Use of loan loss provisions for capital, earnings management and signalling by Australian banks

This study examines whether and to what extent Australian banks use loan loss provisions (LLPs) for capital, earnings management and signalling. We examine if there were changes in the use of LLPs as a result of the implementation of banking regulations consistent with the Basel Accord of 1988, which made loan loss reserves no longer part of Tier I capital in the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio. We find some evidence to indicate that Australian banks use LLPs for capital management, but we find no evidence of a change in this behaviour after the implementation of the Basel Accord. Our results indicate that banks in Australia use LLPs to manage earnings. Furthermore, listed commercial banks engage more aggressively in earnings management using LLPs than unlisted commercial banks. We also find that earnings management behaviour is more pronounced in the post‐Basel period. Overall, we find a significant understating of LLPs in the post‐Basel period relative to the pre‐Basel period. This indicates that reported earnings might not reflect the true economic reality underlying those numbers. Finally, Australian banks do not appear to use LLPs for signalling future intentions of higher earnings to investors.     

Earnings and capital management and signaling: the use of loan-loss provisions by European banks

This paper investigates the relationship between loan-loss provisions (LLPs) and earnings management in the context of the capital adequacy of Euro Area (EA) banks versus non-EA credit institutions. This paper also examines whether LLPs signal managements’ expectations concerning future bank profits to investors. Additionally, this paper traces the role of bank regulations and creditor protection systems in explaining income smoothing. Evidence drawn from the 1996 to 2006 period indicates that LLPs do reflect changes in the expected quality of a bank's loan portfolio for both groups of banks, and that earnings management is an important determinant of LLPs for EA intermediaries, whereas non-EA credit institutions use LLPs to signal private information to outsiders. The paper also finds that higher protection of creditors’ rights significantly reduces the incentives to smooth earnings for EA banks. During the recent financial crisis, EA bank managers are much more concerned with their credit portfolio quality and do not use LLPs for discretionary purposes, whereas LLPs at non-EA banks are used to smooth income more than for the purposes of managing capital ratios or conveying private information about future performance to the market.     

Loan Loss Provisions, Earnings Management and Capital Management under IFRS: The Case of EU Commercial Banks

Prior research has shown that loan loss provisions are primarily used as a tool for earnings management and capital management by listed banks. Effective 2005 all listed companies in the European Union (EU) are required to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Adherence to IFRS, it is claimed, should enhance transparency of reporting practices relative to local General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The overall objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the implementation of IFRS on the use of loan loss provisions (LLPs) to manage earnings and capital. We use a sample of 91 EU listed commercial banks covering a period of 10 years (before and after implementation of IFRS). Since early adopters may have different incentives and motivations relative to those who adopt mandatorily, we dichotomize our sample into early and late adopters. Overall, we find that earnings management (using loan loss provisions) for both early and late adopters while significant over the estimation window is significantly reduced after implementation of IFRS. We also find that, for risky banks, earnings management behavior is more pronounced when compared to the less risky banks, but is significantly reduced in the post IFRS period. Capital management behavior by bank managers is not significant in both pre and post IFRS regimes. Overall, we conclude that the implementation of IFRS in the EU appears to have improved earnings quality by mitigating the tendency of bank managers of listed commercial banks to engage in earnings management using loan loss provisions.     

Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions and Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry

This study examines the relation between earnings management through discretionary loan loss provisions (LLPs) and systemic risk in the U. S. banking sector using a large sample of commercial banks from 1996 to 2009. We find that earnings management increases a bank's contribution to systemic crash risk and systemic distress risk, consistent with the notion that earnings management increases information opacity, facilitates bad news hoarding, co‐moves with macroeconomic conditions, and exhibits cross‐sectional correlation and herding in earnings management. However, the effect of earnings management through discretionary LLPs on systemic risk disappears during the crisis period, consistent with weakened earnings management in crisis times. We also find that the same effect strengthens with bank uncertainty and homogenous loans, and weakens in the post‐SOX period, and when banks are audited by Big 4 auditors.     

