ABNORMAL RETURNS AND ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECAST REVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUBLICATION OF “STOCK HIGHLIGHTS” BY VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY

We examine the reaction of stocks and the response of financial analysts' earnings forecasts to securities recommended as “Stock Highlights” by Value Line Investment Survey. Significant abnormal returns appear around the publication of stock highlights. Stock price responses are relatively efficient and permanent. Using earnings expectation data provided by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System, we find analysts raise their forecasts significantly following Value Line recommendations. Near-term forecast revisions are significantly related to stock returns at the time of the recommendations. Thus, an explanation for Value Line's security recommendation success is its ability to generate firm-specific earnings information.     

The Impact of Publication of Analysts' Recommendations on Returns and Trading Volume

Publication of security analysts' recommendations in the column “Inside Wall Street,” which is published in Business Week, induces abnormal returns on the publication day and the following day. The abnormal returns are robust to the use of alternative samples and methodologies. The publication increases trading volumes for the securities that are recommended to be purchased, but not for securities that are recommended to be sold. The abnormal returns and trading volumes support the view that stock prices do not adjust instantaneously when new information arrives, and that the time pattern of price adjustment depends on the time pattern of the accessibility of the information. The authors find no statistically significant difference between the average abnormal returns that are induced by recommendations that appear at the beginnings of “Inside Wall Street” columns (and are covered more extensively than others) and the average abnormal returns induced by other recommendations.     

The First‐ and Second‐Hand Effect of Analysts' Stock Recommendations: Evidence from the Swiss Stock Market

This paper empirically investigates the impact of both the first release of analysts' stock recommendations to a limited clientele and the subsequent dissemination of the same information in a major newspaper to a broader audience. For a sample of 1460 stock recommendations published in FuW, Switzerland's major financial newspaper, significant positive abnormal returns on the day of the original release of buy recommendations and on the day of publication in FuW are documented. Tests of the price pressure and information hypotheses reveal that analysts' recommendations contain new information, which is quickly incorporated in the stock prices on the first release of this information. In contrast, the statistically significant announcement effects associated with the subsequent publication can be primarily ascribed to price pressure in the underlying securities.     

Short Selling Behavior and Mad Money

We examine 1,234 buy recommendations from Jim Cramer's Mad Money television show. Consistent with prior research, we report positive abnormal returns immediately after buy recommendations, followed by a reversal, indicative of an overpricing event. We also find a marked increase in short selling. Our results show a positive association between shorting and the buy recommendations even after controlling for factors shown in the literature to influence shorting. We do not find similar effects after sell recommendations. These results suggest that short sellers act to exploit short‐term overpricing arising from behavioral biases of some investors.     

A comparison of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts

There is very little research on the topic of buy-side analyst performance, and that which does exist yields mixed results. We use a large sample from both the buy-side and the sell-side and report several new results. First, while the contemporaneous returns to portfolios based on sell-side recommendations are positive, the returns for buy-side analysts, proxied by changes in institutional holdings, are negative. Second, the buy-side analysts' underperformance is accentuated when they trade against sell-side analysts' recommendations. Third, abnormal returns positively relate to both the portfolio size and the portfolio turnover of buy-side analysts' institutions, suggesting that large institutions employ superior analysts and that superior analysts frequently change their recommendations. Abnormal returns are also positively related to buy-side portfolios with stocks that have higher analyst coverage, greater institutional holding, and lower earnings forecast dispersion. Fourth, there is substantial persistence in buy-side performance, but even the top decile performs poorly. These findings suggest that sell-side analysts still outperform buy-side analysts despite the severe conflicts of interest documented in the literature.     

Corporate Governance and Value: Evidence from “Close Calls” On Shareholder Governance Proposals

The authors summarize the findings of their recent study of the effects of specific corporate governance provisions on firm value. Using a sample of governance provisions that were subjected to shareholder votes during the period 1997–2011, this study analyzes cases in which shareholder‐sponsored corporate governance proposals were either rejected or passed by a small margin (no more than 5% of the vote). By so doing, this study helps correct two limitations of the existing governance literature: (1) that the effects of expected governance changes are already incorporated in share prices (the “expectations” problem); and (2) that governance policies are often a consequence rather than a cause of other variables such as corporate performance and are thus correlated with many other firm characteristics (the “endogeneity” problem). The authors' findings show that expected improvements in corporate governance through the adoption of particular corporate governance provisions—particularly the removal of anti‐takeover provisions—is associated with both positive abnormal stock returns and improvements in long‐term firm operating performance. The authors estimate that the adoption of such governance proposals increases shareholder value by 2.6%, on average. Moreover, these returns are consistent with, and thus accurate predictors of, future changes in corporate investment (reductions of capital spending, in most cases) and improvements in operating performance.     

