IRB法下公司敞口组合的风险驱动因子计量研究

巴塞尔银行监管委员会针对防范信贷组合信用风险所需要的资本制定的内部评级法,通过风险驱动因子的变化来反映组合回报的变化,并根据风险权重函数,通过风险加权资产转化为与每一项信用风险敞口更准确匹配的资本要求.本文对违约概率、违约损失率、违约敞口、期限因素以及违约相关性等信贷组合信用风险的风险驱动因子的度量进行了综合研究.     

新资本协议内部评级法对宏观经济运行的影响：亲经济周期效应研究

新资本协议内部评级法大幅度提高了资本监管的风险敏感度,有助于增强银行体系的运行效率和稳定性,但可能导致信贷运行和经济周期的过度波动。本文认为,由于信用风险是变化的,违约概率、违约损失以及违约风险暴露具有亲周期的特点,亲周期程度取决于银行所采用的模型方法和预测时间;通过第一支柱下降低风险参数的风险敏感度、降低风险权重函数曲线的斜率,第二支柱下的压力测试、设立超额资本要求、平滑风险权重函数的输出值,以及提取动态准备金和实施宏观经济政策等方法能够有效缓解内部评级法的亲经济周期效应;监管当局应在更宏观的框架下分析内部评级法的宏观经济效应,选择合理的政策工具解决亲经济周期效应问题。     

LGD、IRB和商业银行信用风险管理

风险的配置和管理是商业银行的职能之一，信用风险是银行业最大的风险之源。巴塞尔新资本协议资本监管下的内部评级法是信用风险管理的全新方式，违约损失率(LGD)是内部评级法(IRB)中最为重要和计量最为困难的参数。对IRB、LGD的进行了总结分析，并提出了我国商业银行发展内部评级法的意义和建议。     

浅析违约概率的应用

新巴塞尔资本协议的出台鼓励银行采用内部评级法评估所面临的信用风险,采用内部评级法,可以使银行资本和所承担风险的联系更加紧密、更加直接,可以大幅度提高资本对风险的敏感性。内部评级法计算资本充足率需要四个变量,违约概率是其中之一,同时只要采用内部评级法,不管应用高级法还是初级法,违约概率都需要由银行自己估算,国内某些商业银行已开始着手违约概率的计量。本文主要对违约概率的定义、作用及在现实中的应用作一些简要的介绍。     

深入开展违约损失率研究 健全银行二维内部评级体系

在巴塞尔新资本协议中,违约损失率是信用风险内部评级法中的重要参数,一般通过二维评级中的债项评级进行量化。目前欧洲、澳洲、新加坡等主要银行系统已经基本完成新资本协议实施进程,在信用风险领域,主要的大型领先银行普遍采用高级内部评级法,即通过开发违约概率和违约损失率模型,建立二维内部评级体系,对银行提高风险管理水平、防范信用风险发挥了重要作用。     

客户违约概率(PD)在风险组合管理中的应用

内部评级体系是商业银行风险管理的核心工具,通过客户的违约概率(PD)来体现的客户信用评级是内部评级体系中重要的内容之一,新资本协议和银监会均对其在风险管理中的使用有相应要求。总体而言,客户违约概率(PD)在行业、地区的风险组合管理的作用分为以下几个方面。     

对商业银行在新资本协议实施中有效落实违约定义的思考

违约定义是商业银行实施新资本协议信用风险内部评级法的关键基础定义之一,其是否得到有效落实直接关系到银行内部风险参数计量的准确性和监管资本计算的可靠性。本文对违约定义实施的相     

信用风险内部评级法下商业银行监管资本套利策略研究--从监管资本公式视角出发

为了获得更有效的资本竞争优势,首先从核心定义入手,阐述了新资本协议信用风险内部评级法下商业银行进行监管资本套利的可行性。随后,以信用风险内部评级法监管资本公式为基础,利用数理解析和图形分析等方法,详细分析了监管资本要求（K）与违约概率（PD）、违约损失率（LGD）、有效期限（M）之间的相关性,以及在不同风险暴露中监管资本要求（K）的系统性差异。最后,以数理分析和图形分析结果为基础,提出商业银行应采取积极推进内评应用、优化资产结构、以组合管理模式积极推进微型和小型企业业务发展、提升合格风险缓释品的覆盖比例、设置合规且有效的合格风险缓释拆分规则等策略,实现监管资本套利。     

