隐性契约、专用性投资与资本结构

隐性契约以商品所有权分割为存在前提。专用性投资是企业传递履约动机与履约能力信息的重要通道，受资产专用性与隐性负债导致较高债务融资成本的双重约束，专用性投资应主要依靠权益融资。实证研究表明，专用性投资强度与资本结构呈负相关，隐性契约对资本结构产生影响。本文研究结论为企业融资政策选择提供了新依据。     

企业间网络的效率边界:经济组织逻辑的重新审视

企业间网络是一种既不同于市场也不同于企业科层的组织形式，它是一些经过筛选的独立的企业通过正式契约和隐含契约所构成的互相依赖、同担风险的长期合作的交易模式。本文综合交易成本理论以及企业能力理论对影响企业网络边界的因素分别进行了阐释，对资产专用性、企业能力、不确定性等因素对企业边界的影响机制进行了分析。随着资产专用性的逐步提高，在其他条件不变的情况下，交易的治理机制逐步从市场过渡到企业网络，当资产专用性进一步提高时，企业科层将替代企业网络。当企业之间的能力是互补但不相似时，交易将通过企业网络来进行。同时，产品需求的不确定性也将导致企业间网络组织的出现。     

资产专用性、模块化技术与企业边界

交易成本经济学家认为资产专用性决定企业边界，是基于它的独有性。他们否定技术对资产专用性的决定性作用．没有认识到它的技术特征——协同专用性．也就忽视了它的历史局限性。计算机发展的事实说明．呆用模块化技术改变了专用性资产的独有性。模块具有功能的独立性和连接的可分解性；模块化设计使用了分权原则；模块化产品的技术特征是协同非专用性．它适应了消费个性化；因而批量生产转向批量定制。提高产品模块化程度．使协同专用性转向协同非专用性，削弱了资产专用性程度，改变了“资产专用性决定企业边界”的命题．对大型企业重组和改革具有实践意义。     

理解企业外包决策的一个概念框架

企业在进行外包决策时，应该比较外包的总成本与内部生产的总成本。总成本由生产成本、谈判成本和机会主义成本构成。谈判成本和机会主义成本统称治理成本，其大小取决于产品的复杂性、市场的可争夺性和资产专用性三个因素。按照产品复杂性和资产专用性的不同，可以将企业的外包环境分成四种类型，在不同类型的外包环境下，外包企业应该采取不同的措施。     

关系契约与企业网络转型

关系契约是企业网络形成和运行的微观基础，它有两条形成途径：一是由专用性资产而形成的双方依赖．二是动用个体社会资本而锁定双方的关系。相应地，企业网络可分为契约型和关系型两大类。关系型企业网络是中国转型经济的特征，家族企业及其网络的发展和寻租性企业网络的大量出现是转型期的必然现象。关系型企业网络产生的根本原因是中国独特的家族文化。经济转型要求企业网络从关系型向契约型转变，实质就是从关系治理向契约治理的转变。为此，必须从产权和日常管理方面加强对家族企业和国有仓、止的管理。尤其要着力培育宏观社会资本．     

从资产专用性看企业规模

企业的规模是大好,还是小好?“船小好掉头”,“船大好远航”,真正是众说纷纭,令我们莫衷一是,新制度经济学首先从成本的角度来认识企业存在的原因和规模的人小,进而通过分析资产专用特性,从本质上解答了企业规模难题。新制度经济学认为资产具有5种专用性:地理专用性、物理专用性、劳动力专用性、用户专用性和商誉专用性。资产专用性强的企业愿意建造“航空母舰”,而资产专用性弱的企业更希望“企业减肥”。这决非空洞的理论推演,本文作者的实地调研很好地验证了这种观点。     

人力资本治理模式的选择--基于任务复杂性的分析

企业的存在、发展、成熟与衰退的演化过程蕴含着不同特征的任务。本文运用过程与效果两因素将任务的复杂性分成5阶(包括0阶)，深入地剖析了这5阶复杂性任务与资产的专用性，尤其是人力资本的通用性、专用性、专有性及通用的专有性之之间的对应关系，指出复杂性任务与人力资本的不同组合其治理成本存在着差异，其选择的治理模式也应有所不同。在此基础上，推断出相应的理论命题。     