Visible Reserves in Banks – Determinants of Initial Creation,Usage and Contribution to Bank Stability

The opportunity of building up visible “Reserves for General Banking Risks” by the bank management represents a peculiarity in the German financial accounting framework for banks. We investigate German banks' motives for the creation and usage of these reserves and assess their role in financial stability. We find that banks primarily create and use GBR reserves to build up Tier 1 capital for regulatory capital management and earnings management purposes. Most importantly, however, we also reveal that banks using these reserves are less likely to experience a future distress or a bank default event. We therefore conclude that the existence of GBR reserves within the financial accounting framework represents both a convenient capital and earnings management tool for bank managers and a beneficial regulatory instrument to enhance bank stability.     

中国商业银行资本监管有效性实证研究

为了检验资本充足性管制对中国商业银行的资本充足率和风险水平的影响,本文在国外学者研究的基础上,构建了一个联立方程模型。根据这个模型,采用两阶段最小二乘法进行实证分析,分析结果表明:不管是资本充足情况较好的银行,还是资本充足情况较差的银行在资本充足性管制的压力下都提高了资本充足率;资本充足性管制促进了商业银行风险的降低。不过,由于多数银行已超过资本充足性管制中的最低标准,该标准产生的管制效应正在减弱。     

RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR AND MANAGEMENT OWNERSHIP IN DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS

We examine the relation between risk and ownership structure among depository institutions. The empirical results provide evidence that the relation between managerial ownership and depository institution risk is negative and significant, suggesting that as managerial ownership increases the level of risk-taking decreases. This finding, which supports a risk aversion hypothesis, is consistent across several market-based risk measures. Furthermore, we document greater risk and greater risk aversion for savings institutions relative to commercial banks.     

The implications of the new capital adequacy rules for portfolio management of credit assets

Over the past several years, there has been an extensive discussion among practitioners and academics about whether and how a portfolio management approach could help banks to better manage risk capital and create shareholder value. In this article, the authors argue that there are four key drivers which require banks to move from a transactional to a more portfolio management like approach when managing credit assets. These are: structural changes in the credit markets, inefficiencies of risk transfer in lending markets, ballooning debt levels in the US, and the proposed changes for capital adequacy. The authors see the latter not as a one-time change in capital adequacy rules, but more as a first step towards full convergence between risk capital and regulatory capital for credit risk. These changes require banks to accelerate their efforts to build first class portfolio management skills and capabilities. Achieving best practice credit portfolio management is rewarded with attractive opportunities for shareholder value creation and enables bank to successfully compete going forward.     

Income smoothing among European systemic and non-systemic banks

There is scant research on the financial reporting behaviour of global systemically-important banks (G-SIBs) and non-global systemically-important banks (non-G-SIBs). We examine the link between financial reporting and financial system stability given the understanding that income smoothing is a stability mechanism for banks. We empirically examine whether the way G-SIBs use loan loss provisions (LLPs) to smooth income differ compared to non-G-SIBs and the incentive to do so. We examine 231 European banks and find that income smoothing is pronounced among G-SIBs in the post-crisis period and pronounced among non-G-SIBs in the pre-crisis period. Also, G-SIBs exhibit greater income smoothing when they: (i) have substantial non-performing loans, (ii) are more profitable and meet/exceed minimum regulatory capital ratios (iii) engage in forward-looking loan-loss provisioning and during recessionary periods. The implication of our findings is that capital regulation and abnormal economic fluctuations create incentives for systemic banks to use accounting numbers (loan loss provisions) to smooth income, which also align with the financial system stability objective of bank regulators. Our findings are useful to accounting standard setters in their evaluation of the role of reported accounting numbers for financial system stability, given the current regulatory environment in Europe which focuses on systemic banks.     

