogenously. Strategic debt service results in significantly higher defaultpremia at even small liquidation costs. Deviations from absolutepriority and forced liquidations occur along the equilibriumpath. The design tends to stress higher coupons and sinkingfunds when firms have a higher cash payout ratio.     

The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 11 Reorganization

Our paper explores a comprehensive sample of small and large corporate bankruptcies in Arizona and New York from 1995 to 2001. Bankruptcy costs are very heterogeneous and sensitive to the measurement method used. We find that Chapter 7 liquidations appear to be no faster or cheaper (in terms of direct expense) than Chapter 11 reorganizations. However, Chapter 11 seems to preserve assets better, thereby allowing creditors to recover relatively more. Our paper also provides a large number of further empirical regularities.     

A Re–examination of the Effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Process

As an increasing number of companies go bankrupt, society grows concerned with the process's efficacy. In contrast to previous research, we find that relatively healthy companies emerge from bankruptcy as evidenced by their operating and equity performance post bankruptcy. While we find a substantial degree of variation in the forecast accuracy of sales, EBIT and net income, we find that forecast errors are not statistically significant and are smaller than had been thought. We provide evidence to support the argument that the economy's health affects operating and equity outcomes post bankruptcy.     

Municipal bankruptcies and crime

While the importance of municipal bonds for the provision of public services is well-documented, the consequences of municipal bankruptcies remain understudied. We contribute to this literature by studying the effects of municipal bankruptcies on crime. Using the staggered difference-in-differences approach and agency-level crime data, we find that violent and property crime rates rise after successful (approved by the bankruptcy courts) Chapter 9 bankruptcy filings. The association between successful municipal bankruptcy and crime remains robust to alternative estimation methods, including a novel empirical technique that allows for the treatment effect heterogeneity and dynamics, and several robustness checks and falsification exercises. Our exploratory evidence suggests that the rise in crime rates is due to lower public safety expenditures. Our findings highlight the importance of efficient financial management for local government entities and the need for particular attention to law and order in the local jurisdiction going through bankruptcy.     

Bankruptcy,overlapping directors,and bank loan pricing

Using a sample of loan facilities borrowed by firms that share directors with bankrupt firms, this study investigates whether the overlapping directors are a transmission channel of the bankruptcy contagion effect in the bank loan market and, if so, what the underlying mechanism is. We find that firms are charged higher loan spreads in the period following the bankruptcy filing of a firm with a common director and that overlapping directors are a relevant channel for the bankruptcy contagion effect, in addition to other channels identified in literature. We also find that the negative contagion effect on loan pricing is most likely driven by the overlapping directors' reputation loss due to their involvement in bankruptcy events, and not by competing hypotheses, such as director distraction and director career concern/experience. Further analyses reveal that the adverse contagion impact on loan spreads is more pronounced when overlapping directors have greater influence over corporate policies or when their reputation is more seriously damaged. Meanwhile, the contagion effect is mitigated when interlocked firms have a higher-quality board. These results further support our evidence of the director reputation loss hypothesis. We strengthen the identification strategy to establish causality. In sum, our study identifies common directors as a channel of bankruptcy contagion effects on loan pricing and director reputation loss as an underlying mechanism.     

Determinants of Bank Debt in a Continental Financial System: Evidence from Spanish Companies

We test hypotheses about the structure of corporate debt ownership and the use of bank debt by firms in a civil‐law country, Spain. We focus on bank debt effects in the presence of information asymmetries and agency costs, and on efficient versus inefficient firm liquidation. We find that the relation between growth opportunities and bank financing is not as strong as the one found in common‐law countries, that there is a positive relation between firm size and the proportion of bank debt used, and that firms closer to bankruptcy and highly leveraged are more likely to use bank debt.     