Stock Price Reactions to Securities Recommended in Business Week's “Inside Wall Street”

The price behavior of stocks of firms that were favorably mentioned in the “Inside Wall Street” column in Business Week are studied. These firms have been the subject of rumors or have been recommended by analysts or brokerage houses and, therefore, their mention in Business Week constitutes dissemination of secondary information. Positive, significant excess returns are observed the day prior to the publication date, the publication date, and the two days after publication. Positive, significant excess returns are observed for long-term holding periods prior to the publication date, while negative, significant excess returns are observed for the post-publication holding periods. The observations appear to be consistent with the price performance of firms that might have been subject of either rumors or recent recom-mendations by analysts or brokerage houses. The results suggest that secondary information is of value only to low transaction cost, short-term traders. Investors who buy for the longer term based on secondary information generally receive below market rates of return.     

Performance of Foreign and Global Mutual Funds: The Role of Security Selection,Region‐Shifting,and Style‐Shifting Abilities

We examine the performance of U.S.‐based foreign and global funds after controlling for their regional and style exposure. We show that, on average, the total performance (TP) and security selection abilities of both foreign and global funds are significantly negative and exhibit short‐term predictability. Additionally, R² reflects funds’ security selection abilities, consistent with previous findings for domestic mutual funds. Investors can earn higher abnormal returns and TP in the short run by purchasing past winners with low R² than by purchasing past losers with high R². However, there is no evidence of predictability in the funds' region‐shifting and style‐shifting abilities.     

The Exploitation of Inside Information at the Wall Street Journal: A Test of Strong Form Efficiency

The study examines if tradings on stocks based on the inside information about the “Heard on the Street” column of the Wall Street Journal could generate abnormal returns. We found significant abnormal returns on days t =?1 and t= 0 (publication date) for the stocks related to insider trading. For a comparable control group of noninsider traded stocks, the abnormal returns were not significant on day t=?1 but were significant on day t= 0. The abnormal returns for the insider trade group on days t=?1 and t= 0 were greater than the returns for the control group. The results indicate that the inside information was the cause for the differences.     

Market reaction to takeover rumour in Internet Discussion Sites

We examine the market reaction to takeover rumour postings in the Hotcopper Internet Discussion Site (IDS). Results from the interday analysis show abnormal returns and trading volumes on the day before and the day of the posting. Results of the intraday analysis show abnormal returns and trading volumes during the 10 min posting interval and abnormal trading volume during the 10 min interval immediately preceding it. Sensitivity analyses indicate that the results are robust to concerns regarding potential confounds, credibility and bid–ask spread bias. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the market reacting to the posting of takeover rumours in IDS.     

Ratings Changes,Ratings Levels,and the Predictive Value of Analysts’ Recommendations

We show that abnormal returns to analysts’ recommendations stem from both the ratings levels assigned and the changes in those ratings. Conditional on the ratings change, buy and strong buy recommendations have greater returns than do holds, sells, and strong sells. Conditional on the ratings level, upgrades earn the highest returns and downgrades the lowest. We also find that both ratings levels and changes predict future unexpected earnings and the associated market reaction. Our results imply that 1) investment returns may be enhanced by conditioning on both recommendation levels and changes; 2) the predictive power of analysts’ recommendations reflects, at least partially, analysts’ ability to generate valuable private information; and 3) some inconsistency exists between analysts’ ratings and the formal ratings definitions issued by securities firms.     

DO U.S. STOCK MARKET INDEXES OVER‐ OR UNDERREACT?

Our objective is to investigate the short‐term over‐ or underreaction of six U.S. stock market indexes. We find evidence of a one‐day underreaction for winners (days on which an index experiences abnormally high returns) and losers (days on which an index experiences abnormally poor performance). We also find strong evidence of a sixty‐day underreaction for winners. For losers, abnormal returns turn from negative to positive as the period is extended, resulting in significant reversals over the sixty‐day period. Results are generally consistent for each of the six indexes. Overall, these results provide strong support for the uncertain information hypothesis. JEL classification: G14     

Re‐assessing the long‐term underperformance of UK Initial Public Offerings

Previous work has identified that IPOs underperform a market index, and the purpose of this paper is to examine the robustness of this finding. We re‐examine the evidence on the long‐term returns of IPOs in the UK using a new data set of firms over the period 1985–92, in which we compare abnormal performance based on a number of alternative methods including a calendar‐time approach. We find that, using an event‐time framework, there are substantial negative abnormal returns to an IPO after the first 3 years irrespective of the benchmark used. However, over the 5 years after an IPO, abnormal returns exhibit less dramatic underperformance, and the conclusion on negative abnormal returns depends on the benchmark applied. Further if these returns are measured in calendar time, we find that the (statistical) significance of underperformance is even less marked.     