信用风险内部评级法下商业银行监管资本套利策略研究——从监管资本公式视角出发

为了获得更有效的资本竞争优势,首先从核心定义入手,阐述了新资本协议信用风险内部评级法下商业银行进行监管资本套利的可行性。随后,以信用风险内部评级法监管资本公式为基础,利用数理解析和图形分析等方法,详细分析了监管资本要求(K)与违约概率(PD)、违约损失率(LGD)、有效期限(M)之间的相关性,以及在不同风险暴露中监管资本要求(K)的系统性差异。最后,以数理分析和图形分析结果为基础,提出商业银行应采取积极推进内评应用、优化资产结构、以组合管理模式积极推进微型和小型企业业务发展、提升合格风险缓释品的覆盖比例、设置合规且有效的合格风险缓释拆分规则等策略,实现监管资本套利。     

个人住房抵押贷款违约风险跃迁概率研究

巴塞尔新资本协议提出针对个人住房抵押贷款可采用内部评级高级法评估其风险,在满足某些最低条件和披露要求的前提下,商业银行可根据自己对个人住房抵押贷款违约概率、违约损失率、违约风险暴露和期限等要素的估计值确定相应的资本要求。本文提出将风险跃迁概率引入到对个人住房抵押贷款提前还款-违约概率的定量估计中。借助逻辑斯特模型,本文将这一概念实际运用到对个人住房抵押贷款微观数据的分析当中,得到的实证研究结论包括借款人历史还款状态可以作为表征其未来还款状态的重要指标,贷龄与借款人还款状态的跃迁概率显著相关等。     

《新资本协议》对商业银行信贷运行的影响——兼论其宏观经济效应

《新资本协议》的出台和实施是银行监管历史上一个具有里程碑意义的事件。本文认为,《新资本协议》特别是内部评级法极大地提高了资本监管的风险敏感度,将对商业银行的信贷增长方式、信贷结构调整和贷款损失准备计提、以及宏观经济运行产生一定的影响。按照目前我国商业银行资本充足水平和资产质量,无论是实施标准法还是内部评级法都将强化信贷扩张的资本约束效应。我国应慎重选择《新资本协议》的实施时机,避免由此对信贷供给和宏观经济运行造成的负面冲击。     

IRB法及农发行风险管理借鉴

以内部评级法（IRB）为核心内容的《巴塞尔新资本协议》已于2004年6月26日正式颁布,并于2006年底在十国集团开始实施。在《新协议》的推动下,目前国内外大多数银行都在积极研究开发IRB法,力争在2006年达标。作为农业政策性银行,积极引入和借鉴IRB法,对于农发行加强信贷管理、有效防范风险、提高经营管理水平等,同样具有非常重要的现实意义。     

The Basel Committee proposals for a new capital accord: implications for Italian banks

Following a few general considerations on the recently proposed revision of the Basel Agreement on capital adequacy, this paper focuses on the first pillar of the Basel Committee proposals, the handling of capital requirements for credit risk in the banking book. The Basel Committee envisages an approach alternatively based on external ratings or on internal rating systems for the determination of the minimum capital requirement related to bank loan portfolios. This approach supports a system of capital requirements that is more sensitive to credit risk. On the basis of specific assumptions, these requirements provide a measure of the value at risk (VaR) produced by models used by major international banks. We first address the impact of the standardised and (internal ratings-based) IRB foundation approach using general data on Italian banks loans' portfolios default rates. We then simulate the impact of the proposed new rules on the corporate loan portfolios of Italian banks, using the unique data set of mortality rates recently published by the Bank of Italy. Three main conclusions emerge from the analysis: (i) the standardised approach implicitly penalizes Italian banks in their interbank funding as their rating is generally below AA/Aa, (ii) the average default rate experienced by Italian banks is higher than the one implied in the benchmark risk weight (BRW) proposed by the Basel Committee for the IRB foundation approach, thereby potentially leading to an increase in the regulatory risk weights, and (iii) the risk-weight is based on an average asset correlation that is significantly higher than the one historically recorded within the Italian banks' corporate borrowers. These findings support the need for a significant revision of the basic inputs and assumptions of the Basel proposals. Finally, in relation to the conditions that allow the capital market to effectively discipline banks, we comment on the proposals advanced in relation to the third pillar of the new capital adequacy scheme.     

