控制权与现金流权分离对控制权转移收益的影响研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

以发生控制权转移的上市公司为研究样本,并且将样本细化为内部控制权转移和外部控制权转移以及总体三类样本,在对控制权收益进行重新度量的前提下,运用多元线性回归模型,在控制股权集中程度、股权制衡程度以及国有股比例、法人股比例等因素的基础上,考察了公司层面的股权结构特征——控制权和现金流权分离程度等因素对控制权转移收益的影响.结果表明,两权分离程度是影响控制权转移收益的重要因素,并且为负向,反映了控股股东对现金流权的偏好;另外,考虑资本成本补偿的控制权转让收益度量指标更能反映控股股东的实际控制权转让所得,对模型更具解释能力.     

上市公司控制权私有收益量化研究

本文以2005~2009年94个导致控制权发生转移的股权转让为研究样本考察上市公司控制权私有收益,在沿用大宗股权交易法的基础上加以改进,研究表明股东类型、负债率、公司规模、控制力等因素对控制权私利有显著影响。     

国有上市公司控制权私人利益问题研究

文章通过2006年到2008年间我国国有上市公司大宗股权交易的数据,对国有上市公司和非国有上市公司股权交易中的溢价问题进行对比,并对其中的控制权私人利益进行了度量。研究发现,在股权转让过程中国有上市公司比非国有上市公司存在更高的控制权私人利益水平,国有控股不利于中小股东利益的保护。     

从国营到国有——国家股转让效果分析

本文系统地研究了从1997年到2000年在上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所发生的国有资产局将控制权转让给国有独资企业和国有法人企业的案例数据。研究发现国家股控制权转让后公司业绩有了明显的改善,同时证券市场对国家股转让行为做出了积极的反应,产生了明显的超额收益。     

控制权结构与股权激励有效期设定——基于资本市场的实证研究

以2006至2015年间我国推出股权激励计划的上市公司为研究对象,从控制权结构视角,本文研究了实际控制人控制权结构对股权激励有效期设定的影响。研究发现,实际控制人控制权比例与上市公司所设定的股权激励有效期长短显著正相关;相对于非国有控股公司,国有控股公司所设定的激励有效期更长,并且国有控股公司实际控制人控制权对上市公司所设定的激励有效期的正向影响程度更大;当管理层权力较弱时,实际控制人控制权与激励有效期之间的正相关关系会增强。本文从激励有效期设定的角度,丰富了股权激励有效性研究文献;同时,从实际控制人控制权结构视角,拓展了股权激励契约设计的影响因素研究。     

企业股权结构与股权转让效率——以中国大陆A股上市公司为例

通过对中国大陆A股上市公司股权转让数据的分析表明,企业股权转让更容易发生在股权较为分散的公司中,但是股权转让后的企业效率并没有明显的改善,公司控制权的转移往往对企业绩效产生负面的影响。由此可见,通过鼓励企业股权结构分散化并对控制权私人收益加以必要的管制,对提高股权转让的效率将起到非常重要的作用。     

上市公司的股权结构、控制权溢价及其影响因素分析

本文从我国上市公司的股权结构入手分析控制权溢价的形成机制和影响因素。认为我国上市公司独特的股权结构所造成的大股东控制和内部人控制,使我国的控制权市场更多的表现为大股东和内部人获取控制权溢价的场所,而我国控制权转移中经常采用的协议转让方式又为控制权溢价的实现提供了便利条件。此外,股权转让比例、目标公司规模等因素影响了控股股东和内部控制人控制权收益的预期,从而影响了控制权溢价。     

上市公司民营化:短期信号效应还是长期业绩改进

以2001—2010年深沪两市A股发生控制权转移的上市公司为样本,研究控制权转移事件中目标公司国有股东将股权转让给民营股东会对其短期市场反应和长期财务绩效产生何种影响。研究发现,无论控制权性质是否变化,并购都能够给目标公司带来显著为正的短期市场反应,民营化的公司市场反应更强。但是控制权转移完成之后,民营化并未比其他控制权转移的公司给目标公司带来更好的长期财务业绩。     

