An antitrust analysis of bundled loyalty discounts

Consider a monopolist in one market that faces competition in a second market. Bundled loyalty discounts, in which customers receive a price break on the monopoly good in exchange for making all purchases from the monopolist, have ambiguous welfare effects. Such discounts should not always be treated as a form of predatory pricing. In some settings, they act as tie-in sales. Existing tests for whether such discounts violate competition laws do not track changes in consumer surplus or total surplus. We apply a new test to an illustrative example based on SmithKline that assumes the “tied” market has homogeneous goods. If the tied market is characterized by Hotelling competition, bundling by the monopolist causes the rival firm to reduce its price. In numerical examples, we find that this can deter entry or induce exit.     

Implications of regulation for entry and investment in the local loop

A number of countries around the world are trying to promote competition at the local loop as demand for higher bandwidth to the home increases. Different technologies (xDSL, cable modems, and wireless local loop) offer alternative solutions and the issue for regulators is to design a framework that promotes competition and investment. Regulators can promote competition in a number of ways, but two “pure” strategies are services and infrastructure competition. This paper models the regulator and incumbent–entrant interactions explicitly in order to understand how the structure of the voice services might evolve under different regulatory frameworks. Our analysis suggests that a “mix” of infrastructure and service competition like the one promoted in Netherlands, stimulates investment by incumbents and entrants alike and offers better consumer benefits. The message for policy makers is that the introduction of “sunset clauses” provides new entrants with strong incentives to invest while allowing them to enter in service competition and to acquire important knowledge about their new market.     

Competition aspects of pricing access to networks: What are the issues?

The introduction of competition between service providers in industries with some sort of network—such as telecommunications, but also gas and electricity—has created the regulatory problem of access pricing. Where a service provider requires access to a network owned by another firm, how much should that other firm be allowed to charge for access to its network? The problem arises where no agreement is forthcoming through normal market negotiations. The paper discusses the question of access pricing in telecoms, and the issues involved in actually deriving a price fixing mechanism for access to a network.     

Markov Perfect Equilibrium in the US digital camera market

This paper examines the model launch and withdrawal decisions of the major digital camera makers for the period 1996–1999. These manufacturers produce differentiated products and some have the experience of participating in a similar market—the film camera market. This paper investigates to what extent the following four factors affect firms' decisions to launch a new model of digital camera: the effects of competition with “within-brand” models; the effects of competition with “cross-brand” models; the level of experience in the film camera market; and market conditions. The empirical findings suggest that good market conditions can accommodate more products, which has a positive effect on product launches. On the other hand, existing cross-brand models have a negative effect on product launches, while within-brand models and experience in similar markets have an ambiguous effect on product launches.     

Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing

We analyze an endogenous average cost based access pricing rule, where both the regulated firm and its rivals realize the interdependence among their outputs and the regulated access price. In contrast, the existing literature on access pricing has always assumed that the access price is exogenously fixed ex-ante. We show that endogenous access pricing neutralizes the artificial cost advantage that is enjoyed by the incumbent firm. Further, endogenous access pricing results in a consumer surplus that is equal to or higher than that under exogenous access pricing. If the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is higher than that under exogenous access pricing.     

论垂直价格挤压下的接入定价规制

在自然垄断产业引入竞争的过程中,独占传输网络的纵向一体化垄断厂商可能对下游市场新进入者实施接入价格挤压。接入价格挤压从属于价格歧视。尽管一定条件下的接入价格挤压具有正向的竞争效应,但垄断厂商将具有同等效率或更高效率的独立厂商驱逐出市场则应该受到规制。接入价格规制包括政府直接规制定价和反垄断法间接规制定价。直接规制定价中整体价格上限较为可取,而反垄断法间接规制需要采用基于福利后果分析的合理推定原则,但从短期来看采用直接规制更有效率。最后提出了完善我国自然垄断产业接入定价规制的相关政策建议。     

Viewpoint: “Customized competitiveness” strategies for horticultural exporters – Central America focus with lessons from and for other regions

This paper presents the idea of “customized competitiveness” as a strategy necessary for overall competitiveness in particular in globalized horticulture markets and in the “second round” of globalization that started in the mid/late 1990s. Customized competitiveness is additional and complementary to basic “structural competitiveness” that is the focus of competitiveness debates today and for the past decade. The paper illustrates the need for this new strategy, using the example of Central America, highlighting the severe challenges (similar to those facing other developing regions) it faces in the second round of globalization of horticulture markets, magnified by market liberalization culminating recently in implementation of CAFTA. The paper then illustrates “solutions” by providing examples of cutting-edge programs in various developing countries of de facto “customized competitiveness” in the form of public–private partnerships and the provision of public and semi-public goods, to help their exporters access and succeed in the new markets. We conclude with policy implications for Central America and other developing regions.     

Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence

I investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two-period model of a durable-goods monopolist. There exists an incumbent that is of two types, that is, high and low quality types. They differ in terms of their R&D capabilities, and the incumbent's type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant. If the entrant decided to enter the market, Nash–Bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant. I show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent's quality type, which serves to discourage entry. In the prestige pricing, the high-quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price. I also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint, the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing.     

Best Practices for New Product Pricing: Impact on Market Performance and Price Level under Different Conditions

To date, research on new product pricing has predominantly been approached as a choice between market skimming and penetration pricing. Despite calls for research that addresses other complexities in new product pricing, empirical research responding to these calls remains scarce. This paper examines three managerial price‐setting practices for new products, i.e., value‐informed, competition‐informed, and cost‐informed pricing. By engaging in these practices, managers can develop and compare quantifications in order to attain an introduction price for the product. The authors draw on consumer price perception literature, Monroe's pricing discretion model, and numerical cognition literature to develop hypotheses about the impact of price‐setting practices on new product market performance and price level. By studying the effects on market performance and price level, the paper provides insights that may help explain the growth of new products and address the problems of underpricing. The hypotheses are tested in a management survey of 144 production and service companies. The results indicate which pricing practices are superior for the achievement of either higher market performance or higher prices in specific product and market conditions. Whereas value‐informed pricing has an unambiguous positive impact on relative price level and market performance, the results also suggest that in many cases engaging in value‐informed pricing is not enough. The effects of cost‐informed and competition‐informed pricing may differ depending upon the objective (market performance or higher prices), product conditions (product advantage and relative product costs), and market condition (competitive intensity). Engaging in inappropriate pricing practices leads to a decline in new product performance. Moreover, bad pricing practices make the positive effect of product advantage on the outcome variables disappear. The latter finding suggests that companies can jeopardize their efforts and investments in the new product development process if they engage in the wrong price‐setting practices. The findings imply that managers should consider different factors in new product pricing. First, when launching a new product, they should determine their explicit pricing objective, either stressing market performance or a higher price level. To determine the most appropriate pricing practices, however, they should next assess their situation in terms of product advantage, relative product costs, and competitive intensity. Together with the pricing objective, these conditions determine the best pricing practice. On a higher level, the findings imply that companies should invest in knowledge development in order to engage in the appropriate pricing practices for each product launch.     

Capacity decisions and supply price games under flexibility of backward integration

A key issue in supply chain design for manufacturing firms is how to make a trade-off between strategies of vertical integration and outsourcing. A two-echelon supply chain model with one supplier and one manufacturer is set up to study this issue. The manufacturer makes decisions on two types of capacities, one is core capacity that cannot be outsourced, the other is non-core capacity on which the manufacturer implements a strategy that includes three options—complete, partial or no outsourcing. Such a strategy is referred to as “flexibility of backward integration”. Optimal capacity decisions of the manufacturer are given and the supplier's pricing strategies are discussed. Managerial implications of partial outsourcing are investigated. The impact of the flexibility of backward integration is presented and finally, supply chain coordination is analyzed.     

Group purchasing, nonlinear tariffs, and oligopoly

Loyalty discounts are nonlinear tariffs that condition rebates or marginal prices on meeting aggregate purchase or market share targets. These discounts are widespread, and are often the impetus for consumers to form buying groups, or group purchase organizations (GPOs). This paper models the competitive effects of the introduction of a GPO into a market within which the preferences of the GPO's members are horizontally differentiated. While nonlinear tariffs are an effective way for a monopolist to extract consumer surplus, when two suppliers compete using such schedules, the results are far more competitive in comparison to simple Bertrand–Nash competition with linear tariffs. This result holds when the product of each of the suppliers is attractive to a substantial portion of consumers. In our model, the nonlinear schedule puts all customers “in play” to a degree that contrasts sharply with the competition at the margin characteristic of constant per unit prices. Moreover, competing in nonlinear tariffs removes allocative inefficiency that can result from single price competition.     

Product Location with Foresight

Traditional location literature concludes that firms will optimally differentiate in order to alleviate a tendency toward competitive pricing. However, it has recently been shown that firms will minimally differentiate if they (correctly) anticipate an absence of price competition. This paper examines the relationship between product location and the sustainability of cooperative pricing, in horizontally and vertically differentiated markets. Further, it describes equilibrium locations when firms are able to choose their locations jointly and when they must choose independently.     

Regulation and investment behaviour in the telecommunications sector: policies and patterns in US and Europe

This paper reports the results of the quantitative analysis of international experience of the relationship between infrastructure investment in the deployment of capacity that can carry large volumes of voice and data traffic and regulatory policy changes in the telecommunications sectors. It looks at the relationship between infrastructure investment for these infrastructure assets and the access pricing régimes for local exchange carriers in the United States and Europe. It then looks at the relationship between various aspects of regulatory and institutional policy changes in Europe and how they affect access prices.The paper finds that a lower access price promotes greater deployment of digital technology among US incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). Based on this finding, it suggests that it is in the ILECs interest to have access to their networks encouraged.The European data for interconnection are recent and far reaching conclusions are not feasible, but the findings, however, suggest that competition has worked by facilitating new entry through decreasing interconnection prices, although path dependencies, of existing and traditional concepts, in the mindsets of operators as well as regulators, may account for these findings.     

Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements With Interdependent Demands

Strategic substitutes and complements have become standard tools of analysis in industrial organization. Bulow et al. (1985) original model which introduced these concepts focused on multimarket oligopoly. Building upon that model, this paper shows that there becomes not one but two strategic interaction terms if the demands between markets is interdependent and the firms compete in prices. This new model is applied to the telecommunications industry, where the local exchange carriers face competition from competitive access providers. The theoretical model shows the critical variables in the local exchange carriers' strategic pricing decision.     

Maximizing the adoption of fixed number portability within the EU: An empirical analysis

Number portability (NP) is considered by the European Commission as a key measure for promoting competition within the telecom sector especially regarding network access infrastructure. However, NP requires several modifications to the network architecture and to the business processes of each operator that, depending on network size, may result in a significant financial cost. This is true for fixed networks in particular. Given the requirement for such an investment, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) desire a clear picture on what to expect, in terms of progress in access competition, when introducing fixed NP in their respective markets. The paper approaches this question by correlating several fixed telephony market indices related to access competition to the degree of success of fixed NP. Relevant analysis based on European Union member states’ data indicates that fixed NP does not significantly contribute to local loop unbundling (LLU) adoption in markets where there are other access technologies available. In these markets, access competition via these other technologies and fixed NP initially achieve similar penetration rates. Consequently, when access competition exceeds a certain threshold and given a reasonable pricing regime then fixed NP is further boosted to include broadband connections based on several broadband technologies/methodologies such as LLU and cable as well as existing narrowband access technologies (e.g. narrowband cable connections). In markets where LLU is the only alternative for access then the rate of Fixed NP adoption is directly correlated with the success of LLU. Consequently, these conclusions are considered within a high-level stepwise approach for NP implementation, which is based on the experience acquired from the respective Greek national project.     

Ex ante regulation and co-investment in the transition to next generation access

Investments in next generation access networks (NGANs) ask for a new set of regulatory remedies. This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on three issues: the migration from the legacy copper network to the NGA infrastructure, and how wholesale pricing regulation might affect this process; the introduction of differentiated wholesale remedies according to geographical differences in NGAN deployment; the impact of co-investment decisions on market outcomes and their interplay with access regulation. Using the recent economic literature, arguments and possible guidelines are proposed, which might be useful to regulators and policy makers.     

Estimating the adoption of Bt eggplant in India: Who Benefits from public–private partnership?

The study analyzes ex ante the adoption of insect-resistant Bt eggplant technology in India. Farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) is estimated using the contingent valuation method. Given the economic importance of insect pests in eggplant cultivation, the average WTP for Bt hybrids is more than four times the current price of conventional hybrid seeds. Since the private innovating firm has also shared its technology with the public sector, proprietary hybrids will likely get competition through public open-pollinated Bt varieties after a small time lag. This will reduce farmers’ WTP for Bt hybrids by about 35%, thus decreasing the scope for corporate pricing policies. Nonetheless, ample private profit potential remains. Analysis of factors influencing farmers’ adoption decisions demonstrates that public Bt varieties will particularly improve technology access for resource-poor eggplant producers. The results suggest that public–private partnership can be beneficial for all parties involved.     

企业内部市场定价:基于行为的理论模型

本文从行为的视角探讨内部市场定价问题。根据内部市场主体之间的合作、竞争行为提出并界定了内部市场结构的概念，将内部市场划分为简单型、合作主导型、竞争主导型、复合型四种结构类型；通过分析企业战略、内部定价对内部市场主体之间合作、竞争行为的影响，得出了企业战略决定内部市场结构应然、内部定价调节内部市场结构实然的结论：以内部市场结构的实然与应然相一致为原则．构建了企业内部市场定价的理论模型，阐述了在各种内部市场结构应然要求下的内部定价方法、决策权安排、绩效考核标准和激励机制等。     

Access regulation, competition, and broadband penetration: An international study

The evolution of broadband penetration has shown substantial differences between OECD countries. This paper empirically investigates to what extent different forms of regulated competition explain these international differences. It distinguishes three modes of competition between broadband internet access providers that result from regulatory policies: (1) inter-platform competition; (2) facilities-based intra-platform competition; and (3) service-based intra-platform competition. In most countries these forms of competition co-exist although their intensity varies from country to country. Intra-platform competition may differ among countries depending on the degree of mandatory access obligations imposed by the regulator on the dominant network firm. Based on a sample of OECD countries, the analysis finds that inter-platform competition has been a main driver of broadband penetration. The two types of intra-platform competition have a considerably smaller effect on the broadband penetration. Linking these findings back to access regulation suggests that the “stepping stone” or “ladder of investment” theories might not provide the justification to impose extensive mandatory access obligations on DSL incumbents.