资产专用性视角下的资本结构动态分析

本文按照公司价值最大化思路建立考虑资产专用性和资本成本因素的资本结构动态模型，以资产专用性为视角考察资本结构动态过程的路径和原因。研究表明，资产专用性程度对公司资本结构动态演变的过程和结果都有深刻的影响，权益资本成本和负债资本成本的不同动态特性诱致公司资本结构动态演变。利用中国上市公司财务数据所进行的实证检验结果显著地支持本文的理论模型和结论。     

建设项目交易的资产专用性问题研究

论文以建设项目业主和总承包商之间的交易为研究对象,就建设项目交易资产专用性的界定、存在的误解、测度3个问题进行了探讨。从建设生产特征对其交易资产专用性界定的影响入手,论证了建设项目交易资产专用性主要来源于业主与总承包商间的依赖关系。在逐一分析现有建设项目交易资产专用性界定局限性的基础上,论证了过程专用性的适用性。特别地,对建设项目交易资产专用性界定上的一些错误观念进行了驳斥。通过模型化的建设项目交易准租,提出用区间[CQR-BQR,CQR]来测度建设项目交易资产专用性的大小。     

产品危机中品牌资产的作用研究

品牌资产是企业重要的无形资产,能够为企业带来多方面的积极影响。在频繁爆发的产品危机中,品牌资产是否仍有积极影响？本研究基于两项实验的实证结论表明在产品危机过程中品牌资产是加剧而不是抵御了危机的负面影响。研究发现危机的严重性和群发性特征能够调节品牌资产的作用,并且发现感知期望破坏程度是产品危机中品牌资产对消费者态度变化影响的中介变量。     

Market regulation of voluntary add-on contracts

This paper analyzes contract choices and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies when firms can offer voluntary add-on insurance for their products. We develop a model in which a base product can be sold together with a voluntary extended warranty contract that insures consumers against the risk of product breakdown. Some consumers do not pay attention to extended warranties before making base product choices, but overestimate the value of such warranties at the point of sale. Under retail competition, the consumers’ option to buy multiple base products can endogenously create a base price floor that may prevent firms from redistributing the full warranty profits via loss-leadership. Inducing competition in the warranty market weakly increases consumer welfare and weakly outperforms a minimum warranty standard, which can even reduce consumer surplus. The results are consistent with the effects of recent changes regarding extended warranty regulation by UK legislators.     

关于服饰类奢侈品牌的品牌忠诚度建设探究——以中国奢侈品市场的消费者为例

著名品牌战略专家David Aaker提出了品牌五大资产,即品牌忠诚、品牌知名、品质认知、品牌联想和专有资产。这些资产的总和构成了企业的品牌资产,它可以提升一个产品或服务的价值。其中,品牌忠诚在品牌资产中占有特殊的地位,它是顾客价值和企业价值的载体[1]。随着市场经济的发展,品牌竞争的时代已经到来。品牌忠诚作为企业资产的重要组成部分,可以为企业带来切实的利润增长和竞争优势。任何品牌想要长久立于不败之地,培育消费者长期的品牌忠诚是有效途径,这就需要品牌企业准确地分析行业特征和目标客户群,不断地维护和提升目标消费者的品牌忠诚度。     

Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Contract Variety

We analyze markets with both horizontally and vertically differentiated products under both monopoly and duopoly. In the base model with two consumer types, we identify conditions under which entry prompts an incumbent to expand or contract its low end of the product line. Our analysis offers a novel explanation for the widespread use of ‘fighting brands’ and ‘product line pruning.’ We also extend our analysis to asymmetric firms and three types of consumers and show that depending on the specific environment, entry may lead the incumbent to expand or contract the middle range of its product line (middle contracts). Our results are mainly driven by interactions between horizontal differentiation (competition) and vertical screening of consumers.     

Anti‐Competitive Interconnection: the effects of the elasticity of consumers' expectations and the shape of the network effects function

I find that interconnection might cause the market to be less competitive, and might lead to an increase in the price firms charge for their product. Absent interconnection, firms compete for a consumer for two reasons. The first reason is to obtain revenue from selling the product to a consumer (as in the case without network effects). The second reason is that by expanding the network by one more consumer, the product becomes more attractive to all other consumers. Interconnection eliminates the second reason—when firms interconnect, they are no longer concerned with consumers' following the crowd. I show that consumers and society might be worse off from interconnection. I focus on two factors that make the (post‐interconnection) price increase larger: consumer expectations that are highly sensitive to prices and consumers putting a high value on small increases in network size at the equilibrium market shares. Both of these factors make firms highly competitive, but only if the firms' products' networks are not interconnected.     