Prior Wall Street Journal Announcements of Possible Bankruptcy Filings and Price Reactions to Subsequent Bankruptcy Filings

This study examines the relation between prior Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcements of possible bankruptcy filings and price reactions to subsequent bankruptcy filings for 336 firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1980 and 1993. Extant research indicates that price reactions to announcements of economic events are inversely related to the amount of surprise in the announcements. Prior WSJ anouncements of possible bankruptcy filings increase the markets a priori assessment of firms' probability of bankruptcy, thereby potentially reducing the surprise in subsequent bankruptcy filings. We hypothesize smaller price reactions to bankruptcy filings for firms where the WSJ previously published an article indicating that the firm may file for bankruptcy. Our results are consistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, we find smaller price reactions to bankruptcy filings for firms with prior WSJ announcements of possible bankruptcy filings. Our results hold after controlling for firm size, probability of bankruptcy, exchange listing, leverage, and predisclosure information.     

A horse race of models and estimation methods for predicting bankruptcy

We use a comprehensive set of performance metrics to analyze the improvement in the classification power and prediction accuracy of various bankruptcy prediction models after adding governance variables and/or varying the estimation method used. In a sample covering bankruptcies of U.S. public firms in the period 2000 to 2015, we find that the addition of governance variables significantly improves the performance of all bankruptcy prediction models. We also find that the additional explanatory power provided by governance measures improves the further the firm is from bankruptcy, which suggests that governance variables may provide earlier and more accurate warning of the firm's bankruptcy potential. Our findings show that the performance of any bankruptcy prediction model is significantly affected by the estimation method used. We find that regardless of the bankruptcy model, hazard analysis provides the best classification and out-of-sample forecast accuracy among the parametric methods. Furthermore, non-parametric methods such as neural networks, data envelopment analysis or classification and regression trees appear to provide comparable and sometimes superior classification accuracy to hazard analysis. Lastly, we use the dynamic panel generalized methods of moments model to address concerns raised in prior studies about the susceptibility of similar studies to endogeneity issues and find that our findings continue to hold.     

Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Is It Good News or Bad News for Industry Competitors?

A firm under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection may emerge from bankruptcy in a more advantageous competitive position within its industry to the detriment of their industry rivals. Using a sample of 264 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy during the period 1999-2006, I find that its industry competitors demonstrate negative postemergence long-term equity returns and deteriorating financial performance. Additional tests indicate that this outcome is less likely due to overall industry distress. Competitors tend to be more adversely affected if they are in more concentrated industries, if they have lower credit quality, when a more efficient firm emerges, and when the duration of bankruptcy is longer. This study suggests a need to reconsider Chapter 11's role in promoting competition and allocation of resources given its negative externalities on industry competitors.     

Bankruptcy as an Auction Process: Lessons from Sweden

The traditional U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy process in which financial claims are renegotiated under court protection and the firm continues to operate under existing management has long been criticized by economists as an inefficient way of dealing with financially distressed companies. In this paper, the authors make the case for a mandatory auction bankruptcy system of the kind now used in Sweden—one that requires all companies filing for Chapter 11 to be sold in open auctions soon after the filing. After discussing the notable features of and differences between the U.S. and Swedish bankruptcy systems, the authors summarize recent research (much of it their own) on the benefits and possible drawbacks of the Swedish system. Among the most notable findings of this research, there is no evidence that mandatory bankruptcy auctions in Sweden lead to “fire‐sale” discounts in auction premiums. Moreover, the fact that three‐quarters of the Swedish companies that filed for bankruptcy survived as going concerns should allay concerns that an auction system will produce excessive liquidations. At the same time, the post‐bankruptcy operating profitability of the companies that emerge from Swedish auctions as going concerns tends to be on a par with that of their (non‐bankrupt) industry peers. Such post‐operating performance, when combined with a 75% rate of reorganization (versus liquidation), suggests that allowing auction investors—instead of the bankruptcy court—decide which companies survive and how they get capitalized and restructured has been quite effective in accomplishing the two aims of a bankruptcy system: (1) preserving intact all economically viable enterprises while (2) eliminating the excess capacity that results from prolonging the existence of companies that are never expected to earn high enough returns on capital to attract private investment. Consistent with these findings, the U.S. in recent years has seen a sharp increase in the use of auctions in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, though on a voluntary rather than a mandatory basis. Such a change reflects the growing recognition of the role of auction processes in reducing bankruptcy costs and preserving going‐concern values as U.S. capital market participants push harder for private workouts, “prepackaged” Chapter 11 filings, and auction sales in Chapter 11.