外部技术创新对企业边界的影响

本文基于能力理论与交易费用理论相融合的视角,探讨外部技术创新对企业边界变动的影响机理。文章指出,企业的边界主要表现为能力边界和规模边界两种形态,而能力和交易费用是决定这两种边界形态及其变动的根本原因。在短期内,能力和交易费用各自独立地决定能力边界和规模边界的变动方向;但是到了长期,能力不仅可以直接决定能力边界的变动,而且还能够通过影响交易费用水平而间接决定规模边界的变动,从而形成能力为主、交易费用为辅的企业边界动态演化机制。外部技术创新活动正是通过改变企业的能力结构和交易费用水平而最终影响企业的边界变动。渐进式创新、模块化创新、架构创新和激进式创新四种外部技术创新模式对企业边界变动存在差异性影响。     

双重性企业边界浅析

长期以来,学者对企业边界的研究视角始终放在企业的规模上,对企业边界的复杂变动情况难以做出合理的解释.本文认为,企业的边界具有两重性:一是由土地、劳动、资本等有形资源决定的规模边界,二是由知识、技术等无形资源决定的能力边界.能力边界是企业边界的核心属性,它的变动决定了规模边界的变动方向.     

信息技术对企业纵向边界的影响:模型及应用

信息技术的发明与应用对企业边界的变动产生了什么样的影响?目前对这一问题的回答存在着广泛的争议。本文基于交易成本理论建立了一个关于信息技术影响企业纵向边界变动的模型,并通过对模型进行分析和简单的应用,进而提出了自己的观点。     

市场与企业混合原因、多样性及扩大化--基于市场最优边界和企业最优边界关系的视角

作为本质上不同的两种交易组织方式,市场与企业在很多情况下相互混合。本文从边界关系视角入手,分析了混合的原因、多样性及扩大化,在既有研究的基础上,分别构建了市场最优边界和企业最优边界的决定模型,论证市场最优边界和企业最优边界之间存在多重的均衡关系,结合两种边界的不一致性,分类讨论混合的形成及其多样性,结合相应的案例探讨垄断定价、规模差异以及扩大两种边界的不一致性,进而分析扩大混合的机制。     

企业制度创新的核心——产权制度创新

产权制度创新是企业制度创新的核心问题,也是市场经济运行的基础。有什么样的产权制度就有什么样的组织框架和约束条件,产权制度的变动必然引起基本组织构架和约束条件的变动。因此,企业制度创新的核心问题就是变更和安排企业的产权结构,以便消除和减少市场运行机制的社会费用,改善资源配置的效率。     

企业的最优产品差异化选择

本文考察了环形城市模型中交通成本对企业最优产品差异程度的影响.企业首先选择产品差异程度,然后进行价格竞争.我们发现:与人们通常的认识-交通成本的凹凸性决定了企业产品差异化倾向-不同;边际交通成本的凹凸性起了关键的作用.当边际交通成本的倒数为凸函数时,企业将选择最大的产品差异化程度.本文指出,产品差异最大化能够得到社会福利最大化,但市场竞争不一定能得到这个结果,此时资源配置的效率存在改进的空间.     

企业研发边界决定:基于问题解决与知识互动的理论解释

借鉴基于知识的企业观点,从知识互动和问题解决视角探讨了企业研发边界决定,认为企业研发边界是由搜寻解决方案的期望费用和知识方案的互动程度共同决定的,且其取决于不同治理形式下不同类型问题的解决成本和效率。通常,市场在治理低交互作用问题时是有效的,基于权威的层级组织在治理中等交互作用问题时是有效的,组织间形式则在治理高交互作用问题时是有效的。     

企业边界:理论、性质及其变动趋势分析

本文对企业边界的性质进行了分析,认为企业性质决定企业边界的性质,并在此基础上对企业边界变动的三种分析框架进行了梳理。     

企业边界变动对管理学发展的创新

现实生活中,企业边界正以产权式企业边界、虚拟式企业边界和混合式企业边界的形式发生显著变化,企业边界变化的根源何在,以及不同的企业边界变化特征,都需要用新的管理学思想去分析、去思考,文章揭示了企业边界变动的原理.从企业边界变动原理的角度,引发了对管理学的新思考.     