公司治理与股权结构、控制权私有收益实证研究

通过对我国公司目前的控制权结构进行分析,总结了我国公司治理特征及控制权私有收益问题,引出对股权结构的分析,研究股权集中度、国家持股、法人股、社会公众股、外资股与控制权私有收益的关系.以公司规模变量、协议转让规模、盈利能力、财务杠杆、目标公司是否拥有配股资格为控制变量相应建立分析模型进行实证研究.在对实证结果进行分析的基础上,建议要降低我国上市公司控制权的私有收益,可以从两个方面着手:一是增加第二到第十大股东的持股比例,对第一大股东形成制约作用;二是积极引入法人股、外资股,增加社会公众股,降低国有股东持股比例,改善股权结构.     

大股东控制权私有收益影响因素研究——基于股权特征和董事会特征的实证研究

现有研究表明,大股东会利用其控制权来"掏空"上市公司,从而获取控制权私有收益.本文对控制权私有收益的大小做出计量,并从股权特征和董事会特征两个方面研究了其对控制权私有收益的影响.研究表明:股权集中度越高、大股东对董事会控制度越高,越容易引发大股东的"掏空"行为,从而攫取控制权私有收益;股权制衡度对"掏空"行为的抑制作用尚未发挥出来,不能有效抑制大股东控制权私有收益的攫取;在大股东单位任职的董事比例越大,且董事长由大股东单位派出能够使控制权私有收益水平高企.笔者建议将股权制衡度作为公司治理的关键和学者们研究的重点.     

Information asymmetry and monitoring in equity private placements

This paper systematically examines the factors that determine price discounts and announcement effects of equity private placements conducted by firms in Taiwan from 2002 to 2008. Different with most studies of private placements using available observations as a whole sample, our study separates the whole sample into subsamples by exchange-listed firms and OTC firms. The results for OTC firms corroborate the information hypothesis; the discounts serve as compensation for investor's costs of assessing firms, while abnormal returns reflect the information about firm quality. On the other hand, the empirical results show that some of our findings support an information explanation and some support a monitoring explanation in the case of exchange-listed firms. It seems that there are different motives behind the exchange-listed firms placing equity privately.     

基于多项Logit选择模型的在线渠道价格促销效应实证研究

在线渠道下,不同品牌的价格折扣促销的差异性会引起在线消费者品牌选择行为变化。同时,在线的价格比较机制也增加了消费者价格敏感度,如果不分离出这一重要的促销效应,那么会产生估计偏差,影响模型的预测能力。本文首先回顾品牌选择的离散模型中价格促销的研究脉络;然后构建在线渠道消费者品牌选择离散Logit模型;接着在对中国某电子商务公司的消费者实际购买可乐的面板数据分析的基础上,研究价格折扣对于该公司消费者品牌选择行为的影响效应,研究发现：（1）如果不引入价格折扣促销因素,将会过高估计价格的影响;（2）价格折扣促销对于消费者网上品牌选择有显著的影响,且影响为正效应。文章最后剖析价格折扣对在线渠道的消费者品牌选择的行为影响机理,并提出未来的研究方向。     

Price discrimination and bargaining power in the U.S. vaccine market: Implications for childhood immunization policy

The U.S. vaccine market exhibits a pricing structure in which the major purchaser of vaccines, the public sector, receives substantial discounts. This outcome is consistent with three theories of market behavior: third-degree price discrimination; bargaining power; and cost differences. The true nature of this pricing structure has important efficiency and policy implications. This paper uses a longitudinal data set of private catalog and federal contract prices to empirically determine whether price discrimination or bargaining power is being practiced in this market. I find that, while it is not possible to eliminate other factors, the results favor the bargaining power hypothesis.     