资本约束、风险管理与商业银行成长

基于资本必须覆盖风险命题的要求,银行的风险管理能力决定了银行的资本规模和资本的配置,银行资本管理实质上等价于风险管理,资本约束实质上就是风险约束。资本软约束是制约中国商业银行成长的主要障碍之一,但仅仅致力于资本充足率问题的解决并不能保证我国商业银行的可持续成长,风险约束是制约我国商业银行成长的瓶颈。只有从制度、技术和经营战略等方面入手,不断提高风险管理能力,建立以资本约束为核心的业务增长模式和资源配置方式,尽快实现成长模式由资金约束到资本约束的转变,中国商业银行才能在效益、质量和规模协调发展的基础上实现持续成长。     

资本约束、风险管理与商业银行成长

基于资本必须覆盖风险命题的要求，银行的风险管理能力决定了银行的资本规模和资本的配置，银行资本管理实质上等价于风险管理，资本约束实质上就是风险约束。资本软约束是制约中国商业银行成长的主要障碍之一，但仅仅致力于资本充足率问题的解决并不能保证我国商业银行的可持续成长，风险约束是制约我国商业银行成长的瓶颈。只有从制度、技术和经营战略等方面入手，不断提高风险管理能力，建立以资本约束为核心的业务增长模式和资源配置方式，尽快实现成长模式由资金约束到资本约束的转变，中国商业银行才能在效益、质量和规模协调发展的基础上实现持续成长。     

Credit derivatives, capital requirements and opaque OTC markets

In this paper we study the optimal design of credit derivative contracts when banks have private information about their ability in the loan market and are subject to capital requirements. First, we prove that when banks are subject to a maximum loss capital requirement the optimal signaling contract is a binary credit default basket. Second, we show that if credit derivative markets are opaque then banks cannot commit to terminal-date risk exposure, and therefore the optimal signaling contract is more costly. The above results allow us to discuss the potential implications of different capital adequacy rules for the credit derivative markets.     

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刘明康：银行应计提留存和逆周期资本缓冲 中国银监会主席刘明康撰文指出,宏观审慎监管与微观审慎监管应有机结合。应结合对宏观形势和银行业风险状况的判断,要求商业银行在最低资本充足率要求基础上,计提留存和逆周期资本缓冲。根据经济发展不同阶段、银行业金融机构贷款质量差异和盈利状况的不同,对贷款损失准备进行动态化和差异化调整。他表示,要持续加强对系统重要性银行的监管。     

Earnings versus capital ratios management: role of bank types and SFAS 114

We document in this paper that large banks use Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) more than small banks to manage reported earnings, but we find no significant difference in the use of LLP to manage capital ratios between large and small banks. Additionally, we document that banks with high risk asset portfolios use more LLP to manage reported earnings as well as capital ratios compared to the banks with low risk asset portfolios. Our findings also show that SFAS 114 has a moderating effect on the use of LLP to manage reported earnings, especially by large banks, but there is no conclusive evidence on the impact of SFAS 114 to manage capital ratios. Furthermore, the findings show that there has been significantly more earnings management during the 2007–2008 financial crisis compared to earlier periods.     

Loan loss provision decisions: An empirical analysis of the Spanish depository institutions

Accountants and financial economists have long held concerns that inefficient loan loss accounting may have a material impact on reported capital and earnings, especially in the banking industry. Prior research has examined banks’ incentives to manipulate loan loss provisions (LLPs) and the resulting impact. However, most of this research has focused on management incentives and other determinants of LLP decisions without addressing the relevant factors associated with best-practiced or efficient LLP decision-making. In this paper, we identify a stochastic frontier model that examines the “efficiency” of the LLP decisions of bank managers. Further we explore the relationship between efficient LLP decision-making and relevant factors that could potentially explain any inefficiency. Our evidence indicates that there is considerable inefficiency in loan loss decision-making among the sample institutions. The research is based on data from the Spanish banking industry, which is particularly relevant in light of the recent deregulatory initiatives in Spain. The findings in this study with regard to the existence of inefficiency in loan loss decisions and the causes of such inefficiency have far-reaching implications for regulators throughout Europe.     

Banks’ procyclical behavior: Does provisioning matter?

A panel of 186 European banks is used for the period 1992–2004 to determine if banking behaviors, induced by the capital adequacy constraint and the provisioning system, amplify credit fluctuations. We find that poorly capitalized banks are constrained to expand credit. We also find that loan loss provisions (LLP) made in order to cover expected future loan losses (non-discretionary LLP) amplify credit fluctuations. By contrast, LLP used for management objectives (discretionary LLP) do not affect credit fluctuations. The findings of our research are consistent with the call for the implementation of a dynamic provisioning system in Europe.     