The effects of personal information on competition: Consumer privacy and partial price discrimination

This article studies the effects of consumer information on the intensity of competition. In a two dimensional duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation, firms use consumer information to price discriminate. I contrast a full privacy and a no privacy benchmark with intermediate regimes in which the firms can profile consumers only partially. I show that with partial privacy firms are always better-off with price discrimination: the relationship between information and profits is hump-shaped. In particular, competing firms prefer to target consumers with partial but asymmetric information about preferences. Instead, consumers prefer either no or full privacy in aggregate, but the effects of information on individual surplus are ambiguous: there are always winners and losers. Finally, I study the information acquisition incentives of the firms when there is an external data seller. When this upstream data broker holds partially informative data, an exclusive allocation arises. Instead, when data is fully informative, each competitor acquires consumer data but on a different dimension. These findings are relevant for the strategic decisions of firms active in digital markets and contribute to the policy debate surrounding privacy, exclusive access to data and competition.     

Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination

We study competition by firms that simultaneously post (potentially nonlinear) tariffs to consumers who are privately informed about their tastes. Market power stems from informational frictions, in that consumers are heterogeneously informed about firms’ offers. In the absence of regulation, all firms offer quantity discounts. As a result, relative to Bertrand pricing, imperfect competition benefits disproportionately more consumers whose willingness to pay is high, rather than low. Regulation imposing linear pricing hurts the former but benefits the latter consumers. While consumer surplus increases, firms’ profits decrease, enough to drive down utilitarian welfare. By contrast, improvements in market transparency increase utilitarian welfare, and achieve similar gains on consumer surplus as imposing linear pricing, although with limited distributive impact. On normative grounds, our analysis suggests that banning price discrimination is warranted only if its distributive benefits have a weight on the societal objective.     

User Toolkits for Innovation: Consumers Support Each Other

User toolkits for innovation were recently proposed as a means to eliminate (costly) exchange of need-related information between users and manufactures in the product development process. The method transfers certain development tasks to users and thereby empowers them to create their own desired product features. This article examines the implications of different levels of opportunities for consumer involvement (OCI) in product development to learn what happens when firms pass design tasks on to consumers. It explores this issue by studying the relation between the employment of user toolkits and the need for firms to support their consumers. An analysis of 78 computer games products and the amount of support given by firms to the consumers of these products suggests that a share of the costs firms save on information acquisition by letting consumers "do it themselves" may eventually reemerge as costs in consumer support. In other words, an increase in opportunities for consumer involvement seems to increase the need for supporting consumers. A promising solution to the problem of support costs is identified, namely, the establishment of consumer–consumer support interaction. A case study of an outlier in terms of firm support to consumers—Westwood Studios—shows that consumers who use toolkits may be willing to support each other. Such interactive problem solving in a firm-established user community is advantageous to the firm, because the process reduces the amount of resources that the firm itself needs to dedicate to the support of consumers using toolkits. Generally, consumer-to-consumer interaction can facilitate problem-solving in the consumer domain, can aid the diffusion of toolkit related knowledge, and potentially can enhance the outcomes produced by the toolkit approach.     

M&A advisory and the merger review process

Two firms propose a merger to the antitrust authority. They are uninformed about the efficiencies generated by the merger, but can hire an expert to gather information on their behalf. The authority is also uninformed about the merger’s efficiencies, but can run a costly internal investigation to learn them. We analyze the effect of the disclosure of the expert’s contract on consumer welfare, and show that consumers are not necessarily better off with disclosure. This possibility result hinges on a free-riding problem between expert and authority in the information acquisition game, and is more relevant in highly competitive industries.     

固定资产处理在会计和税法上的异同

由于固定资产是企业生存、发展的基础,它的计价与核算对会计利润、所得税的影响相当大.会计利润根据《企业会计制度》的规定对固定资产进行折旧计提,在计算企业应交所得税时,则根据《企业所得税前扣除办法》的规定进行核算.所以为了更好地了解有必要对财务会计和所得税会计在固定资产处理方面比较异同.