主导零售商折扣行为的利润补偿研究

主导零售商折扣行为的最终目的只能是为了最大限度地获取利润,但主导零售商的折扣销售表明其商品价格远低于其竞争对手,由此文中主要研究主导零售商折扣行为的利润补偿问题,以期为这一现象提供合理的解释。     

All-Units Discounts in Retail Contracts

All-units discounts in retail contracts refer to discounts that lower a retailer's wholesale price on every unit purchased when the retailer's purchases equal or exceed some quantity threshold. These discounts pose a challenge to economic theory because it is difficult to understand why a manufacturer ever would charge less for a larger order if its intentions were benign. In this paper, we show that all-units discounts may profitably arise absent any exclusionary motive. All-units discounts eliminate double marginalization in a complete information setting, and they extract more profit than would a menu of two-part tariffs in the standard incomplete information setting with two types of buyers. All-units discounts may improve or may reduce welfare (relative to menus of two-part tariffs) depending on demand parameters .     

考虑市场冲击下易变质商品的临时价格折扣模型

文章从零售商的角度出发．考虑当零售商能够预知市场变化并采用价格折扣时所得到的利润收入,同时价格的变化会影响顾客需求的变化。由于采取价格折扣时刻的不同会导致零售商利润收入的不同．文中给出了零售商的最优定价策略,并通过实例对模型进行分析。     

Optimal pricing for new and remanufactured products

This work investigates the optimal pricing of new and remanufactured products using a model of consumer preferences based on extensive experimentation. The experimental investigation reveals two distinct segments of consumers. One segment is relatively indifferent between new and remanufactured products and displays high sensitivity to price discounts. The second segment shows strong preferences for new products—with an accompanying aversion to remanufactured products—and realtively low sensitivity to price discounts. The pricing analysis examines several scenarios involving a new product manufacturer, ranging from a simple monopolist scenario to a more complex scenario involving competition with third-party remanufacturers. In contrast to the usual finding that new product prices should decrease when competitive remanufactured products enter the market, the introduction of market segments reveals a robust finding across all scenarios: when remanufactured products enter the market, the optimal price of the new product should increase. Through appropriate pricing of new products, the OEM can mitigate the effects of cannibalization and increase profitability.     

Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion

Using a dynamic overlapping‐generations model, we show that loyalty rewards robustly facilitate tacit collusion. We compare the sustainability of tacit collusion when uniform prices are used, when loyal customers are rewarded without using commitment, and when loyalty rewards are implemented by committing to offering customers either lower fixed repeat‐purchase prices or fixed repeat‐purchase discounts. We find that, relative to uniform prices, rewarding loyalty without using commitment on the equilibrium path makes tacit collusion easier to sustain, because a deviating firm is unable to steal one period of industry profit before losing all future profits. When loyalty rewards are offered by firms committing to repeat‐purchase prices, collusion is even easier to sustain, because a deviating firm cannot renege on its discounted price for repeat‐purchase customers. When firms commit to repeat‐purchase discounts, they also commit to lowering the price for their repeat‐purchase customers if they undercut the regular price, rendering tacit collusion to be even more readily sustainable. Our results hold whether products are homogeneous or horizontally differentiated as in a Hotelling model.     

原料有批量折扣的生产库存模型

研究了原料价格有多种批量折扣,生产商进行批量采购,且每次生产至少采购一次;需求率与生产成本固定的条件下,生产商的最优采购策略及最优生产批量问题。模型的求解一般需要分两个阶段:首先初步求出可能的最优采购批量与可能的最优生产批量,并由此得出可能的采购次数,而后求出各采购次数条件下各采购策略下的总成本,其中令总成本最低者即为所求。给出了一个算例对模型进行了说明。     

Quasi-experimental evidence on the effect of aircraft noise on apartment rents

Inferring the implicit price of an environmental good hinges on ceteris paribus conditions that are often hard to justify. This paper uses an unexpected change in flight regulations as source of exogenous variation and identifies aircraft noise effects from price adjustments in the market for rental apartments. Controlling for spatial and apartment heterogeneity, we find that aircraft noise reduces apartment rents by about 0.5% per decibel. Our results indicate (i) that noise discounts are overestimated in cross-sectional studies because aircraft noise tends to be negatively correlated with omitted neighborhood and housing amenities and (ii) that noise effects are unlikely to be constant over the entire noise range.