The Impact of SFAS No. 114 on the Linear Information Dynamic for Commercial Banks

Increase (decrease) in loan loss provisions would decrease (increases) bank earnings, but increase (decreases) regulatory capital. Previous studies have separately documented earnings and capital management behavior via loan loss provisions by commercial banks. However, it is difficult to isolate a bank's demand for increasing earnings from its demand for regulatory capital because earnings is a source of capital. Based on the objective bank function, this study investigates the impact of SFAS No. 114 on the information content of loan loss provisions in relation to both earnings quality and capital adequacy in a linear information dynamic framework. Test results show that the association between market value with loan loss provisions became significantly stronger for commercial banks in the post- than in the pre-adoption period. As a result, SFAS No. 114 is also found to positively affect the association of market value with both bank earnings and regulatory capital through the clean surplus relation because of the higher value relevance of loan loss provisions. The findings thus provide empirical evidence that SFAS No. 114 has significantly complemented banking regulations in enhancing (reducing) the (dispersion from the) accounting measurement construct of loan loss provisions.     

Bank earnings and regulatory capital management using available for sale securities

Based on a large sample of publicly listed and non-listed US commercial banks from 1996 to 2011, we find robust evidence consistent with banks using realized available for sale (AFS) securities gains and losses to smooth earnings and increase low regulatory capital. We also find that (i) banks with positive earnings smooth earnings, and banks with negative earnings generally take big baths; (ii) regulatory capital constrains big baths; (iii) banks with more negative earnings and more unrealized beginning-of-quarter losses (gains) take big baths (smooth earnings); and (iv) banks with low regulatory capital and more unrealized gains realize more gains. Also, banks with negative earnings take big baths (avoid or reduce the earnings loss) if their unrealized gains are insufficient (sufficient) to offset the negative earnings. Our inferences apply to listed and non-listed banks, which indicates that the earnings management incentives do not derive solely from public capital markets. Our findings reveal that the accounting for AFS securities gains and losses enables banks to manage regulatory capital and earnings in a variety of ways.     

The effectiveness of bank capital adequacy regulation: A theoretical and empirical approach

The aim of this paper is to analyse how banking firms set their capital ratios, that is, the rate of equity capital over assets. In order to study this issue, two theoretical models are developed. Both models demonstrate the existence of an optimal capital ratio; the first one for firms not affected by capital adequacy regulation, the second one for firms which are. The models have been tested by estimating a disequilibrium model using data from Spanish commercial banks.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON ENTERPRISE-WIDE RISK MANAGEMENT

For many years, MBA. students were taught that there was no good reason for a company that hedged a large currency exposure to trade at a higher P/E than an otherwise identical company that chose not to hedge. Corporate stockholders, simply by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of interest rate and currency risk on corporate values. And thus corporate efforts to manage risk were thought to be “redundant,” a waste of corporate resources on a function that was already accomplished by investors at far lower cost. But the theory underlying this “perfect markets” framework has changed in recent years to focus on ways that corporate risk management can add value. The academics and practitioners who participated in this roundtable began by discussing in general terms how risk management can be used to support a company's strategic plan and investment policy. At Merck, for example, where R&D spending was determined as a percentage of earnings, a policy of hedging foreign currency exposure to reduce earnings volatility was viewed as adding value by “protecting” the firm's R&D. The panelists also agreed that a well executed risk management policy can increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital by lowering the likelihood of financial distress. For example, companies with debt covenants might undertake a risk management program to lower earnings volatility and ensure a minimum level of earnings for debt compliance purposes. But one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that risk management and earnings management are not the same thing, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic functions. Moreover, in making decisions to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. That is, if there is an outside firm or investor willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. In addition to the cost savings and higher return on capital promised by such an approach, a number of the panelists also pointed to a less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—namely, a marked improvement of the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the firm's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among the firm's business units.