基于知识的企业理论

本文认为，企业的根本任务是创造知识，企业是许多专业化分工活动通过一定的结构与方式联结与聚集在一起的动态性组织，这种独特的结构会产生一种系统集成放大效应。企业的存在是因为企业能够创造出独特的生产性知识、制度性知识和管理性知识，企业进行知识创造和知识转换的能力是企业存在的原因，企业专业化生产与协作过程中积累的共有知识和和人知识决定着企业的效率边界。一种有效率的、最有生命力的企业制度就是能提供一种合理性、激励性的制度安排，鼓励知识的不断创造、使用、转移和共享，而不仅仅是那些理论上能够使组织交易费用最小的企业制度。     

科斯《企业的性质》之质疑

企业是资源所有者的取得更多的收益而建立起来的经济组织，交易成本的存在并不是企业存在的根本原因，科斯将企业定义为不同于价格调节机制的企业家计划调节机制，源于其错将企业计划混同于计划经济，事实上，企业是以市场合约为基础形成的，按市场运行原则运作的市场性组织，其资源配置并不独立于市场价格机制之外，价格调节机制与企业家调节机制是不可分割的两个方面，任何企业作为市场参与者与市场都是互动的。     

企业:一种人力资本使用权交易的粘性组织

本文沿着科斯的思路 ,把企业理解为一种人力资本使用权交易的粘性组织。企业用权威关系替代价格机制 ,而权威关系能够减少交易费用的原因在于“组织粘性”的存在。企业是一种有粘性的契约 ,而市场是一种无粘性的契约。企业的组织粘性把关键员工和企业联在一起 ,并使企业在引入企业家才能时有更低的临界交易效率。企业的边界由交易费用和组织粘性共同决定。     

企业研发边界影响因素的国外研究综述

企业研发边界的本质是寻求企业研发资源的最优配置。近年来,国外学者将影响企业研发边界的因素分为企业特征因素和行业与技术特征因素两大类。其中,企业特征因素包括研发强度、企业规模、纵向一体化、多样化、现金流和组织结构等;行业与技术特征因素包括专有性、信息流、创新速度等。可见,研发边界影响因素的相关结论并不十分一致,仍有待进一步的研究。     

Digital Platforms and the Nature of the Firm

Abstract:

Digital platforms turn traditional approaches of the firm, which relied on the wage relation to explain the major difference between firm and market, upside down and underline the advantages of coordination through organization over coordination through market. This study aims to propose a definition of the firm able to integrate, besides the integrated firm, also hybrid forms such as networks of subcontractor/subcontracting firms as well as atypical forms such as digital platforms. By reactivating the firm-boundary problem, this article suggests putting valorization by labor at the heart of the firm’s decisions concerning integration. It suggests therefore a general definition of the firm as a techno-institutional center of capital valorization, provided that firms make profits by means of the appropriation of labor incorporated into their (productive, structural, intellectual) capital through institutional arrangements. By stressing the relation of production between the owners of the means of production and the direct producers, the approach of the firm supported here should allow to cover the different existing models of the firm, from the classical firm to hybrid models, around which the boundary debate has revolved, to digital platforms.     

Opportunity Costs,Competition, and Firm Selection

Abstract

The paper questions the standard economic assumptions that competing economic agents have identical reservation utility levels, and that when differences in opportunity costs exist, they can be conveniently represented by fixed costs. Asymmetries in opportunity costs are considered in relation to current efficiency. The effect of this interchangeability of skills is studied in the context of the effect of entry on firm selection in a Cournot setting. It is found that inefficient firms are more likely to crowd out efficient ones when the relationship between current efficiency and opportunity costs is strong, and when the fixed costs of changing markets are high. Moreover, in the long-run, firms with intermediate cost levels are likely to induce the exit of low and high cost firms. The model sheds light on the benefits of diversification by multiproduct and multinational firms, and their relationship to skill transferability.     