资本计量方法改革、商业银行风险偏好与信贷配置

为提高银行业风险管理水平与信贷配置效率,监管部门于2014年开展了资本管理高级方法的试点工作。本文基于上市银行2010至2016年的微观数据,与银监会公布的行业信贷风险进行匹配,采用双重差分和三重差分法,实证分析前述改革如何影响试点银行的风险偏好和信贷调配。研究发现,在资本管理高级方法实施后:(1)试点银行显著降低了风险加权资产的规模;(2)试点银行风险偏好的变化存在非线性的特征,在调减高风险行业贷款的同时,并未显著增加最安全行业的贷款,而是增加了风险略高行业的贷款,体现出试点银行对风险与收益的权衡;(3)进一步将行业划分为“虚”与“实”,研究发现试点银行减少了房地产业(“虚”)、制造业(“实”)和建筑业(“实”)贷款,显著增加了金融业(“虚”)贷款。本文研究不仅丰富了资本监管方面的文献,也对金融支持供给侧结构性改革具有启示意义。     

Procyclicality: The Macroeconomic Impact of Risk-Based Capital Requirements

Recent research on the Basel II capital framework suggests that binding capital requirements may be responsible for bank behaviour which causes procyclical amplifications of the macroeconomic cycle. This paper presents a model of the interrelations between the state of the economy, credit risk, and loan supply to clarify and quantify this effect. Special attention is paid to the fact that both regulatory and economic capital requirements can significantly influence loan supply, provided that they are binding. The model shows that both economic capital, based on a one-factor model, and the regulatory IRB requirements cause more procyclicality than the constant regulatory requirements of the Basel I capital accord. However, the overall impact depends on the interrelation of the regulatory requirements with economic capital. Based on this result, the replacement of the Basel I requirements with risk-sensitive IRB capital requirements boosts procyclicality under most, but not under all conditions.     

CP3's Standardized Approach for Credit Risk and Current Capital Requirements

This paper reports estimated risk-weighted assets at 27 New York banks after applying the provisions of the Standardized Approach, both singly and in combination. The provisions that lead to estimated decreases in risk-weighted assets had greater impact than provisions that lead to estimated increases. This finding implies that using Standardized Approach elements to make capital requirements more risk-sensitive will lead to lower levels of required capital, unless regulators also impose a capital charge for operational risk. The effect of the different provisions varied across the 27 institutions, but the results, on average, are consistent with those reported in the third Quantitative Impact Study.     

P2P借款人的定价偏差与被动违约风险——基于“人人贷”数据的分析

本文主要通过行为资产定价理论和"人人贷"2014-2018年的数据,研究网络借贷(P2P)借款人定价偏差的影响因素及其与被动违约风险之间的关系。定价偏差是将P2P借贷利率分解为效率部分和无效率部分,并通过成本随机前沿模型得到。结果表明:借款人定价存在显著偏差且在不同群体间有所差异;借款人的粉饰行为未能起到减小定价偏差的作用,甚至会起到反效果;当借款人的声誉成本高于还款成本时,此时的违约主要表现为被动违约;即使借款人主观还款意愿强烈,但定价偏差越大,借款人剩余收入就越吃紧,还款过程中逾期次数和欠债比例增加的可能性就越大,进而引发被动违约风险。     

Information risk and credit contagion

This paper demonstrates a positive relationship between information risk and the credit contagion effect. We use abnormal changes in the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads to measure the contagion effect, and the dispersion of analyst forecasts as a proxy for information risk. We find that firms with higher information risk suffer a greater contagion effect that occurs in advance to the credit default events. This finding is robust under controls of key firm-specific characteristics and general condition of stock and credit markets.     

Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements

We characterize welfare maximizing capital requirement policies in a quantitative macrobanking model with household, firm, and bank defaults calibrated to Euro Area data. We optimize on the level of the capital requirements applied to each loan class and their sensitivity to changes in default risk. We find that getting the level right (so that bank failure risk remains contained) is of foremost importance, while the optimal sensitivity to default risk is positive but typically smaller than under Basel internal ratings based (IRB) formulas. Starting from low levels, savers and borrowers benefit from higher capital requirements. At higher levels, only savers prefer tighter requirements.