Analyst Tipping: Additional Evidence

We examine whether analysts tip investors during investor conferences. We find that conference‐day abnormal returns of a presenting company are about 0.6% higher when the conference is hosted by an analyst who will initiate coverage with a Buy recommendation than when the conference is hosted by non‐initiating analysts. Furthermore, conference‐day abnormal returns of the presenting company amount to half of the price run‐up during the 20 trading days prior to the Buy initiation. Finally, there is a statistically and economically significant price run‐up prior to a Sell initiation (by about –0.7%) when the analyst who will initiate coverage with a Sell recommendation hosts a conference but does not invite the company to present. Our findings collectively suggest that analysts, rather than companies, tip select investors about upcoming initiations during conferences.     

Can financial statement analysis beat consensus analysts’ recommendations?

We examine whether investors can exploit financial statement information to identify companies with a greater likelihood of future earnings increases and whether stocks of those companies generate 1-year abnormal returns that exceed the abnormal returns from following analysts’ consensus recommendations. Our approach summarizes financial statement information into a “predicted earnings increase score,” which captures the likelihood of 1-year-ahead earnings increases. We find that, within our sample of consensus recommendations, stocks with high scores are much more likely to experience future earnings increases than stocks with low scores. A hedge portfolio strategy that utilizes our approach within each consensus recommendation level generates average annual abnormal returns of 10.9 percent over our 12-year sample period, after controlling for previously identified risk factors. These abnormal returns exceed those available from following analysts’ consensus recommendations. Our results show that share prices and consensus recommendations fail to impound financial statement information that helps predict future earnings changes.     

The Performance of the European Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from the Fifth Takeover Wave

This paper presents an in‐depth analysis of the performance of large, medium‐sized, and small corporate takeovers involving Continental European and UK firms during the fifth takeover wave. We find that takeovers are expected to create takeover synergies as their announcements trigger statistically significant abnormal returns of 9.13% for the target and of 0.53% for bidding firms. The characteristics of the target and bidding firms and of the bid itself are able to explain a significant part of these returns: (i) deal hostility increases the target's but decreases bidder's returns; (ii) the private status of the target is associated with higher bidder's returns; and (iii) an equity payment leads to a decrease in both bidder's and target's returns. The takeover wealth effect is however not limited to the bid announcement day but is also visible prior and subsequent to the bid. The analysis of pre‐announcement returns reveals that hostile takeovers are largely anticipated and associated with a significant increase in the bidder's and target's share prices. Bidders that accumulate a toehold stake in the target experience higher post‐announcement returns. A comparison of the UK and Continental European M&A markets reveals that: (i) the takeover returns of UK targets substantially exceed those of Continental European firms. (ii) The presence of a large shareholder in the bidding firm has a significantly positive effect on takeover returns in the UK and a negative one in Continental Europe. (iii) Weak investor protection and low disclosure in Continental Europe allow bidding firms to adopt takeover strategies enabling them to act opportunistically towards the target's incumbent shareholders.     

Valuation Effects of Short Sale Constraints: the Case of Corporate Takeovers

We examine the relation between the degree of short sale constraints for acquiring firms' equity and post takeover stock performance. We find that negative long‐run abnormal returns appear to decline (in economic and statistical terms) as the extent and persistence of institutional block‐holder ownership increase, after accounting for the size, book‐to‐market and method of payment effects. In the spirit of Miller (1977) , such evidence implies that the degree of short sale constraints serves as an important determinant of acquiring firms' short‐run overpricing. It appears that the presence of concentrated institutional presence mitigates and in most cases eliminates, through effective arbitrage, any short‐run overpricing that may be responsible for the long‐run underperformance of acquirers, preserving in this way efficiency in the takeover markets.     

Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

Why Do Insiders Sell Shares Following IPO Lockups?

We examine long run returns subsequent to the lockup expiration of firms having gone public. We find that returns are negatively associated with abnormal selling by senior executives but unrelated to selling by other insiders. Our results suggest that even though lockup expirations provide an initial opportunity for insiders to diversify their holdings by selling a firm's shares, sales by senior executives are still motivated in part by private information. Sales by other insiders, on the other hand, are consistent with portfolio diversification.     

Can Companies Influence Investor Behaviour through Advertising? Super Bowl Commercials and Stock Returns

Recent research shows that mood and attention may affect investors’ choices. In this paper we examine whether companies can create such mood and attention effects through advertising. We choose a natural experiment by investigating price reactions and trading activity for firms employing TV commercials in 19 Super Bowl broadcasts over the 1969–2001 period. We find significant positive abnormal returns for firms which are readily identifiable from the ad contents, which is consistent with the presence of mood and attention effects. For recognisable companies with the number of ads greater than the sample mean, the event is followed by an average abnormal one day return of 45 basis points. The effect appears to persist in the short term with the 20‐day post‐event cumulative abnormal returns for such firms averaging 2%. We find significant abnormal net buying activity for small trades in shares of recognised Super Bowl advertisers indicating that small investors tend to be the ones most attracted by the increased publicity.