企业理论之新解释:一个基于知识管理的模型

企业理论研究往往关注三个基本问题:"企业为什么存在、企业和市场的边界是什么";"为什么企业会有所不同,是什么原因导致了这种不同";以及这些理论如何被应用于企业以获得持久的竞争优势.本文力图在这三个方面作出理论探索:一是从知识管理的角度回答企业理论的几个基本问题;二是建立一个基于知识传输的模型,并基于这个模型提出了四个可以检验的命题;三是讨论该模型对战略管理实践的启示.     

Environmental Innovations and Firm Profitability: Unmasking the Porter Hypothesis

We examine impacts of different types of environmental innovations on firm profits. Following Porter’s (Sci Am 264(4):168, 1991) hypothesis that environmental regulation can improve firms’ competitiveness, we distinguish between regulation-induced and voluntary environmental innovations. We find that innovations which do not improve firms’ resource efficiency do not provide positive returns to profitability. However, innovations that increase a firm’s resource efficiency in terms of material or energy consumption per unit of output have a positive impact on profitability. This positive result holds for both regulation-induced and voluntary innovations, although the effect is greater for regulation-driven innovation. We conclude that the Porter hypothesis does not hold in general for its “strong” version, but depends on the type of environmental innovation. Our findings rest on firm-level data from the German part of the Community Innovation Survey 2008 (CIS 2008).     

Misallocation and financial market frictions: Some direct evidence from the dispersion in borrowing costs

Financial frictions distort the allocation of resources among productive units—all else equal, firms whose financing choices are affected by such frictions face higher borrowing costs than firms with ready access to capital markets. As a result, input choices may differ systematically across firms in ways that are unrelated to their productive efficiency. We propose an accounting framework that allows us to assess empirically the magnitude of the loss in aggregate resources due to such misallocation. To a second-order approximation, the framework requires only information on the dispersion in borrowing costs across firms, which we measure—for a subset of U.S. manufacturing firms—directly from the interest rate spreads on their outstanding publicly-traded debt. Given the observed dispersion in borrowing costs, our approximation method implies a relatively modest loss in efficiency due to resource misallocation—on the order of 1 to 2 percent of measured total factor productivity (TFP). In our framework, the correlation between firm size and borrowing costs has no bearing on TFP losses under the assumption that financial distortions and firm-level efficiency are jointly log-normally distributed. To take into account the effect of covariation between firm size and borrowing costs, we consider a more general framework, which dispenses with the assumption of log-normality and which implies somewhat higher estimates of the resource losses—about 3.5 percent of measured TFP. Counterfactual experiments indicate that dispersion in borrowing costs must be an order of magnitude higher than that observed in the U.S. financial data, in order for misallocation—arising from financial distortions—to account for a significant fraction of measured TFP differentials across countries.     

企业边界变迁的产业组织演化

交易成本理论从成本角度分析企业边界形成与变迁,企业能力理论则采用比较利益的方法从收入角度分析.短期中,如果企业能力有很大的差异,交易成本降低,位于价值链中上下游的企业将趋于专业化生产;如果企业能力均匀分布,交易成本降低,对专业化生产没有影响.长期中,企业能力、交易成本、企业边界形成互动循环的演化机制,并且在竞争过程中实现自然选择,引起产业组织演化.     

The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth

This articleanalyzes the links between the internal organization of the firmand macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth modelin which firms face agency costs due to the existence of asymmetriesof information and the formation of vertical collusions insidethose firms. To respond to the threat of collusion, optimal collusion-proofincentive contracts depend on the efficiency of collusive sidecontracting within organizations. Collusion affects thereforethe firms' profitability, the incentives to innovate, and, finally,the stationary equilibrium growth rate of the economy. On theother hand, when the growth rate is small, the prospects of long-termrelationships within firms increase the agents' incentives toinvest in a better collusive technology. We then discuss thetwo-way relationships between the structure of internal transactioncosts, organizational technologies, and macroeconomic growth.